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Abstract 
Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes Used  
for Cyber Situation Assessment 
Thomas Heverin 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this dissertation research was to examine the information behaviors and 
cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders when completing cyber situation 
assessment tasks (SA-tasks) of different complexities. Theoretical propositions from 
Library and Information Science (LIS) task-complexity research and the Cognitive 
Continuum Theory (CCT) informed the theoretical framework. LIS task-complexity 
research predicts that increased task complexity results in numerous changes in 
information-source and information-type use.  The CCT predicts that increased task 
complexity results in a shift from analytical to intuitive cognition.   
A multiple-case studies design was selected as the research approach. The Critical 
Decision Method served as the basis for semi-structured, retrospective interviews 
conducted with 21 expert cyber defenders from small defense companies. The data 
analysis techniques included directed content analysis, pattern matching, and statistical 
analysis (the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s Exact test).  
 
The main findings of this study are as cyber SA-task complexity increased, the expert 
cyber defenders sought more technical information, used more external sources, 
including external experts, and based their information behaviors on intuitive cognition.  
These findings support several of the theoretical predictions from LIS task-complexity 
research and the CCT.  
x 
 
 
The findings are important because they show that the expert cyber defenders base their 
information behaviors on years of experience in the cyber defense domain and on years 
of experience in designing their own companies’ security postures. Each company has its 
own security posture as well as its own level of acceptance of risk. Therefore, cyber 
situation assessment tools need a design that can be tailored for each company. 
Additionally, methods are needed to elicit the intuitive processes used by expert cyber 
defenders in order to train novice cyber defenders as well as other expert cyber 
professionals taking over the experts’ localized cyber defense roles.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Threat of Cyber Attacks 
Cyber attacks represent a considerable threat to national security and American 
business interests. Cyber attacks can cause serious consequences such as the disruption of 
military and other critical operations, theft of intellectual property, loss of revenue, and 
even loss of life.  Criminal groups, hackers, terrorists, and even nation states make use of 
various types of cyber attacks to “…compromise information or adversely affect 
computers, software, a network, an organization’s operation, an industry, or the Internet 
itself” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013, p. 6).  According to the recent 
Worldwide Assessment of Global Threats given by the U.S. Director of National 
Intelligence (2013) , cyber attacks represent the number one threat to the U.S. The threat 
posed by cyber attacks toped threats such as terrorism and transnational crime, weapons 
of mass destruction, and North Korea’s nuclear stance (Clapper, 2013).   
All types of companies have fallen victims to cyber attacks. Recent examples 
include the Target Corporation’s data breach1 and University of Maryland’s data breach2.  
U.S. government agencies and defense companies have increasingly become targets of 
cyber attacks. A recent report shows a 782 percent increase in the number of cyber 
attacks that targeted government agencies from 2006 to 2012 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2013).  Companies that work with the U.S. government especially 
the Department of Defense (DoD) have also been targeted by cyber attacks. For example, 
one defense company faced a three-year long cyber intrusion in which all of the 
                                                          
1
 https://corporate.target.com/about/shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-FAQ 
2
 http://www.umd.edu/datasecurity/ 
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company’s computers and research were compromised3.  This dissertation research 
focused on small defense companies, companies with less than 500 employees that hold 
contracts to work with the DoD. Small businesses companies represent one of the largest 
growth areas for cyber attacks (Symantec Corporation, 2013).   
1.2 Cyber Defenders and Cyber Defense 
Companies and government agencies employ cyber professionals to defend and 
protect networks as well as national security information. These professionals hold titles 
such as network administrator, information security manager, network security engineer, 
intrusion detection team member, information assurance analyst, and computer network 
defense analyst (D’Amico & Whitley, 2008; Paul & Whitley, 2013). This dissertation 
research uses the term “cyber defender” to capture all of the above mentioned roles. This 
term has been used in previous research (D’Amico & Whitley, 2008). Depending on the 
size of a company, cyber defenders may work alone or work on teams to detect and 
analyze cyber attacks. This dissertation research focused on cyber defenders who hold the 
sole responsibility of defending their company’s networks and resources from cyber 
attacks. This type of cyber defender completes tasks for the entire cycle of cyber defense. 
In contrast, cyber defenders who work on cyber defense teams may not complete tasks 
for the entire cycle of cyber defense and therefore may only hold a partial view of cyber 
defense. Only cyber defenders who hold the sole responsibility of protecting their 
companies’ networks were selected to participate in this study.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2012) defines the 
main tasks of the cyber defense cycle as  Preparation; Detection and Analysis; 
                                                          
3
 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-01/china-cyberspies-outwit-u-s-stealing-military-
secrets.html 
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Containment, Eradication and Recovery; and Post-Incident Activity. These main tasks are 
displayed in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Cyber Defense Tasks from NIST (2012, p. 21) 
 
 
 
The Preparation task consists of cyber defenders ensuring systems, networks, and 
applications are secure to prevent cyber attacks. This task also consists of formulating 
policies and plans for cyber attack response. The Detection and Analysis task consists of 
cyber defenders monitoring intrusion and detection systems (IDS), intrusion detection 
and prevention systems (IDPS), antivirus software, and network device logs for 
suspicious activity. This task also involves analyzing signals that might indicate an attack 
is taking place. Upon detecting an attack, a cyber defender gathers more information 
about the attack, identifies systems impacted by the attack, assesses the severity of the 
attack, and assesses the damage caused by the attack as well as potential damage.  
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The Containment, Eradication, and Recovery task focuses on containing the 
attack to limit its impact, eradicating malicious components of the attack, and then 
restoring systems to normal operation. Finally, the Post-Incident Activity task involves 
developing lessons learned and retaining evidence. The cyber defense tasks are iterative 
as represented by arrows in Figure 1.  
1.3 Cyber Situation Assessment  
The cyber defense task of detecting and analyzing cyber attacks is also called the 
situation assessment task (SA-task) or “cyber situation assessment” task (Barford et al., 
2010; Cichonski et al., 2012; A. D’Amico, Whitley, Tesone, O’Brien, & Roth, 2005).  
The SA-task is an information intensive task that consists of  viewing an initial set of 
information about a situation, evaluating and selecting information sources, and 
integrating new information into existing evidence (Ben-bassat & Freedy, 1982; 
Gorodetsky, Karsaev, & Samoilov, 2005). The SA-task involves identifying and 
clarifying the state of a problem including why the situation appears the way it does, the 
risks of the situation, and actions that can minimize these risks (Kirillov, 1994; D. Noble, 
1993; Salas, Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010). Completing the SA-task leads to obtaining 
situation awareness (Endsley, 2000).  
Cyber defenders face various challenges when completing the SA-task. Cyber 
defenders must review massive amounts of data from multiple sources to determine if an 
attack is taking place and to understand characteristics of the attack. The abundance of 
data needed to be reviewed results in data overload for the cyber defenders  (A. D’Amico 
et al., 2005; Erbacher, Frincke, Wong, Moody, & Fink, 2010; Tyworth, Giacobe, 
Mancuso, & Dancy, 2012; Yen et al., 2010).  In addition to facing data overload, cyber 
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defenders need to fuse data from complex sources including internal sources and external 
sources (A. D’Amico et al., 2005; Goodall, Lutters, & Komlodi, 2009).  The information 
gathered from these sources often contains a high level of uncertainty (Yen et al., 2010) 
and a high level of deception (Tyworth et al., 2012). Another challenge for cyber 
defenders when completing the SA-task consists of the uniqueness of each cyber attack. 
The uniqueness of each attack makes it difficult for cyber defenders to use information 
found on previous attacks to respond to a current attack (A. D’Amico et al., 2005; 
Erbacher et al., 2010). Additionally, cyber attacks are dynamic and change over time 
even when being analyzed by cyber defenders (Tyworth et al., 2012; Yen et al., 2010).   
Several automated techniques have been developed to assist cyber defenders in 
completing the SA-task. Examples of these techniques include information fusion (Sabata 
& Ornes, 2006), clustering (Kang & Mayfield, 2003), ontology reasoning (Anita 
D’Amico, Buchanan, Goodall, & Walczak, 2009), machine learning algorithms (Stroeh, 
Mauro Madeira, & Goldenstein, 2013), and network visualization techniques (Holsopple 
et al., 2010). Although automated solutions can help cyber defenders complete the SA-
task, these automated solutions often ignore the importance of the human elements of 
cyber security including communication, collaboration, cognitive processes, and 
information behaviors (Forsythe, Silva, Stevens-Adams, & Bradshaw, 2012; Knott et al., 
2013; McNeese et al., 2012; Paul & Whitley, 2013).  As a result, more research is needed 
on the human side of cyber security.  
1.4 Theoretical Approach 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) research focuses on the human elements of 
decision making in contexts with high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty. 
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Situation assessment has been found to be a critical process for expert decision makers in 
NDM contexts (Klein, 1993).  NDM situation assessment research has demonstrated that 
experts seek more information than novices when completing the SA-task (R. Lipshitz & 
Shaul, 1997) and base their information behaviors on intuitive cognition (David F. Noble, 
Boehm-Davis, & Grosz, 1986).  However, NDM situation assessment research lacks a 
theoretical foundation for testing predictions in information behavior and cognitive 
modes used by experts when completing SA-tasks of different complexities. In this 
dissertation research, information behavior is defined as “how people need, seek, 
manage, give, and use information in different contexts” (Fisher, Erdelez, & McKechnie, 
2005, p. xix) 
Library and Information Science (LIS) task-complexity research (Byström & 
Järvelin, 1995) provides a theoretical approach for examining the information behaviors 
used by expert cyber defenders when completing SA-tasks of different complexities. 
Additionally, the Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT) (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & 
Pearson, 1997) provides a theoretical approach for examining the cognitive modes used 
by expert cyber defenders when completing SA-tasks of different complexities.  The 
theoretical predictions of LIS task-complexity research and the CCT were tested in this 
dissertation research in the context of cyber situation assessment.  
1.5 Research Questions 
The purpose of this dissertation research was to test the theoretical propositions of 
LIS task-complexity research and the CCT in the context of cyber situation assessment. 
The broad research question for this dissertation research included: 
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How does situation-assessment task complexity influence information behaviors 
and cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders in the context of cyber situation 
assessment?  
More specifically, this dissertation research focused on the following:  
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the information 
behaviors of expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment 
tasks?  
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the cognitive modes 
used by expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment tasks? 
LIS task-complexity research states the following: as task complexity increases 
the number of information sources used, the use of external sources, the use of people as 
sources, the use of experts as source, and the use of problem solving/domain information 
increase (Byström & Järvelin, 1995).  The CCT states that low task complexity induces 
the use of analytical cognition (step-by-step, deliberate processing) and high task 
complexity induces the use of intuitive cognition (automatic, non-conscious processing) 
while medium task complexity induces a mix of analytical and intuitive cognition (quasi-
rational cognition) (Hammond et al., 1997). 
1.6 Significance of the Dissertation Research   
The findings of this dissertation research will further our understanding of how 
situation assessments are formed in NDM contexts. The information behaviors and 
cognitive modes used for situation assessments have not been examined together in NDM 
situation assessment research. The findings of this dissertation research will be compared 
to NDM situation assessment research conducted in contexts such as U.S. Navy ship 
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warfare and submarine warfare. This dissertation study shows how LIS theory can be 
incorporated with theory from other fields, as in the case of the CCT from cognitive 
psychology, to examine decision-making processes in real world contexts. 
The findings of this dissertation research will also further our understanding of 
information behaviors used by professionals in contexts with high stakes, high time 
pressure, and high uncertainty, contexts not typically focused on in LIS research. 
Additionally, the theoretical propositions posed by LIS task-complexity research and the 
CCT have yet to be tested in the context of cyber defense. LIS task-complexity research 
has primarily focused on non-NDM contexts such as public administration. Additionally 
this dissertation research will further our understanding of information behaviors of a 
specific group of professionals not previously studied in LIS research – expert cyber 
defenders.  
Significance for Cyber Defense Training   
Current cyber defense training relies on traditional, instructor-led classroom 
training. The dissertation findings suggest that this traditional training may not work for 
all SA-tasks. For example, this dissertation’s findings suggest that for SA-tasks with low 
complexity, cyber defenders follow a step-by-step deliberative process. For these low 
complexity SA-tasks, traditional, instructor-led classroom training may be sufficient. 
However, the dissertation findings also suggest that for SA-tasks with high complexity, 
the expert cyber defenders follow a more non-conscious, intuitive process. Therefore, the 
traditional cyber defense training method may not appropriate for these tasks. Instructor-
led classroom training does not allow decision makers to develop situation assessment 
skills needed to complete complex SA-tasks. As a result, training methods need to be 
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developed to help novice cyber professionals acquire situation assessment skills to face 
the complexities of cyber defense. Previous methods applied in other NDM contexts that 
may prove effective in cyber defense include training higher order cognitive skills, 
training on using critical cues, and providing situation assessment feedback (Salas, 
Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995) along with scenario-based training (Oser, Gualtieri, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1999). 
Significance for System Design 
The findings of the dissertation research suggest the need for secure, collaborative 
information seeking and sharing tools. For SA-tasks with high complexity, the 
dissertation findings showed that expert cyber defenders relied heavily on the research 
conducted by external experts and that expert cyber defenders reached out to 
communicate directly with external experts. However, none of the expert cyber defenders 
stated the use of secure, collaborative information seeking or sharing tools. Rather the 
expert cyber defenders relied on general instant messaging tools (such as Yahoo or 
Google), forums, blogs, and email to share and exchange information. With these 
communication channels, the experts found it difficult to share confidential or non- 
identifiable information. Secure, collaborative information seeking and sharing tools are 
needed to provide cyber defenders the capability of exchanging confidential information 
with trusted external experts.  
1.7 Need for Research in Cyber Situation Assessment  
The need for research on the cyber situation assessment has been evidenced by 
several recent DoD requests for proposals (RFPs). Table 1 shows recent examples of 
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DoD RFPs that focus on the cyber situation assessment as well as the cognitive processes 
used in cyber defense.   
 
 
Table 1  
Department of Defense Requests for Proposals Related to Dissertation Research 
Topic Name/Number Agency Description 
Effective Cyber Situation 
Awareness (CSA) 
Assessment and Training / 
OSD12-T08 
Office of the 
Secretary of 
Defense 
The goal of this project is to develop a 
novel human-in-the loop simulation 
and assessment system for cyber 
situation awareness and for assisting 
cyber analyst training 
Cognitive Modeling for 
Cyber Defense / N132-132 
U.S. Navy Modeling the complex cognitive 
processes involved in cyber defense. 
The modeling includes cues, features, 
and characteristics monitored by 
defenders and attackers. 
Adaptive, Immersive 
Training to Counter 
Deception and Denial 
Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTPs) for 
C4ISR / AF141-031 
U.S. Air Force The goal of this project is to develop a 
cyber-training environment that 
represents current actual environments 
(high stakes, high uncertainty, and high 
deception) and that includes current 
cognitive science developments. 
Enhancing Intuitive 
Decision Making Through 
Implicit Learning / 
ONRBAA012-011 
Office of Naval 
Research 
The expected results of this research 
include laying the scientific foundation 
for understanding intuitive decision 
making that support warfare areas 
including cyber warfare. 
 
 
 
The findings of this dissertation can contribute to improving cyber defense efforts 
in protecting national security information and American business interests.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The NDM research paradigm is used in this dissertation because it focuses 
explicitly on how experts make decisions in contexts with high stakes, high time 
pressure, and high uncertainty, contexts similar to cyber defense. This literature review 
provides an overview of NDM research including the Recognition Primed Decision 
(RPD) Model (Klein, 1993) and situation assessment research (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 
1997). Although, NDM situation assessment research focuses on information behaviors 
as well as the cognitive basis of these behaviors, this line of research lacks a theoretical 
foundation for testing predictions on how task complexity influences information 
behavior and cognitive modes used by experts when completing SA-tasks.  LIS task-
complexity research (Byström & Järvelin, 1995) provides a theoretical framework for 
examining differences in information behaviors  used  by expert cyber defenders for 
completing SA-tasks of different complexities. The CCT (Hammond et al., 1997) 
provides a theoretical framework for examining the differences in cognitive modes used  
by expert cyber defenders when completing SA-tasks of different complexities.   
2.1 Naturalistic Decision Making  
Decision making research has evolved from studies that focused on simulated 
tasks completed by novice research participants in controlled laboratory studies (classical 
decision making) to studies that focused on complex, real world tasks completed by 
experts (naturalistic decision making) (Randel, Pugh, & Reed, 1996). A description of the 
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evolution from classical decision making to naturalistic decision making is provided 
below.  
2.1.1 Classical Decision-making Description  
Through the 1970’s classical decision making research (also labeled as rational 
decision making research) focused on experimental laboratory studies and developed 
models based on formal or mathematical foundations such as Bayesian probability theory 
and decision theory (Nemeth & Klein, 2011). Lipshitz et al. (2001, p. 333) stated that 
classical decision making research contained four essential characteristics: choice 
(choosing among alternatives), input-output orientation (predicting which alternative a 
decision maker will choose), comprehensiveness (a deliberate process requiring complete 
information for optimal performance), and formalism (the establishment of quantitative 
models).  In this approach, an ideal decision maker selects the optimal choice from an 
array of concurrent options after reviewing all information about each option. Following 
this way is the “rational” way (Beach & Lipshitz, 1993, p. 22). 
Classical decision making assumes that choices are clearly defined, information is 
fully available, goals are isolated, and that probabilities can be accurately estimated 
(Klein & Calderwood, 1991). Additionally, Randel , Pugh, and Reed (1996) stated that 
classical decision making focused on well defined problems and relatively stable 
environments. A major strength of the classical decision making approach includes 
demonstrating its applicability across a wide range of domains and developing powerful 
techniques for improving decision quality where feasible (Klein & Calderwood, 1991). 
Examples of classical decision making approaches include multi-attribute utility analysis 
(Edwards and Newman, 1982) and elimination by aspects (Tversky, 1972). 
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2.1.2 Naturalistic Decision-making Description  
In the classical decision making research, NDM contexts (contexts that contain 
high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty) were not touched (Hammond, 
1988). However, in naturalistic contexts, early research indicated that decision makers 
were not following the rational approach as predicted by classical decision making 
(Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989); rather, expert decision makers were following 
an intuitive decision making approach.  Prior to the late 1980s and early 1990s, intuitive 
decision-making was not considered to be serious concept in classical decision making 
research. Intuitive decision making was viewed as reliable as flipping a coin (Simpson, 
2001).  
To address the early findings that showed that experts were using intuitive 
decision making in contexts with high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty, 
researchers started to develop the NDM approach. NDM evolved rapidly starting in the 
late 1980s (Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Raanan Lipshitz et al., 2001; Simpson, 2001).  The 
accidental shooting down of an Iranian commercial aircraft by the USS Vincennes, a U.S. 
Aegis guided missile cruiser, in 1988 created a strong interest in NDM from the U.S. 
military. After that incident, the U.S. Navy, as well as the U.S. Army, sought to improve 
decision making in high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty situations 
(Klein, 2008; Schraagen, Browne, & Hoffman, 2008). The U.S. Army sponsored the first 
NDM conference in 1989 as well as other research efforts.  Additional research funding 
and support for the NDM has come from the Office of Naval Research, the U.S. Marine 
Corps, the Army Research Institute, the Army Research Laboratory, the Human 
Effectiveness Directorate of the U.S. Air Force, and the National Aeronautics and Space 
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Administration (NASA) (Schraagen et al., 2008). NDM has been incorporated into the 
following military doctrine and training (Klein, 2008): 
 U.S. Army Field Manual on Command and Control 
 U.S. Marine Corps planning guidance 
 Tactical mission planning for the Swedish Armed Forces 
 Recommendations for training decision making and cognitive skills based on 
NDM studies with the U.S. Navy – Tactical Decision Making Under Stress 
(TADMUS) 
The goal of NDM research is to understand how decision makers handle difficult 
cognitive demands of their work in naturalistic contexts (Cannon-Bowers, Pruitt, & Salas, 
1996; Schraagen et al., 2008). NDM research encompasses the skills, knowledge, and 
experience of decision makers, aims to improve expert decision making, aims to help 
non-experts achieve expertise faster, and emphasizes the cognitive processes used by 
decision makers (Schraagen et al., 2008). Rather than focusing on novices, NDM 
research focuses on experts  (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1996).  
There are several NDM models. From a review of nine different NDM models 
that were developed in parallel, Lipshitz (1993) summarized the main tenants of the 
models as follows:  experts use prior experience to make decisions rather than generating 
and comparing options;  experts form situation assessments before making a decisions; 
and experts rely on prototypes of situations to make decisions (Klein, 2008). Three NDM 
approaches are discussed in this dissertation research: the RPD Model (Klein, 1993),  
NDM situation assessment research (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; David F. Noble et al., 
1986), and the CCT (Hammond et al., 1997) . These NDM approaches were developed 
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based on studies focusing on the decision making of experts such as Navy commanders, 
nuclear power plant operators, fire-ground commanders, Army small unit leaders, 
airplane pilots, highway engineers, and nurses.  
2.2 Recognition Primed Decision Model 
2.2.1 RPD Model Background  
The RPD Model often serves as the prototypical NDM model (Flin, Slaven, & 
Stewart, 1996; Raanan Lipshitz et al., 2001). The RPD Model focuses explicitly on 
decision making in situations with three attributes: high time pressure, high level of 
expertise, and high consequences. At the time that the RPD Model was developed, 
previous research  decision making research focused on situations without low time 
pressure, naïve decision makers (college students trained on new tasks), and laboratory 
studies which lacked  high consequences (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 2010). 
Klein  (1993, pp. 143–144) stated that the RPD Model is different from other decision 
models in that:  
 The RPD Model focuses on situation assessment and not decision events. 
 The RPD Model describes how people bring their experience to bear on a 
decision.  
 The RPD Model relies on satisficing rather than optimizing.  
 The RPD Model asserts that experienced decision makers evaluate an option 
by conducting mental simulations of a course of action to see if it will work, 
rather than contrasting strengths and weaknesses of different options.  
In the RPD Model, decision makers first assess a situation (complete the SA-task) 
and then select an action that is believed to be most appropriate based on that assessment 
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(McLennan & Omodei, 1996).  The SA-task completion is based on recognizing a current 
situation as being similar to a previous situation. This is labeled as “recognitional 
decision making”. Recognitional decision making has be found to hold three forms 
(Kaempf, Klein, Thorsden, & Wolf, 1996):  
 Simple Match: the decision maker recognizes the situation as familiar or 
typical allowing the decision maker to make a rapid decision.  
 Developing a Course of Action: in this situation, the decision maker appraises 
courses of action by selecting the first one that can work and then running a 
mental simulation of what the outcome would be. This is done through serial 
evaluation of options rather than concurrent evaluation.  
 Complex RPD Strategy: in this situation, the decision maker encounters an 
unfamiliar situation. When facing an unfamiliar situation, the decision maker 
reassesses the situation and tries to find more information. Once the situation 
is recognized as similar to a previous one, the decision maker conducts the 
mental simulation, modifies as necessary, and then implements the decision.  
In the RPD Model, the process of completing the SA-task consists of 
understanding the goals that can be accomplished based on the situation, increasing the 
salience of important cues in the situation (though information seeking), forming 
expectations which can be used to conduct a check on the situation assessment, and 
identifying typical actions to take (Klein, 1993, p. 142). A decision makers’ experience 
developed over time allows him or her to effectively complete SA-tasks.  
2.2.2Review of RPD Model Studies  
Foundational Study  
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The foundational study that provided the initial formation of the RPD Model 
focused on the decision making of fire ground commanders (leaders at the scene of a fire 
who determine where to send personnel and equipment to fight fires) (Klein, 
Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). The CDM served as the interview protocol 
surrounding 32 critical incidents discussed by 26 fire ground commanders who had an 
average of 23 years of experience (Klein et al., 2010). The researchers expected the fire 
ground commanders to prescribe to the classical decision making perspective of 
concurrent option evaluation. However, the results provided almost no evidence to 
support this classical decision making research perspective (Klein et al., 2010).  
The researchers found that rather than trying to assess concurrent options the fire 
ground commanders attempted to first form a situation assessment. When forming a 
situation assessment, the fire ground commanders attempted to match the current 
situation with situations they had faced in the past. Upon recognizing a situation as 
similar to a previous one, the fire ground commanders selected the first course of action 
that came to mind. The researchers labeled this as “recognitional decision making” and 
found that that 80% of the fire ground commanders’ decisions were recognition-based 
while only 12% consisted of option deliberation (Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2009).  
Support for the RPD Model  
Support for the RPD Model has come from many studies in the military domain. 
For example, Kaempf et al. (1996) examined how 20 experienced U.S. Navy officers 
(officers that led anti-air warfare teams on a U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser) made complex 
decisions in a high time pressure, high stakes environment. The researchers found that the 
Navy officers worked in an environment in which doctrine and rules of engagement 
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controlled actions. In order to determine the appropriate course of action, the officers had 
to determine what type of situation they were facing.  The researchers found that the 
officers used a recognitional decision strategy in 95% of the actions taken.  
Numerous other studies have the shown the dominance of recognitional decision 
making used by various types of experts in NDM contexts including Army officers in 
command and control situations (Pascual & Henderson, 1997), Navy officers in the 
Combat Information Center (CIC) of a Navy cruiser (Kaempf, Wolf, & Miller, 1993), 
highly experienced nurses in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) (Crandall & 
Calderwood, 1989), and off-shore emergency response team leaders responding to 
emergencies (Flin et al., 1996).  
Recognitional vs. Analytical Strategies  
Several differences have been found in outcomes when using recognitional-
primed decision-making strategies vs. rational decision-making strategies. Johnston, 
Driskell, and Salas (1997) examined the decision making of 90 U.S. Navy enlisted 
personnel in a technical training school. The participants performed a simulation of a 
naval command and control task (identifying unknown air, surface, and sub-surface 
contacts) and were trained on using either recognitional-primed decision making 
strategies or rational decision making strategies.  For the recognitional-primed decision 
making strategies, the participants were trained on scanning the information needed to 
assess a threat, scanning information in any sequence, rapidly attending to specific data 
points, and reviewing needed information only when required (Johnston et al., 1997, p. 
617).  For the rational decision making strategy, the participants were trained on scanning 
all available information, scanning information in a systematic manner, devoting a 
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consistent amount of attention to each data point, and reviewing all alternatives before 
making a decision.  
The results showed that when facing a naturalistic task (a task with high stakes, 
high time pressure, and high uncertainty) military personnel trained with the 
recognitional-primed decision making strategy outperformed those trained on analytical 
decision making strategies (Johnston et al., 1997). Similarly, Driscoll, Salas, and Hall 
(1994) also found that Navy officers who were trained to systematically review all 
available information prior to making a decision showed degraded performance when 
compared to Navy officers who were trained on using recognitional-primed decision 
strategies. 
RPD Model:  Novices vs. Experts 
Differences between recognitional decision-making have been found between 
experts and novices. Randel, Pugh, and Reed (1996) studied the decision-making 
processes used by 28 U.S. Navy electronic warfare technicians. There were three 
categories of participants: novices, intermediates, and experts. The researchers found that 
the intermediates and experts focused primarily on the SA-task while the novices focused 
more on selecting a course of action. In a study on tank platoon commanders, Brezovic, 
Klein, and Thorsden (1990) identified command decisions and environmental features of 
the situations encountered by the novice and expert commanders. The researchers found 
that both the novices and experts (nine instructors) placed attention on the same 
environmental cues; however, the novices tended to misinterpret the importance of the 
cues (Brezovic et al., 1990). The researchers posited that novices used conscious 
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deliberation when they lacked the experience to recognize a situation. It was observed 
that students would even stop in the middle of the battlefield to deliberate possible COAs.   
2.2.3 Limitations of the RPD Model 
One criticism of the RPD Model is that it does not necessarily fit across all 
situations and therefore lacks generalizability (Joshua Klayman, 2001; Patel, Kaufman, & 
Arocha, 2002). However, the RPD Model does not attempt to generalize across all 
situations; rather the use of the RPD Model focuses on situations in which the decision 
maker is experienced, time pressure is high, and the conditions are unstable (Klein, 
1993). Additionally, the RPD strategy has been found to not be appropriate to follow for 
all tasks. For example, the RPD strategy may not be well suited for tasks that require 
optimizing rather than satisficing, tasks requiring decisions to be justified, tasks requiring 
agreement from multiple stakeholders, and tasks where the level of expertise is low 
(Klein & Crandall, 1996).  
The RPD Model suggests that information seeking only comes into play for the  
Complex RPD Strategy of the RPD Model when experts face unfamiliar situations 
(Kaempf et al., 1996). However, NDM situation assessment research shows that experts 
seek more information than novices even when forming situation assessments even when 
the experts have experienced the same type of situation in the past (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 
1997). The RPD Model cannot adequately explain these findings on the information 
behaviors of experts. The RPD Model posits that the experts would not need to seek 
information when facing a situation that they faced before. NDM research that focuses on 
situation assessment attempts to resolve this issue.  
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 2.3 NDM Situation Assessment Research 
2.3.1 Situation Assessment Background  
Situation assessment is viewed as crucial for decision making in NDM contexts 
(David F. Noble et al., 1986; Salas et al., 2010; Simpson, 2001). Situation assessment can 
be viewed as the process that leads to the situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; 2005; 
Randel et al., 1996). Forming a situation assessment is called completing a “situation 
assessment task” (David F. Noble et al., 1986). Ben-bassat and Freedy consider this task 
to be a “puzzle building task” as decision makers put together pieces of information to 
understand a situation (1982, p. 489). The SA-task consists of viewing initial information 
about a situation, evaluating and selecting sources, and integrating new information into 
existing evidence (Ben-bassat & Freedy, 1982; Gorodetsky et al., 2005). Several NDM 
situation assessment studies have examined information behaviors of experts and several 
studies have conceptualized the cognition underlying this information behavior.  
2.3.2 Situation Assessment and Information Behaviors   
Several NDM studies have examined the situation assessment processes of 
experts, which include information behaviors. Kaempf et al. (1996) examined how 20 
experienced U.S. Navy officers responded to complex situations in a ship’s CIC. The 
researchers found that most actions taken by the Navy officers focused on acquiring more 
information about potential threats in order to form a situation assessment. The experts 
also sought information about internal resources to make sure potential actions could be 
carried out. For example, they sought information about whether Navy aircraft had 
enough fuel and weapons to carry out a mission. The results supported Cohen et al.’s 
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(1994) analysis on battle commanders which found that intricate situation assessments 
formed by experts were critical for successful mission accomplishment.  
Some studies have shown that expert decision makers place a greater emphasis on 
developing a situation assessment than novices. In a study on U.S. Navy electronic 
warfare technicians, Randel et al. (1996) examined the differences in SA-task completion 
by experts and novices. The findings showed that the experts placed a greater emphasis 
on the SA-task while the novices placed a greater emphasis on deciding on a COA.  The 
researchers suggested that the experts concentrated on getting the situation assessed 
correctly and then once the situation was understood correctly they could react quickly 
(Randel et al., 1996). In a study on U.S. Marines in a battle command-post scenario, 
Kobus, Proctor, Bank, and Holste (2001) also found that novices spent more time 
deliberating over a COA while experts spent more time trying to understand the situation. 
These results aligned with Orasanu and Connolly’s (1993) position that experts focus 
more on the SA-task than novices. 
The differences in information behavior between experts and novices for situation 
assessment have also been examined in NDM contexts. Lipshitz and Shaul (1997) 
examined the differences in the information sought for the SA-task between expert and 
novice Navy commanders facing gun boat situations. The researchers found that the 
expert commanders collected more information for the SA-task than the novice 
commanders. The researchers stated that the novices were more likely to make decisions 
based on what was given to them rather than actively seeking more information as the 
experts did. Other research has also shown that experts collect far more information about 
a situation prior to making a decision when compared to novices as in the case of battle 
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planners  facing a Persian Gulf  wartime scenario (Serfaty, MacMillan, Entin, & Entin, 
1997). 
Experts also tend to look for different types of information for situation 
assessment than novices. In an anti-submarine warfare scenario, Kirschenbaum  (1992) 
found that experts used more raw, unprocessed data than computer processed information 
(the system calculating the speed of an unknown contact).  In a study on weather 
forecasters, Pliske, Crandall, & Klein (2004) also found that experts not only relied on 
computer models but also relied on sub-elements of the model to find data that they 
needed. Other research has shown that experts seek more information from more sources 
on more varied aspects of the situation (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; Pliske et al., 2004). 
Research has also shown that experts can better organize information than novices (Waag 
& Bell, 1997) and that experts conduct more directed information searching than novices 
(Kirschenbaum, 1992).  
Overall, these studies show that experts, when facing complex NDM contexts,  
placed a great emphasis on the SA-task and seek a lot of information (as compared to 
novices) to complete the SA-task. Simpson (2001) posited that expert decision makers 
know how much information they need to make a correct situation assessment while 
novices might not know what information is missing resulting in less information being 
sought by novices. Additionally, even though experts and novices may view the same 
information, experts can see more complexity in the situation than novices (Serfaty et al., 
1997).  Noble et al. (1986) and Lipshitz and Shaul (1997) posit that schemas, cognitive 
structures developed through years of experience, guide experts in their information 
behavior. This concept is discussed in more detail in the next section.  
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2.3.2 Situation Assessment and Cognition  
As stated before, the RPD model cannot accurately explain why experts require 
more information to complete a SA-task than novices (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997). Noble 
et al. (1986) and Lipshitz and Shaul (1997) conceptualize the schema serve as a way for 
explaining this information behavior. In the NDM perspective, experts complete SA-tasks 
based on schema that have developed through years of experience. Lipshitz and Shaul 
(1997, p. 295) define schema as  “situation or domain specific cognitive structures that 
(a) direct external information search, (b) specify which available information will be 
attended to and which information will be ignored, (c) organize information in memory, 
(d) direct the retrieval of information from memory, and (e) become more differentiated 
as a function of experience.”  Schema allow experts to determine which information is 
missing, where it can be obtained, and how to organize information in a meaningful way 
(R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; D. Noble, 1985; Serfaty et al., 1997).  According to Elliot 
(2005, p. 215) “A schema helps determine what we attend to, what we perceive, and what 
we remember and infer.”   
 (Elliott, 2005, p. 12) provides an overview of this NDM perspective on schema 
and information behaviors for completing SA-tasks in NDM contexts as compares this 
perspective to the RPD Model.  
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Figure 2. Schema-based Model of the RPD Model (Elliott, 2005, p. 12) 
 
 
 
The schema-based model on the right side of shows that as experts identify cues 
in the environment of a situation, schema are activated which guide their information 
behaviors.  Once the situation is recognized as being familiar to a previous situation 
encountered, a mental model is created which allows the expert to run a simulation in his 
or her head, which then leads to a decision being made and then implemented.  
When schema are used by expert decision makers, several researchers have 
conceptualized that the expert decision makers are using intuitive cognition – 
unconscious, recognition-based information processing. Some researchers have 
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conceptualized the direct link between schema and intuitive cognition. Noble, Boeman-
Davis, and Grosz (1986, p. 61) state: 
“Schema for situation assessment support "intuitive" decision making. This kind 
of decision-making is based on recognizing that an observed situation is similar to 
other situations in which particular decisions or strategies generally work well. 
"Intuitive" decision making requires data in memory that supports the necessary 
similarity assessment.”  
This means that expert decision makers use their memory to form situation 
assessments. For example, if a decision maker faces a situation that matches the 
properties of a situation that is stored in the decision maker’s memory, the previous 
situation becomes “strongly activated” in the decision maker’s mind and guides task 
completion (Zsambok, Beach, & Klein, 1992). When a new or unfamiliar situation fails 
to match properties of a similar situation, the decision maker matches features of similar 
situations or modifies the response of a previous situation. Schema provide the basis of 
expert performance by enabling experts “to recognize the similarity between new and 
previously experience situations and to adapt old procedures for new situations” (D.F. 
Noble, 1989, p. 473).  
Cohen et al. (1994, p. 73) explicitly stated how structures within an expert 
decision maker’s memory (called knowledge structures) are connected with intuitive 
cognition: “Intuitive processing tends to involve domain-specific knowledge structures 
that are developed through experience.” Cohen et al. (1994) differentiates between 
domain-specific knowledge structures and general-purpose knowledge structures. 
Intuitive processing consists of using domain-specific knowledge structures drawn out 
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over time through experience while analytical processing consists of using general-
purpose knowledge structures learned through instruction. The intuitive processing and 
analytical processing described by Cohen et al. (1994)  are synonymous with Hammond’s 
(Hammond et al., 1997) descriptions of intuitive cognition and analytical cognition 
respectively.  
In the NDM situation assessment perspective, schema are developed over time 
and through experience. When expert decision makers use the schema for situation 
assessment and information behaviors, they are relying on intuitive cognition.  
2.3.3 Limitations of Situation Assessment Research  
One limitation of NDM situation assessment research is that previous studies do 
not show how the process of completing SA-tasks differs for experts across tasks of 
varying complexity.  Rather NDM situation assessment research tends to focus on the 
differences between expert and novice information behavior when completing SA-tasks 
(Kirschenbaum, 1992; R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; Serfaty et al., 1997; Waag & Bell, 
1997).  There lacks a solid theoretical framework for examining these differences in 
information behavior. LIS task-complexity research  (Byström & Järvelin, 1995) provides 
a solid theoretical framework for examining the differences between the information 
behaviors used for completing SA-tasks with different complexities (Vakkari, 1999).     
Another limitation of NDM situation assessment research is that previous studies 
have not empirically examined the cognitive processes used by experts when completing 
SA-tasks. NDM research posits that experts develop schema based on years of experience 
(D.F. Noble, 1989) which contribute to intuitive decision making (Cohen et al., 1994) and 
guide information behaviors. However, the use of intuitive cognition for information 
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behaviors when forming situation assessments has not been adequately tested in NDM 
research. The CCT (Hammond et al., 1997) provides a theoretical framework work for 
examining differences in the cognitive modes used by experts when completing SA-tasks 
of different complexities. LIS task-complexity research and CCT studies are reviewed in 
the next sections.  
2.4 Task Complexity and Information Behavior 
2.4.1 LIS Models of Tasks Characteristics and Information Behavior  
A task is an activity or set of activities to be performed in order to accomplish a 
goal.  Numerous researchers in LIS have stated that tasks greatly affect information 
behavior  (Belkin, Chang, Downs, Saracevic, & Zhao, 1990; Byström & Järvelin, 1995; 
Leckie, Pettigrew, & Sylvain, 1996; Taylor, 1986; Vakkari, 1998).  Two general models 
of information behavior of professionals have been developed: Taylor’s (1986) 
Information Use Environment Model (IUE Model) and Leckie et al’s GMISP (1996). 
Overall, these two models state that task characteristics influence information behaviors. 
However, these models lack theoretical predictions. LIS task-complexity research 
provides theoretical predictions on the influence of task complexity on information 
behaviors. Taylor’s IUE Model, Leckie’s GMSIP, and LIS task-complexity research are 
discussed below. These LIS models are included in this literature review due to the fact 
that although NDM situation assessment research states that information behavior is a 
core component of situation assessment, there is a minimal amount of NDM situation 
assessment studies that have primarily focused on information behaviors. LIS models 
provide a foundation for examining these information behaviors.  
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The Information Use Environment Model  
Background of the IUE Model  
The context of the environment influences how members of a defined group (i.e. 
engineers, lawyers, doctors) assess the value of information to help solve their problems. 
Taylor (1991, pp. 25–26) defines IUE as the “set of those elements that (a) affect the flow 
and use of information messages into, within, and out of any definable entity; and (b) 
determine the criteria by which the value of information messages will be judged.” The 
IUE affects the availability and access to information used and determines the criteria 
used to judge whether information is relevant and useful (Agada, 1999).  The IUE is 
embedded in the total external environment of the individual and consists of the 
“environmental elements that are most salient to information seeking and use” 
(Berryman, 2008). The foundations of the IUE Model stem from Dervin (1983), Paisley 
(1980), Wilson (1981), Roberts (1982), and Wersig and Windel (1985). 
The IUE Model explicitly places the individual at the center of its conceptual 
framework (Rosenbaum, 1996) and is considered to be a “user- and context-centric 
construct for framing practice” (Durrance, Souden, Walker, & Fisher, 2006).  The 
individual evaluates information in relation to objectives that created his or her need.  
Although individuals may conduct searches surrounding a specific subject, the choices of 
information are not just based on subject matter, rather they are based on other elements 
found in the context within which people live or work (Rieh, 2004).The IUE is dynamic 
in that it changes in response to new information and how individuals interact with the 
information and others (Rosenbaum, 1996).  
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Although the IUE Model initially focused on problems faced in the workplace 
(Berryman, 2008), the IUE Model can “…serve as a generalized model, a useful means 
for organizing, describing, and predicting the information behaviors of any given 
population in a variety of contexts (Luo, 2008, p. 605).”   The IUE Model has been used 
as a framework to understand information seeking of inner city gatekeepers (Agada, 
1999), individuals in their homes (Rieh, 2004),  community organizers  (Durrance et al., 
2006), foster care children (Hersberger, Murray, & Sokoloff, 2006), middle managers 
(Maurel & Bergeron, 2007), high school principals (Luo, 2008), public sector workers 
(Berryman, 2008),  and medical practitioners (Olatokun & Ajagbe, 2010).   
Taylor (1986, p. 35) defines three general types of IUEs:  
 Geographical – defined by a physical limit such as a neighborhood, city, 
region or a nation.  
 Organizational – defined as a complex social unit designed to achieve a 
specific purpose. Examples include a police department, a hospital or a 
department within a hospital.  
 Social/Intellectual/Cultural – defined as a group of people, even unknown to 
each other, whose professional activities form a foundation for various 
information services.  Examples include all members of a religious faith, all 
chemists, and all chamber music players.  
The IUE Model has four components: sets of people, typical problems 
experienced by these sets of people, typical settings, and resolutions of the problems. 
Detailed explanations of these four components are described below.  
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Sets of People 
Sets of people share work or organizational settings or other types of interests. 
The education, professional training, occupation, and daily activities influence the 
assumptions and attitudes about the nature of an individual’s work (Luo, 2008). Sets of 
people can be defined by demographic variables (age, sex, marital status, education, race 
etc.) as well as non-demographic characteristics including assumptions and preferences 
for different sources and attitudes about certain phenomena  (Durrance et al., 2006).  
More specifically, sets of people tend to share similar characteristics in media use (i.e. 
print, electronic, verbal), social networks (i.e. networks within the company, networks 
within the profession etc.) and attitudes towards technology, education, risk taking, and 
innovation (Taylor, 1991). Taylor (1991) categorizes four general sets of people: the 
professions (engineers, lawyers, scientists etc.),  the entrepreneur (farmer, small business 
owner etc.), special interest groups (community organizations, political action groups 
etc.), and special socioeconomic groups (minorities, the elderly etc.).  
Typical Problems and Problem Dimensions  
According to Taylor (1986, p. 41) “problems represent the use environment…” 
and these problems influence information use (Durrance et al., 2006). Problems are 
defined by the individuals in the group and are often dynamic in nature. Each IUE has a 
discreet class of problems produced by the setting and profession (Taylor, 1991).  
Problem dimensions establish the criteria for judging the relevance of information 
to a problem or class of problems and go beyond subject matter (Taylor, 1986, p. 42). 
MacMullin and Taylor (1984) defined 11 problem dimensions as shown in Table 2 and 
represented each dimension on a continuum.  
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Table 2   
Problem Dimensions Identified by MacMulling and Taylor (1984) 
Problem Dimension Description Description 
1. Design/Discovery  Discovery  
Description of the natural world  
Design  
Things and processes made by 
humans  
2. Well-structured/Ill-
structured 
Well-Structured  
Can be solved by application of 
logical or algorithmic process 
Ill-Structured  
Cannot be resolved through 
strictly analytical means 
3. Simple/Complex Simple 
Path from initial statement to 
solution is easily defined  
Complex 
Path from initial statement to 
solution is not easily defined 
4. Specific/ Amorphous 
Goals 
Specific Goals 
Goals can be measured 
Amorphous Goals 
Goals cannot be measured  
5. Initial State 
Understood/Not 
Understood 
Initial State Understood 
Interrelationships among 
contributing factors are 
understood to some degree or 
completely  
Initial State Not Understood 
Interrelationships among 
contributing factors are not  
understood  
6. Assumptions Agreed 
Upon/Not Agreed 
Upon 
Assumptions Agreed Upon 
Centered on an accepted 
knowledge based (i.e. natural 
sciences) 
Assumptions Not Agreed Upon 
Lacking an accepted 
knowledge base (i.e. policy 
sciences) 
7. Assumptions 
Explicit/Not Explicit 
Assumptions Explicit 
Analysis and explication of 
assumptions available  
Assumptions Not Explicit 
Analysis and explication of 
assumptions not available  
8. Familiar 
Pattern/New Pattern 
Familiar Pattern 
Problems are procedural  
New Pattern 
Problems are non-procedural  
9. Risk Not Great/ 
Great 
Risk Not Great 
Consequence of failure low  
Risk Great 
Consequence of failure high  
10. Susceptible/Not 
Susceptible to 
Empirical Analysis  
Susceptible to Empirical Analysis 
Problems rely on data which are 
objective and aggregated  
Not Susceptible to Empirical 
Analysis  
Problems based on judgment 
call 
11. Internal/External 
Imposition  
Internal Imposition  
Problems are sought out 
External Imposition  
Problems come from the 
environment 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Each of these problem dimensions appear to have “an effect on the kinds of 
information deemed useful” (Taylor, 1991, p. 226). Although not explicitly stated by 
MacMullin and Taylor (1984), the problem dimensions on the right hand side of Table 2  
(for example, ill-structured, amorphous goals, high risk, initial state not understood etc.) 
could be described as characteristics of complex problems.  
Typical Settings 
The setting, usually the work setting, produces constraints and opportunities 
(Durrance et al., 2006). The setting can be classified as a common physical setting that a 
group of people (i.e. doctors) work in (i.e. hospitals)  (Luo, 2008).  The setting can be 
grounded in physical space or grounded in virtual space as in the case of an “invisible 
college” (Zuccala, 2006). Additionally, the setting can consist of a “loosely connected 
collection” of dispersed individuals across an area as in the case of individuals attempting 
to solve community problems (Durrance et al., 2006).  
Problem Resolution  
This component consists of the attitudes and approaches to problem resolution 
that influence information seeking and use (Durrance et al., 2006).The perceptions about 
the problem resolution “regulate the intensity of an individual’s information search and 
his or her expectations about the kinds of information he or she needs” (Luo, 2008, p. 
605).  
Taylor (1991, p. 229) states that problems “pose different requirements on the 
type of information perceived as necessary, and hence different uses to which 
information is put in the process of resolution.”  Taylor  (1991, pp. 229–230) categorizes 
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eight non-exclusive classes of information use that are generated by the need perceived 
by users in particular situations: 
1. Enlightenment – the desire for context information or ideas to make sense 
of a situation  
2. Problem Understanding – better comprehension of particular problems  
3. Instrumental – finding out what to do and how to do something  
4. Factual – need for precise data  
5. Confirmational – need to verify a piece of information  
6. Projective – future oriented, concerned with estimates and probabilities  
7. Motivational – related to personal involvement  
8. Personal or Political – has to do with relationships, status or reputation 
Taylor (1986) defines nine information traits that determine how users prefer 
information to be presented to them to help solve their problems (Detlor, 2000).  
Although these traits are content oriented, they go beyond subject relevance  and focus on 
situational relevance as in the case of helping in a specific work situation (Detlor, 2000). 
The information traits are related to the problem dimensions and information needs of the 
individuals. The nine information traits are listed in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3  
Information Traits Identified by Taylor (1986) 
Information Traits Description Description 
Quantitative continuum  Quantitative   
Derived from phenomena that 
can be measured numerically   
Qualitative  
Derived from qualitative and 
descriptive information   
Data continuum  Hard Data 
Result of observation, able to 
be replicated 
Soft Data 
Data cannot be observed, 
must be inferred 
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Temporal continuum  Historical  
Information on what has 
taken place   
Forecasting  
Information on what will be 
or should be taking place 
Solution continuum  Single Solution  
One desired, best solution  
Option range  
A range of solutions can be 
used   
Focus continuum  Precision  
Requires exactness of 
information  
Diffusion  
Does not require exactness, 
rather information is used to 
orient or gain perspective 
about situation  
Specificity of use continuum  Applied  
Immediately useful in an 
operational sense  
Theoretical   
Gives possible clues about 
how something works or 
behaves  
Substantive continuum  Applied  
Immediately useful in an 
operational sense 
Descriptive  
Describes content and 
meaning of a phenomenon   
Aggregation continuum  Clinical  
Information drawn from an in 
depth single case 
Census  
Information drawn from 
entire populations  
Causal or diagnostic 
continuum  
Causal  
Why something happens   
Diagnostic  
What is happening   
 
 
 
Review of Studies with the IUE Model  
Several studies used the IUE Model to provide descriptive accounts of different 
types of information seekers in different contexts. For example, Agada (1999) examined 
the information behavior of inner city gatekeepers and found that their most prevalent 
information needs focused on discrimination and race relations, crime and safety, and 
family planning. Hersberger, Murray, and Sokoloff (2006) applied the  IUE Model to 
examine the information behavior of foster children being adjudicated by a court of law 
for being maltreated and found their needs focused on adjustment (why children are 
removed from their homes), maintenance (what will happen to the foster children), and 
case closure (reunification with parent(s) or relative placement; parental rights are 
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terminated). Olatokun and Ajagbe  (2010) used the IUE Model to examine the 
information behaviors of traditional medical practitioners who treat sickle cell anemia. 
Based on responses to surveys, the researchers found that the practitioners primarily used 
information sources through professional associations. Additionally, it was found that the 
practitioners relied on orally stored knowledge of medical practice, which resulted in a 
lack a collection of practices across various situations.  
Other IUE studies have found connections in specific contexts between problem 
type and information behaviors. Berryman (2008) used a multiple-case study, semi-
structured interview approach with 21 public sector workers to investigate factors that 
influenced the workers’ assessments of “enough” information. The researcher found that 
the public sector workers faced complex problems that lacked structure, were unclear, 
and held conflicting goals from different stakeholders. To resolve the challenges posed 
by these complex problems, public sector workers used various channels and sources of 
information. Luo (2008) found similar results in a study on the data-driven decision 
making of 183 public high school principals. The results suggested that complex or ill-
structured problems (such as student achievement and school improvement) required 
more thought and increased the role of information collection. Conversely, structured 
problems demanded less thought and decreased the role of information collection. 
Additionally, Berryman’s (2008) study on public sector workers and Durrance et al.’s  
(2006) study on community workers show that for complex problems, information 
seekers were more likely to seek information provided by people rather than from other 
types of sources.  
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Several studies have shown how the organizational setting of workers influences 
information behaviors. Maurel and Bergeron (2007) used the  IUE Model to examine the 
problem situations of 30 middle managers. Based on in-depth critical-incident interviews 
and direct observations, the researchers found that problems for middle managers arose 
primarily from internal contextual factors including power and responsibility-sharing, 
compliance with policies and procedures, and strategic organizational priorities all of 
which influences information seeking. Berryman (2008) found that two characteristics of 
the organizational settings, bureaucratic style of management and organizational attitudes 
towards risk and uncertainty, influenced the information behavior of the public sector 
workers (Berryman, 2008).  In a comparison of information seeking in the home and 
work setting, Rieh (2004) found that information seekers held more diverse kinds of 
goals for information seeking in their home settings, sought information at separate times 
for the same task, and initiate searches for entertainment purposes rather than only for 
problems.  
Limitations of the IUE Model  
The previous studies that used the IUE Model provide rich, descriptive accounts 
of the information behaviors of various sets of people. However, the IUE Model does not 
predict how the eleven problem dimensions listed in Table 2 influence how professionals 
resolve problems or what types of information are sought. A couple of IUE Model studies 
provide an initial starting point for investigating this further. For example, Berryman’s 
(2008) study and Durrance et al.’s  (2006) study showed that when faced with more 
complex tasks, workers used multiple sources and reached out more to other people. Luo 
(2008) found that when public high school principals faced complex tasks, the principals 
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required more information than when facing simple tasks. More research on the 
relationship between task complexity and information behavior is needed. 
Another limitation of the IUE model is that it implies that most information 
behavior is rational and conscious (Lievrouw, 2001).  None of the above-mentioned 
studies focused on decision makers in high stakes, high time pressure, and high 
uncertainty contexts.  Taylor (1986, pp. 156–157) states that ideal decision makers 
carefully analyze problems to determine the nature of the problem, then review a wide 
range of alternative courses of action, weigh the costs and risks of consequences of each 
course of action, assimilate new information, reexamine consequences of all known 
alternatives, and make detailed provisions for selecting a course of action. For each step 
one could make a “checklist for assessing the likelihood of an optimal decision” (Taylor, 
1986, p. 157).  
The use of sequential steps, the comparing of options, and the use checklist to 
reach an optimal decision represent a rational style of decision making (Hammond et al., 
1997; Klein et al., 2010).  Taylor (1991, p. 249) admits that decision research has focused 
primarily on rational decision making “… excluding the importance of hunch and 
intuition based on experience and personal association. We need to have a better 
understanding of the nonrational (less rational?) environmental factors affecting these 
processes” (Parentheses from Taylor). The lack of focus on situations with high stakes, 
high time pressure, and high uncertainty may explain the lack of focus on non-rational 
decision-making.  
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General Model of Information Seeking of Professionals   
In addition to Taylor’s IUE Model (1991), Leckie et al.s’ GMISP offers another 
framework for understanding the influence of task characteristics on information 
behavior in  professional settings. 
Background of the GMISP 
Based on the analysis of empirical studies of the information behaviors of various 
types of professionals (engineers, health care professionals, and lawyers), Leckie et al.  
(1996) developed the GMISP. Leckie et al. (1996, p. 181) stated  that “the basic 
supposition of the model is that the roles and related tasks undertaken by professionals in 
the course of daily practice prompt particular information needs, which in turn give rise 
to an information seeking process.”  
The GMISP consists of the following components:   
1. work roles 
2. associated tasks 
3. characteristics of information needs 
4. awareness  
5. sources  
6. outcomes  
Figure 3 illustrates the relationships between these six components.  
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Figure 3. General Model of Information Seeking of Professionals 
 
 
 
Work Roles and Associated Tasks  
In the GMISP view, workers may assume a variety of roles including service 
provider, administrator/manager, researcher, educator, and student. A professional may 
assume one or multiple roles depending on the context of work (Landry, 2006). Each role 
requires different associated tasks. The enactment of certain roles and tasks influence the 
information behaviors of professionals. For example, an engineer (categorized as a 
service provider) must carry out technical and non-technical tasks such as building 
systems and subsystems or conducting financial analyses; these tasks require specific 
information found in technical manuals or datasets (Leckie et al., 1996).   
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Characteristics of Information Needs  
Information needs are not constant and can be influenced by various factors. 
According to Leckie et al. (1996, pp. 182–183) the following factors influence 
information needs: 
 Individual demographics (age, profession, specialization, career state, geo-
location) 
 Context (situation specific need, internally or externally prompted) 
 Frequency (recurring need or new) 
 Predictability (anticipated need or unexpected)  
 Importance (degrees of urgency) 
 Complexity (easily resolved or difficult)  
Each of these factors exists on a “continuum of intensity and interacts with the 
others in a complex fashion” (Leckie et al., 1996, p. 183).   
Sources  
Professionals use different channels or formats of information sources including 
formal or informal, internal or external, oral or written, and personal 
knowledge/experience (Landry, 2006). Professionals may use a combination of sources to 
fulfill their information needs. The sources may be used simultaneously or in sequence. 
Leckie et al (1996, p. 184), stated that the  continual interaction of sources “…contributes 
to the overall complexity of the source as a variable affecting information seeking.”    
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Awareness  
The professional’s awareness of various information sources can determine the 
path of information seeking.  The variables that a professional maintains or develops 
awareness about include (Leckie et al., 1996, p. 185): 
 Familiarity and prior success (results previously obtained from a source) 
 Trustworthiness (how reliable or helpful) 
 Packaging (convenience, usefulness and others) 
 Timeliness (found when needed) 
 Cost (relative cost-effectiveness in terms of psychological or physical effort)  
 Quality (level of detail, accuracy, and more) 
 Accessibility (relative ease of access)  
As in the case of the interaction of sources, these awareness variables continually 
interact with each other and change over time.   
Outcomes  
Outcomes consist of the end-point for the requirements of the tasks. The optimal 
outcome consists of the information need being met for the professional to complete his 
or her task. However, if the optimal outcome is not reached, the GMISP states 
professional will continue searching to complete the task.  
Review of Studies with the GMISP  
There have been a limited number of empirical studies conducted with the GMISP 
as the primary framework. Wilkinson (2001) conducted interviews with over 150 lawyers 
and found that the lawyers considered informal sources to be their primary information 
sources. Additionally, the lawyers preferred internal organizational sources rather than 
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external sources, although this was found less true for lawyers from smaller firms. 
Wilkinson (2001) found the results fit under the GMISP; however it was recommended 
that the organizational context (size of firm) and demographics of the user (although not 
found significant in the study) should be included in the GMISP.  
Baker (2004) used the GMISP to further the understanding of the information 
needs and information behaviors of seven undercover police officers in a prostitution 
sting. Various variables were found to impact the police officers’ information needs. The 
researcher found that context (an externally-prompted, situation-specific need) greatly 
influenced the information needs of the officers. The officers needed to know the 
location, appropriate dress to fit in at the location, the language to use, and characteristics 
of “johns” (potential clients of prostitutes). For these needs, the officers used informal 
sources including team members or members of the community.  
The complexity of each encounter in Baker’s (2004) study also affected the 
information needs of the police officers. The complexity stemmed from the conversation 
with the “johns” and situational/environmental factors such as other people on the street. 
An additional variable found to impact information behavior was the immediacy of the 
situation. The police officers needed to get information from the johns quickly and 
efficiently and needed to adjust their own behavior. Overall, Baker’s  (2004) study 
showed that task complexity influenced the information behavior of the undercover 
police officers.  
Landry (2006) used the GMISP as a conceptual framework to conduct multiple 
rounds of interviews with 12 dentists to examine their information behaviors. The results 
showed that different work-role tasks shaped the dentists’ choices of information sources. 
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The dentists performed various roles including service provider, student (learning), 
educator, administrator, and researcher (investigating unusual cases). Each role resulted 
in different preferred sources. According to Landry, (2006, p. 1903) 
Textbooks were the preferred source for the patient management/service provider 
task, professional associations were favored for CDE/student and patient 
education/educator tasks, vendors and sales representatives were first for the 
practice management/administrator task, and colleagues and journals were chosen 
for the research task.  
Interestingly, dentists preferred to use traditional information sources to meet 
their information needs rather than using the Internet for all types of tasks.  The internet 
was considered to be an alternate information source. Search engines and specific 
websites offered value as well. Overall, Landry (2006) found support for the GMISP. 
Greyson, Cunningham, and Morgan (2012) examined the information behavior of 
15 pharmaceutical policy decision makers via semi-structured interviews and compared 
the results to the GMISP. The researchers used the critical incident technique (Flanagan, 
1954) and found that characteristics of information needs included: topic, depth/breadth 
of questions, and time sensitivity. Depending on the characteristics of problems and 
resources available, the information seeking approaches were either “scattershot”, 
systematic, or delegated. Primary information sources were fellow experts, electronic 
resources, and trusted organizations.  Based on using the GMISP, the researchers formed 
design recommendations including recommending a design of a rapid-response service to 
answer questions and a design for a better information-sharing infrastructure. The 
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researchers found the information behavior of the research participants fit with the 
GMISP. 
Overall, these GMISP studies show that different contexts (such as law, police 
investigations, health care and pharmaceutical decision making) and roles within those 
contexts (such as lawyers, police officers, dentists, and policy makers) influence 
information seeking. Additionally, different situations within those contexts also 
influence information seeking.  
Limitations of the GMISP  
The GMISP holds similar limitations to Taylor’s (1991) IUE Model.  The GMISP 
states that an individual will keep searching until an optimal decision is reached. 
Reaching an optimal decision is representative of rational decision-making. However, the 
GMISP does consider personal knowledge and experience to be a “primary source of 
information” (Leckie et al., 1996, p. 184).  Also, similar to the IUE Model, the GMISP 
has not been used to examine situations with high time pressure and high stakes with the 
exception of one study that focused on undercover police officers (Baker, 2004). In the 
study on undercover police officers, Baker (2004) expressed concerns with the GMISP 
and stated that it is “…limited in its ability to describe the fast-paced, give and take, real 
time information world…” of undercover police officers and similar professionals. 
Finally, the GMISP model, as shown in Figure 3 places a significant emphasis on 
workers’ tasks which are shaped by the workers’ roles; however, no prediction is 
provided on how different task characteristics will influence information behaviors of the 
workers. More research is needed in this area.  
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2.4.2 Task Complexity and Information Behavior 
As stated by the IUE Model (Taylor, 1986) and the GMISP (Leckie et al., 1996), 
in a professional setting, information needs and information behaviors depend on a 
worker’s task.  Task complexity has been identified as a critical factor that affects 
information behavior and can be described in numerous ways.  
 
Background of Task Complexity  
Culnan (1983) defines task complexity as being related to the external 
environment; in other words, the level of complexity in the environment determines the 
level of complexity of the task. According to Wood (1986), task complexity can be 
examined by the components of the task (number of acts needed to execute the task and 
number of information cues needed to be processed), coordinative nature of the task 
(relationship between inputs and products as well as sequencing of inputs), and dynamic 
nature of the task (adapting to changes in the world that have an effect on task inputs and 
products). In this view, a simple task does not require many steps, has a small number of 
information cues, has a defined set of sequential steps to follow, and is static. A complex 
task has many steps, has a large number of information cues, lacks steps or consists of 
multiple co-occurring steps, and is dynamic (Wood, 1986).  
Campbell (1988) developed  a classification scheme to resolve differences in 
definitions of task complexity. A complex task consists of the of the following: presence 
of multiple paths to arrive at an end goal, presence of multiple desired outcomes, 
presence of conflicting interdependence among paths and multiple desired outcomes, and 
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presence of uncertain or probabilistic linkages among paths and outcomes (Campbell, 
1988, p. 46). 
Daft and Macintosh (1981) define task complexity as consisting of task variety 
and task analyzability. Task variety consists of the occurrence of unexpected and novel 
events. A complex task consists of unpredictable events while a simple task consists of 
predictable events. Task analyzability refers to the ability to follow an objective or 
computational procedure to resolve problems. In this category, a complex task would not 
be able to be solved by objective or computational procedures.  Zeffane and Gul (1993) 
also consider task variety and task analyzability to be useful for categorizing task 
complexity in addition to task interdependence. Task interdependence refers to “the 
amount of work (normal job activities) which require checking on or working with 
others” (Zeffane & Gul, 1993, p. 709). A complex task consists of work requiring a 
considerable amount of checking or working with others while a simple task consists of 
zero to a minimal amount of working with others.  Pinelli et al. (1993) also considered 
task interdependence to be useful for measuring task complexity. 
Drawing on previous definitions of task complexity, Tiamiyu (1992) and Byström 
and Järvelin  (1995) define  task complexity as the predeterminability of information 
requirements, procedures, and outputs. For simple tasks, the inputs, processes, and 
outcomes of tasks can be a priori determined. For complex tasks, they cannot. Vakkari 
(1998) states that this definition of task complexity covers a broad common area across 
studies on task complexity. 
Several of MacMullin and Taylor’s (1984) eleven problem dimensions relate to 
other descriptions of task complexity. For example, the initial state understood/not 
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understood dimension relates to  the predeterminablity of information requirements 
(Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Tiamiyu, 1992); the susceptible/not susceptible to empirical 
analysis dimension relates to task analyzability (Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Zeffane & Gul, 
1993); and the simple/complex dimension relates to the presence of uncertain or 
probabilistic linkages among paths and outcomes (Campbell, 1988).  
Leckie et al.’s (1996, pp. 182–183) factors that influence information needs also 
lend themselves to characteristics of task complexity. For example, the factors of 
frequency (recurring need vs. new need), predictability (anticipated or unexpected), and 
importance (degree of urgency) can be used to describe task complexity. A complex task 
consists of a new need, is unexpected, and has a high degree of urgency.  
Other task characteristics that relate to task complexity include the amount of risk 
(tasks with high complexity have high risk) (MacMullin & Taylor, 1984) as well as the 
amount of time pressure (tasks with high complexity have high time pressure) (Liu & Li, 
2012). Mahan (1994) also considered high time pressure and high stress to be indicative 
of a task with high complexity.  
 Review of Studies on Task Complexity and Information Behavior 
Vakkari (2003) states that there has been limited research conducted on task 
complexity and information behavior. However, some general theoretical propositions 
evolved from this research. According to Zeffane and Gul  (1993) and Daft and 
Macintosh(1981), the main theme of this research revolves around the following concept: 
complex, non-routine tasks require more information than simple, routine tasks. Other 
themes from the research conducted on task complexity and information behavior revolve 
around the use of external sources, use of people as sources, use of experts as sources, 
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and use of different information types. Table 4 summarizes the theoretical propositions 
supported by previous LIS research on task complexity and information seeking. These 
theoretical propositions are tested in this dissertation research in the cyber defense 
domain.   
 
 
Table 4 
 
Theoretical Propositions from LIS Research Task-Complexity Research 
Theoretical Propositions Previous Studies 
As task complexity increases, the amount of 
information sources used increases  
Daft and Macintosh (1981), Culnan (1983), 
Tiamiyu (1992), Zeffane and Gul (1993), 
Byström  and Järvelin (1995) 
As task complexity increases, the use of external 
sources increases  
Tiamiyu (1992),  Pinelli et al. (1993), 
Zeffane and Gul (1993), Byström  (2002) 
As task complexity increases, the use of people 
as sources increases   
Culnan (1983), Tiamiyu (1992), Byström  
(2002) 
As the task complexity increases, the use of 
experts increases  
Tiamiyu (1992),  Byström  (2002) 
As task complexity increases, the needs for 
domain information and problem solving 
information increase 
Culnan (1983), Byström  and Järvelin (1995), 
Byström  (2002) 
 
 
 
A review of these theoretical propositions follows.  
Task Complexity and Amount of Information Sources Used 
Based on a quantitative analysis of questionnaires conducted with 24 work units, 
Daft and Macintosh (1981), found that as task complexity increased (based on task 
analyzability and task variety) the amount of information processing increased. In another 
study with 362 analysts from two large companies, Culnan (1983) found that as task 
complexity increased, the use of information sources increased by the analysts. Tiamiyu 
(1992) found similar results in a questionnaire-based study conducted with 274 senior 
civil servants. In another survey-based study conducted with 1300 full-time employees of 
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a large public sector telecommunications organization,  Zeffane and Gul  (1993) found 
that an increase in  task variety (an indicator of task complexity) increased the need to 
acquire more information. From an analysis of 25 tasks performed by public 
administrators, Byström  and Järvelin (1995)  also found that as task complexity 
increased, the quantity of information processed also increased.  
Task Complexity and Use of External Sources  
Pinelli et al.  (1993) conducted an exploratory study to understand the information 
behaviors of U.S. aerospace engineers and scientists. The researchers examined the use of 
information sources based on survey responses surrounding tasks performed by 2,016 
research participants. The researchers found that as task complexity increased the use of 
external information increased. Tiamiyu’s (1992) study  also showed an increase in the 
civil servants’ use of external sources based on an increase in task complexity. Zeffane 
and Gul (1993) found that the more technical uncertainty involved with a task the more 
external written sources were used. Byström’s  (2002) study on municipal administrators 
demonstrated similar results.  
Task Complexity and Use of People as Sources  
In addition to finding that increased task complexity increased the amount of 
information sources used, Culnan (1983) found that as task complexity increased the use 
of internal people as sources increased. Tiamiyu’s (1992) study on civil servants also 
showed that increasing task complexity increased the use of people as sources. In a later 
study, Byström (2002) asked 39 municipal administrators to complete semi-structured 
self-recorded journals and to participate in interviews. The results showed that increasing 
task complexity increased the use of people as sources. 
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Task Complexity and Use of Experts  
In Byström’s (2002)  study on task complexity and information use by 39 
municipal administrators, the results showed that as task complexity increased, the use of 
experts increased. Experts were found internal to the public administrators’ organizations 
as well as external to their organizations. Furthermore, the results showed that external 
experts were used more than internal experts as task complexity increased.  Tiamiyu’s 
(1992) earlier study also demonstrated this relationship.   
Task Complexity and Use of Different Information Types 
In their study on tasks performed by public administrators, Byström  and Järvelin 
(1995) defined  various information types: task information, domain information, and 
task-solving information. 
 Task Information: this information describes the structure, properties, and 
requirements of the task/problem at hand (e.g. names, numbers, places, statements 
or events.) “This information type is seen to comprise mainly answers to the 
information requirements that are related only to the particular task.” (Byström, 
1999, p. 45). For example, when a journalist seeks facts about a specific traffic 
accident, this information is task information (Byström, 1999). Task information 
is related to Taylor’s (1991) classification of “factual information” which focused 
on the need for precise data.  
 Domain Information: this information consists of laws, concepts, and proven 
theories of the task/problem and is applicable to several tasks of the same kind. 
Going back to the journalistic context, Byström (1999) provides the example of a 
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journalist seeking information about the general reasons for traffic accidents or 
information about laws in traffic accidents.  
 Task-solving or domain information: this information covers the methods or 
procedures across several tasks. It describes how problems should be viewed and 
formulated and what domain information should be used. For example, a 
journalist would be looking for how to structure a news story about a traffic 
accident and how to investigate a traffic accident (Byström, 1999). 
In their study, Byström  and Järvelin (1995) found that as task complexity 
increased,  the need for domain information and problem solving information increased. 
Byström (2002) found similar results in a later study. In a previous study, Culnan (1983) 
found that as task complexity increased, the use of general information sources increased.  
Limitations of Studies on Task Complexity and Information Behavior 
Similar to the IUE Model  (Taylor, 1986)  and the GMISP (Leckie et al., 1996), 
the main limitation LIS task-complexity research is that the foundation of this research 
rests on rational decision making.  Byström  and Järvelin (1995) proposed an information 
seeking model surrounding task completion as shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Information Seeking Model Surrounding Task Completion 
 
In the center of this model, the “Choice of Action” component depends on the 
identification of alternatives, ranking of the alternatives, and the selection of the best 
action. The generation of alternatives and then ranking them represents rational decision 
making; however, in contexts with high time pressure and high stakes, rational decision 
making has been found not be used by individuals (Klein, 1993; Mahan, 1994). Vakkari 
(2003, p. 420) states: “It is evident that the research community in information searching 
would extend the understanding of these phenomena, if ideas generated in other fields 
concerning task performance and analysis were taken into account.”  
Similar to Taylor’s (1991) IUE Model and Leckie et al.’s (1996) GMISP,  LIS 
research on task complexity and information seeking has not been examined in high 
stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty environments. Overall, in LIS research, 
there lacks focus on information seeking research in these type of environments (Allen, 
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2011; Mishra, Allene, & Pearman, 2011). NDM research focuses explicitly on 
environments with high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty and provides a 
conceptual framework to understand information seeking in these types of environments.  
2.5 Cognitive Continuum Theory   
2.5.1 Theoretical Foundations of CCT 
NDM situation assessment research conceptualizes that intuitive cognition, based 
on schema developed over years of experience, forms the foundation of expert SA-task 
completion (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; D. Noble, 1985; Serfaty et al., 1997). As stated 
for the limitations of NDM situation assessment research, there lacks empirical research 
on the cognitive modes used by experts for SA-task completion and there lacks a 
theoretical foundation for predicting the cognitive modes used by exerts when completing 
SA-tasks of different complexities. The CCT provides a framework to address these gaps. 
The theoretical foundations of CCT draw mainly from Brunswik (1943) who 
developed the concept of probabilistic functionalism and the Lens Model both of which 
contributed to Social Judgment Theory, another foundation of CCT. These theoretical 
foundations, the concepts posed by CCT, and the results of empirical CCT studies are 
described in this section.  
Probabilistic Functionalism  
Brunswik (1943) claimed that previous psychology research of his time focused 
primarily on the individual without any emphasis placed on the environment. However, 
Brunswik (1943) stated that both the environment in which an individual is embedded 
and the individual should receive equal focus in theory and research. In the Brunswikian 
perspective, an individual selects which environmental cues to use out of many available 
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environmental cues to achieve his or her goals. These cues may or may not portray the 
actual state of the environment. Therefore an individual cannot know his or her 
environment with complete certainty; the environment can only be known 
probabilistically (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). This forms the basis of probabilistic 
functionalism.  
According to Hammond (1996), each cue used to interpret the environment offers 
limited validity and may be related to other cues, redundant to other cues, and able to 
substitute for other cues. Additionally, individuals have the cognitive ability to change 
their selection of cues to make inferences about their environments. Hammond (1996) 
calls this vicarious functioning.  
The Lens Model  
Brunswik  (1952) developed the Lens Model to provide further insights into 
probabilistic functionalism. The Lens Model stems from theories of visual perception and 
posits that perceptions of the environment are derived from multiple probabilistic sources 
of information or cues (Hammond, 1996). According to Rappoport and Summer (1973), a 
state of the environment consists of a distal object, event or variable that is presented to 
the individual as an array of cues. The cues relay information to the individual about 
aspects of the environment which are not directly observable by the individual (Standing, 
2008).  Brunswik’s model suggests that a “lens” collects information from the cues and 
refocuses them within the cognitive system of the individual who makes a judgment 
about the environment (Hammond, 1996).   
Hammond (1996, p. 87) provides two  questions researchers consider under the 
Lens Model perspective: 
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1. What cues are present and available to the individual in his/her effort to reach 
an inference about an intangible object or event of interest or what 
information that can be “seen” is available to make inferences about the 
“unseen”?  
2. How is this information that can be “seen” used by the individual to make 
inferences about the “unseen”?  
Figure 5 provides a visual representation of the Lens Model.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  shows the degree of validity to each cue, a weight attached to each cue 
by a judge, and the accuracy of the judgment. More specifically, the cues used for 
judgment are at the center of the figure (Xi) with the array of cues representing a criterion 
in the environment Ye. Each cue’s validity (accuracy of representation of the true state of 
environment) is represented by re,i. The weight the judge places on each cue (defined as 
cue utilization) is represented by rs,i. The final judgment is represented by Ys which is 
Figure 5. The Lens Model 
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then compared to the environmental criterion Ye for accuracy to obtain the level of 
achievement ra. Goldstein and Hogarth (1997, p. 7) state the Lens Model, as derived 
from probabilistic functionalism, shows “the proximal cues are related only 
probabilistically to the identity and properties of the distal object.”   
 
 
Social Judgment Theory  
Hammond and Stewart (1975) further developed the Brunswikian perspective by 
formulating the Social Judgment Theory (SJT). According to Cooksey (1996b), SJT 
evolved through the 1960s and 1970s as a methodology and a perspective for 
understanding the judgment process in various contexts. SJT describes the weighting and 
combining of information by individuals for making judgments as related to judgment 
accuracy (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). More specifically, SJT states that the accuracy of an 
individual’s judgment about an event or object depends on the weight the individual 
attaches to the cues coming from the event or object. If cues are weighted to reflect the 
real event or object, then the judgment will be accurate; if the cues are not weighted to 
reflect the real event or object, then the judgment will be inaccurate. Although SJT is 
sometimes listed as a theory, Cooksey (1996b, p. 145) states SJT  “should not be 
construed as a formal theory of the judgment process… [rather it] provides the 
methodology through which the predictions of Cognitive Continuum Theory may be 
tested.” (1996a, pp. 25–26).  
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2.5.2 CCT Theory Description  
The conceptual model of CCT is derived from Brunswik’s probabilistic 
functionalism and the Lens Model as well as Hammond’s SJT. The CCT focuses on the 
following cognitive modes: analytical cognition, intuitive cognition, and quasi-rational 
cognition. Analytical cognition involves conscious, methodological, and time-consuming 
information processing while intuitive cognition involves non-conscious, holistic, and 
rapid information processing. Quasi-rational cognition represents a combination of these 
two cognitive modes. According to Hammond (1996), the literature on social psychology 
from the 1960s to the 1980s viewed intuitive cognition as a hazard flawed by biases and 
untrustworthiness. In opposition to the previous research on the separation of intuitive 
and analytical cognition, Hammond (1996) suggests that a dichotomy should not be 
placed between intuitive and analytical cognition; rather, intuitive and analytical 
cognition should be placed on a continuum in which individuals can use aspects of both 
modes of cognition depending on the environment or environmental tasks.  
Cognitive Continuum Index 
Hammond (1996) developed the cognitive continuum index (CCI) as a way to 
describe the characteristics of each mode of cognition and represent the concept of a 
continuum for cognitive modes. The CCI is displayed in Table 5. 
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Table 5  
Cognitive Continuum Index 
Cognitive Property Intuitive Cognition Analytical Cognition 
Rate of information 
processing 
Rapid Slow 
Cue use Simultaneous Sequential 
Cognitive control 
Unconscious information 
processing 
Conscious information 
processing 
Availability of rules Formal rules unavailable 
Formal rules available and 
used 
Cue type Reliance on qualitative cues Reliance on quantitative cues 
Cue evaluation Cues evaluated perceptually 
Cues evaluated at 
measurement level 
Organizing principle Pattern recognition, averaging 
Task specific organizing 
principle 
 
 
 
The representation of intuitive and analytical cognition on a continuum allows for 
the conceptualization that an individual could move back and forth between the two 
modes of cognition in the judgment process (Cooksey, 1996a). For example, if an 
individual cannot solve a problem with the use of one mode of cognition, then he or she 
could use the other mode of cognition and alternates between the two modes until the 
problem is solved (Cooksey, 1996b; Hammond, Frederick, Robillard, & Victor, 1989; 
Hammond, 1996). The continuum also allows an individual to utilize the advantages of 
each mode of cognition as well as overcome the disadvantages of each mode of 
cognition.  
According to Hammond (1996) analytical cognition can provide precision in 
specific circumstances and intuitive cognition can provide robustness over a wide range 
of conditions. A downside to using analytical cognition is that the models and formulas 
used to predict an answer may produce errors which are a magnitude larger than when 
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intuitive cognition is used (Doherty & Kurz, 1996). Additionally, there may be a poor fit 
between the model and the data available as well as the environment. Intuitive cognition 
while being robust is often imprecise. There may be demands from others for analytical 
accountability or demands for a precise judgment resulting in a conflict with using 
intuitive cognition.  
Additionally, the CCI provides a middle ground between intuitive and analytical 
cognition. Hammond (1996, p. 150) defines the mixture of the two modes of cognition as 
“quasirationality” or quasi-rational cognition. Dunwoody et al (2000, p. 37) consider 
quasi-rational cognition to be “robust and adaptive” and state that cognition is rarely only 
intuitive or analytical; rather it is more likely a mixture of the two.  
Task Continuum Index  
In addition to representing the modes of cognition on a continuum, CCT also 
posits that there is a relationship between characteristics of tasks faced and the modes of 
cognition induced by these tasks (Hammond, 1996). Hammond (1996) developed the 
Task Continuum Index (TCI) that parallels the CCI to represent this relationship. The 
TCI lists several properties of tasks that are considered to induce the use of intuitive and 
analytical cognition as shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 
Task Continuum Index 
Task Properties Intuitive Cognition Inducing Analytical Cognition Inducing 
Number of cues 
available  
Large,  >5 Small, < 5 
Order in which cues are 
displayed 
Simultaneous Sequential 
Type of cue Perceptual Objective 
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measurement required 
Reliability of cue 
measurement 
Low High 
Cue distribution 
characteristics 
Continuous, highly variable, 
normally distributed 
Dichotomous, valued in specific 
numbers, distribution unknown 
Redundancy among cues High Low 
Degree of a priori 
decomposition  
Low High 
Uncertainty of the 
criterion  
High Low 
Degree of nonlinearity in 
the correct 
environmental model 
Low High 
Extent to which cues are 
combined in the correct 
environmental model 
with equal weights 
High Low 
Availability of an 
organizing principle  
Low High 
 
 
 
Overall, CCT suggests that a complex, ambiguous,  ill-structured task  with a 
short time period induces intuitive cognition (Mahan, 1994).  While a highly structured, 
deterministic task requiring a high degree of accuracy and a methodological approach 
induces analytical cognition (Mahan, 1994). Lipshitz (1993) also stated that when task 
properties align with the appropriate cognitive modes, there will be more accurate 
judgments.  
Although the TCI parallels the CCI, Hammond et al. (1997) state that the parallels 
of the cognitive and task continuums are not deterministic: analytical cognition can be 
applied to intuitive cognition inducing tasks (if there is time) and intuitive cognition to 
analytical cognition inducing tasks (if time is limited).  Furthermore, Doherty and Kurz 
(1996) point out that there is no absolute catalog of cognitive inducing task 
characteristics; each situation or task may elicit different task characteristics.  
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In the CCT perspective, if a judge’s mode of cognition (intuitive or analytical 
cognition) on the CCI aligns with cognition inducing task properties (intuitive or 
analytical cognition inducing task characteristics) on the TCI, then judge performance 
will be optimal resulting in high task achievement (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Harvey, 
2001). If there is a mismatch between the mode of cognition used and task characteristics 
faced, then performance will be sub-optimal resulting in low task achievement. 
Dunwoody et al. (2000) provide an example of a mismatch between task properties and 
cognitive mode: an individual would fail at highway driving (a fast paced environment 
requiring the processing of a large number of continuous, simultaneous cues) if he or she 
solely followed an analytical cognitive approach (using a sequential, slow rate of 
processing for the cues and relying on calculation of precise measurements for each cue).   
2.5.3 Review of CCT Studies 
Numerous studies have employed CCT as the primary theoretical framework. In 
the foundational CCT study, Hammond et al. (1997) examined the judgment processes of 
highway engineers when facing tasks with different task characteristics. The researchers 
gave 20 highway engineers three tasks consisting of characteristics which were 
hypothesized to induce intuitive, analytical or quasi-rational cognition. The results 
showed that achievement in a judgment task increased as the degree of congruence 
increased between the task properties on the TCI and the cognitive modes on the CCI. In 
other words, intuitive tasks were best handled with intuitive cognition, analytical tasks 
were best handled with analytical cognition, and quasi-rational tasks best handled with 
quasi-rational cognition.  
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As Harvey (2001, p. 110) stated,  the results of Hammond (1997)study showed 
that “it is possible to use a set of task factors to structure knowledge in a way that allows 
predictions to be made about how tasks that have not been previously studied will be 
performed.”  The results also demonstrated that intuitive cognition can be both efficient 
and effective in making certain types of judgments (Cooksey, 1996a). Overall, the results 
showed there is not a dichotomy between intuitive and analytical cognition in that 
individuals can use either cognitive mode depending on the types of tasks faced as well 
as a mix of the two. Other studies have also demonstrated the effectiveness of 
quasirationality (Bjørk & Hamilton, 2011; Hamm, 1988b).   
Support for the relationship between task complexity and cognitive mode use has 
been demonstrated in other studies (Dowding, Spilsbury, Thompson, Brownlow, & 
Pattenden, 2009; Dunwoody et al., 2000). Dowding et al. (2009) showed that when heart-
failure nurse specialists faced unclear tasks (as in the case of administering medication 
for palliative care to relieve the suffering of patients), the nurse specialists predominantly 
used intuitive cognition. When the nurse specialists faced a task with both clear and 
unclear tasks (the administering of medication for medication titration), they 
predominantly used quasi-rational cognition as the CCT predicted. Dunwoody et al. 
(2000) showed that when decision makers faced a task with highly visual cues, the 
decision makers use more intuitive cognition than when facing a task with more 
numerical cues.  
Some CCT studies have shown how decision makers can move back and forth 
between intuitive cognition and analytical cognition. Hamm (1988b) conducted a 
moment-by-moment analysis of high way engineer’s decision making processes and 
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found that the engineers alternated between intuitive and analytical cognition. Based on 
the analysis of eight medical students’ diagnoses of six patient cases, Hammond et al. 
(1989) also found that the students alternated between using intuitive and analytical 
cognition often using both modes evenly in the overall judgment process. Offredy, 
Kendall, and Goodman (2008), also found that nurse medication prescribers changed 
their use of cognitive modes based on the tasks encountered.  
Other CCT studies have shown that additional concepts may need to be 
considered by the CCT. For example, Offredy, Kendall, and Goodman (2008) showed 
that when nurse medication prescribers lack prescribing knowledge for a specific case the 
nurses would switch from using analytical cognition to using intuitive cognition. This 
study showed that a lack of knowledge about a task can also induce intuitive cognition 
and that a decision maker’s level of expertise plays role in the cognitive mode used. 
Mahan (1994) focused on the impact of stress conditions on the use of intuitive and 
analytical cognition when completing a complex judgment task. Mahan (1994) varied 
task uncertainty and task duration for research participants and found that an increase in 
task uncertainty and an increase in task duration led to a decrease in two things: in 
judgment accuracy and a decrease in the consistency of using learned judgment policies. 
The results showed there was a shift towards the intuitive cognition on the CCI in 
response to these stress conditions.   
One CCT study only found partial support for the CCT. Dunwoody et al. (2000) 
conducted an experiment with 104 undergraduate students to examine how judgments 
were made in a simulated, multiple-cue threat assessment task (assessing the potential 
threat of hostile aircraft while being stationed on a naval aircraft carrier). Based on 
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providing conditions to induce different modes of cognition (intuitive, analytical and 
quasi-rational), the results provided partial support to CCT. More specifically, Dunwoody 
et al. (2000) varied surface (information representation) and depth characteristics of tasks 
(task structure). The results showed that more visual representations of information 
induced intuitive cognition and more numerical representations of information induced 
analytical cognition.  
However, the results did not show a correlation between a group of four task 
characteristics (number of cues presented, redundancy among cues, the degree that the 
cues were equally weighted in the optimal strategy and the total environmental 
predictability from the available cues) and the cognitive mode used as predicted by the 
CCI. Dunwoody et al. (2000) describes the potential reason for partial support of the 
CCT: the type of judgments required in their study (threat assessments) differed from the 
type of judgments required in Hammond et al.’s (1997) study (engineering-based 
judgments). 
2.5.4 CCT Limitations 
The CCT has been categorized as one of the original NDM approaches (Klein, 
2008; R. Lipshitz, 1993); however, the CCT has been predominantly been used to 
examine the cognitive processes of professionals that were not facing high stakes, high 
uncertainty, and high time pressure situations. These professionals include healthcare 
professionals (Bjørk & Hamilton, 2011; Dowding et al., 2009; Hammond et al., 1989; 
Offredy et al., 2008) and engineers (Hamm, 1988b; Hammond et al., 1997). The two 
CCT studies that focused on high time pressure and high stakes situations used 
simulations with college students and not experts (Dunwoody et al., 2000; Mahan, 1994). 
 66 
 
However, the RPD Model, which focuses on these types of situations, demonstrates the 
main relationships of the CCT in that complexity induces the use of intuitive cognition. 
Unlike NDM situation assessment research, the CCT does not consider information 
seeking as a primary component of its theory. As a result, CCT studies do not focus on 
information behaviors which are viewed as critical when conducting situation 
assessments (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997).  
2.6 Literature Review Summary   
The RPD Model, a representative NDM model, shows that experts rely heavily on 
forming situation assessments prior to making decisions (Klein, 1993). Although the 
RPD Model considers information behaviors to be a critical component of forming 
situation assessments, this model lacks a focus on how experts go about information 
seeking. NDM situation assessment research shows that experts seek more information 
than novices and base their information behavior on schema developed over years of 
experience (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997). However, NDM situation assessment research 
lacks theoretical foundations for testing predictions on information behaviors and 
cognitive processes used when completing SA-tasks of different complexities.   
LIS research provides a solid foundation for examining information behaviors 
when experts complete SA-tasks. Taylor’s IUE Model (1991) and Leckie et al.’s (1996) 
GMISP both state that task characteristics influence the information behaviors of 
professionals. However, these models to not provide predictions on how task 
characteristics influence information behaviors. LIS task-complexity research (Byström 
& Järvelin, 1995)  provides predictions which state that an increase in task complexity 
results in an increase in the following: the number of information sources used, number 
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of people used as sources, number of external sources used, number of experts used as 
sources , and the amount of domain and problem solving information used.  As a result, 
LIS research on task complexity and information behavior (Byström & Järvelin, 1995) 
provides a solid theoretical framework for examining the influence of SA-task 
complexity on information behaviors of expert cyber defenders. Additionally, the CCT 
(Hammond et al., 1997) provides a theoretical framework for examining the influence of 
SA-task complexity on the  cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders.  The CCT 
predicts that an increase in task complexity induces the use of intuitive cognition. The 
domain of cyber defense provides a unique domain for examining the information 
behaviors and cognitive modes used for situation assessment.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Overview of Methods  
The purpose of this dissertation research was to test the theoretical propositions of LIS 
task-complexity research and the CCT in the context of cyber situation assessment. 
The main research questions for the dissertation are restated below:    
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the information behaviors 
of expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment tasks?    
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the cognitive modes used 
by expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment tasks? 
The researcher selected a multiple-case studies design for the dissertation’s research 
design.  For this dissertation study, “cases” consisted of SA tasks completed by expert cyber 
defenders from small defense companies (companies with less than 500 employees that were 
awarded contracts to work with the DoD) when responding to phishing attempts, zero-day 
exploits, and malware attacks.  The expert cyber defenders discussed a total of 38 SA-tasks.   SA 
tasks were selected as cases due to expert cyber defenders from the initial interviews discussing 
multiple types of attacks. The discussion of multiple types of attacks provided the opportunity to 
compare SA-tasks across the different types of attacks. A SA-task became a case when an expert 
cyber defender was able to provide a full description of forming a situation assessment from the 
initial detection of an attack to deciding on which actions to take to combat the attack.  
The CDM (Klein et al., 1989) served as the foundation of semi-structured interviews  
conducted with 21 expert cyber defenders.  For data analysis, the researcher followed a directed 
content analysis approach (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999) and 
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developed coding categories based on LIS models of (professional information seeking and task 
complexity) and NDM research. The LIS models included Taylor’s (1986) IUE Model, Leckie et 
al.’s (1996) GMISP, and LIS task-complexity research (Byström & Järvelin, 1995). The NDM 
approaches included the RPD Model (Klein, 1993) and the CCT (Hammond et al., 1997). To 
enhance the research quality of the dissertation research, the dissertation researcher conducted 
intercoder reliability testing on all coding categories. 
Pattern matching was used to examine the emergence of patterns of information-source 
use, information-type use, and cognitive modes used for wach SA-task type (the phishing 
attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks).  The overall patterns found for each 
SA-task type were compared with patterns found in the other SA-task types. The dissertation 
researcher also used the Freeman-Halton extension (Freeman & Halton, 1951) of Fisher’s Exact 
test , to examine relationship between SA-task complexity and several information behaviors. 
The frequencies of information-source use and information-type use were derived from the 
interview transcripts and used in the statistical analysis. Figure 6 provides an overview of the 
multiple-case studies design, adapted from Yin (2009, p. 57), that was used for the dissertation 
research.   
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Figure 6. Overview of Multiple Case Studies Design Used for the Dissertation Research 
 
 
 
3.2 Case Study Approach  
3.2.1 Background of the Case Study Approach  
Characteristics of Case Studies  
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A case study is defined as a strategy for examining “in depth a program, an event, an 
activity, a process, or one or more individuals” (Creswell, 2009, p. 15). Case study research can 
describe phenomena, build theory or test existing theoretical concepts and relationships (Cavaye, 
1996). Benbasat, Goldstein, and Mead (1987, p. 371) state that in the case study approach 
researchers study phenomenon in a natural setting, examine one or a few entities (person, group 
or organization), do not impose experimental controls, answer “how” or “why” questions, and 
focus on contemporary events. Case studies have been used in a wide variety of research 
domains including deception detection (Thomas & Biros, 2011), information systems (Cavaye, 
1996; Walsham, 1995), and LIS (Fidel, 1984; Zach, 2006).  
Case study research often consists of qualitative methods (although quantitative methods 
may also be used), and multiple data collection techniques including interviews, observations, 
questionnaires, and document analysis (Darke, Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998). Creswell (2009) 
states that a researcher should select either a quantitative or qualitative (as well as mixed 
methods) approach based on the researcher’s experience and training.  
3.2.2 Single vs. Multiple Case Studies  
A case study researcher can select either a single-case study design or a multiple-case 
studies design. A single-case study design is appropriate when a single case represents either a 
critical case for testing a theory, an extreme or unique case, a representative or typical case, a 
revelatory case, or a longitudinal case (R. K. Yin, 2009). Additionally, within a single case study, 
a researcher can employ an embedded design in which the researcher uses multiple units of 
analysis, such as an entire organization, a department in the organization, and individuals all 
within the same case study (R. K. Yin, 2009).  
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The multiple-case studies design consists of a researcher conducting multiple single-case 
studies. The multiple-case studies design allows for cross-case comparisons and the potential for 
generalizable results. The use of multiple-case studies can strengthen research findings as in the 
case of using multiple experiments to strengthen experimental research findings (Benbasat et al., 
1987). However, multiple cases are not selected for statistical sampling purposes; rather multiple 
cases are selected for theoretical reasons. Cases are selected for either literal replication, in which 
similar results are predicted across cases, or for theoretical replication, in which contradictory 
results are predicted across cases for anticipated reasons (Benbasat et al., 1987). In order to 
strengthen research findings and to conduct cross-case comparisons, a multiple-case studies 
design was selected for this dissertation research. Cases consisted of SA-tasks completed by 
expert cyber defenders from small defense companies (companies with less than 500 employees 
that were awarded contracts to work with the DoD) when responding to phishing attacks, zero-
day exploits, and malware attacks. 
3.3 Multiple-Case Studies Approach for the Dissertation Research  
This section provides a more in-depth description of steps used in multiple-case studies 
research design of this dissertation research. These steps included the use of theoretical 
propositions, selection of cases, data collection, the conducting of the case studies, data analysis, 
and the writing up of findings. Yin’s (2009) guided approach for conducting case studies 
provided the foundation for this dissertation research design. Prior to beginning the dissertation 
research, the researcher received Institutional Review Board approval to conduct the overall 
study (Appendix A. Institutional Review Board Approval).  
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3.3.1 Theoretical Propositions  
The first step in the multiple-case studies design consists of using theoretical propositions 
to guide the research. According to Yin (2009), theoretical propositions provide a basis for the 
overall research objectives and data collection methods. As Cavaye (1996) stated, case study 
research can describe phenomena, build theory or test existing theoretical concepts and 
relationships. Based on data drawn from 74 issues of the “Academy of Management Journal” 
spanning 50 years, Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) developed a taxonomy of theoretical 
contributions along two dimensions: theory building and theory testing. This taxonomy is shown 
in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Taxonomy of Theoretical Contributions from Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007, 0. 
1283) 
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In this taxonomy, building new theory (located on the vertical axis) “…captures the 
degree to which an empirical article clarifies or supplements existing theory or introduces 
relationships and constructs that serve as the foundations for new theory” (Colquitt & Zapata-
Phelan, 2007, p. 1283). Theory testing, located on the horizontal access, “…captures the degree 
to which existing theory is applied in an empirical study as a means of grounding a specific set of 
a priori hypotheses”  (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007, p. 1284) 
Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan (2007) also define five distinct types of studies: reporters, 
testers, qualifiers, builders, and expanders.  
 Reporters hold low levels of theory building and theory testing.  
 Testers contain high levels of theory testing but low levels of theory building.  
 Qualifiers contain moderate levels of theory building and theory testing. 
 Builders contain high levels of theory building but low level of theory testing. 
 Expanders contain high levels of theory building and testing.  
This dissertation research focuses on testing theory rather than building theory and 
therefore is labeled as a “tester.” The main theoretical research propositions tested in this 
dissertation research focus on theoretical propositions from LIS task-complexity research  
(Byström & Järvelin, 1995) and the CCT (Hammond et al., 1997) . These theoretical 
propositions include the following:  
As task complexity increases... 
 the number of information sources used increases  (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the number of external sources  used increases (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the number of people used as sources increases  (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the number of experts used increases (LIS task-complexity research) 
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 the use of domain information and problem solving information increases (LIS task-
complexity research) 
 the use of intuitive cognition increases (CCT)  
3.3.2 Selection of Cases 
In this dissertation research, cases consisted of expert cyber defenders completing 
phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks. Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 373) 
stated that when focusing on individuals or processes in work settings (as in the case of 
completing SA-tasks), case selection criteria may include characteristics such as “the industry, 
company size, organizational structure, profit/not-for-profit status, and public or private 
ownership” as well as other criteria. The dissertation researcher invited expert cyber defenders to 
participate in the study if they worked for small defense companies with less than 500 
employees. According to 2011-2012 data provided on the Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program’s website (http://www.sbir.gov/), the DoD awarded 1644 small defense 
companies SBIR contracts to work with DoD agencies in 2011 and 2012.  
The researcher selected small defense companies as criteria for case selection for several 
reasons. Defense companies, due to their interactions with the DoD and their possession of 
classified data, make them prime targets for cyber attacks. Furthermore, small defense 
companies are perceived to have lower staff numbers, lower budgets, and fewer resources than 
large defense companies all of which contribute to making small defense companies high-value 
targets for cyber attackers. Additionally, cyber defenders in small companies typically complete 
the entire cyber defense cycle by themselves rather than as part of a team. The dissertation 
researcher wanted to ensure that the cyber defenders in the study could provide an in-depth view 
of forming situation assessments of cyber attacks.  Cyber defenders that work for large 
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companies often work on teams and may only be able to provide in-depth views on one task of 
the cyber defense cycle (such as post-incident activity) and not the SA-task.  
Additional criteria used to select research participants included level of expertise. There 
lacks a standard definition for the number of years of experience that an expert should have. For 
example, the years of experience for experts cited from previous research ranges from five years 
(Benner, 2001) to ten years of experience (Klein et al., 1986). For this dissertation research, 
expert cyber defenders were considered to be cyber professionals who held at least seven years 
of experience in detecting and analyzing cyber attacks. Seven years was selected since it falls in 
the middle of the range of five years to ten years. The research participants for this dissertation 
research held an average of 11 years of experience with a range of 8-15 years of experience. 
Table 7 displays the years of experience, education background, and titles of roles held by the 
expert cyber defenders who participated in the study. The cyber security industry has a high 
incidence of males. All research participants were males and this not surprising considering the 
domain.  
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Table 7 
Background of Expert Cyber Defenders Interviewed 
Expert Cyber 
Defender (CD) 
Years of 
Experience 
Education 
Background 
Title of Role 
  
State 
  
CD1 10 years  B. S., M. S.  Cyber security operations 
manager 
 NY   
CD2 13 years  B. S. Information security 
consultant 
 VA   
CD3 10 years B. S. Network security 
specialist 
 VA   
CD4 13 years B. S. Cyber security consultant  MD   
CD5 15 years B. S., M. S.  Network security 
administrator  
 DC   
CD6 10 years B. S., M.S. Information operations 
specialist  
 PA   
CD7 8 years  B. S.  Information assurance 
engineer  
 VA   
CD8 11 years B. S.  Senior information 
assurance consultant  
 CA   
CD9 12 years B. S.  Security engineer  FL   
CD10 10 years B. S. Network engineer  TN   
CD11 10 years  B.A Systems administrator  CO   
CD12 11 years  B. S., M.S. Systems administrator   CO   
CD13 9 years B. S Information systems 
manager 
 MD   
CD14 8 years B. S., M.S. Information security 
professional  
 FL   
CD15 12 years B. S Information systems 
manager 
 TN   
CD16 10 years B. S., M.A. Network security 
manager  
 NY   
CD17 11 years  B. S Chief information officer  MA   
CD18 11 years B. S. Chief information 
security officer 
 PA   
CD19 8 years B. S., M.S. Network engineer   UT   
CD20 15 years B. S. Information assurance 
manager 
 WA   
CD21 12 years B. S., M.S. Cyber security analyst   MA   
 
 
 
All of the expert cyber defenders are males as shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8 
Gender of Expert Cyber Defenders Interviewed 
Expert Cyber Defender (CD) 
  
Gender  
  
CD1  Male   
CD2  Male   
CD3  Male   
CD4  Male   
CD5  Male   
CD6  Male   
CD7  Male   
CD8  Male   
CD9  Male   
CD10  Male   
CD11  Male   
CD12  Male   
CD13  Male   
CD14  Male   
CD15  Male   
CD16  Male   
CD17  Male   
CD18  Male   
CD19  Male   
CD20  Male   
CD21  Male   
 
 
The small defense companies that expert cyber defenders work for complete various 
types of projects for the DoD. Examples of these projects include: developing automated 
maintenance tools for a new class of submarines, modeling intelligence information gathering 
processes, designing new hardware for new classes of Navy ships, developing effective training 
methodologies for soldiers entering high stakes environments, and developing facial recognition 
software for drones.  
There lacks a hard-set rule on the number of cases to include in a multiple-case studies 
design. Yin (2009) suggests using two to three case studies for literal replication and using four 
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to six more cases for theoretical replication; however, Yin (2009, p. 58) also states that 
designating the number of replications depends upon the level of certainty desired by the 
researcher. According to Eisenhardt (1989), the appropriate number of cases depends on how 
much is known about the phenomenon under study and how much new information will emerge 
from adding more cases. As the researcher approached 38 cases derived from 21 interviews with 
expert cyber defenders, the researcher found that no new findings emerged from the data 
resulting in saturation. The researcher consulted with the dissertation supervisor of this 
dissertation research and the decision was made to discontinue data collection.   
3.3.3 Data Collection – Critical Decision Method  
Benbasat et al. (1987, p. 374) stated that the goal of case study research is “to obtain a 
rich set of data surrounding the specific research issue, as well as capturing the contextual 
complexity.”  Although various sources of evidence should be considered in a case study design, 
interviews are considered to be one of the most important data collection techniques in case 
study research (Walsham, 1995; R. K. Yin, 2009). Interviews allow a researcher to gain access to 
the interpretations of the participants as well the participants’ views of themselves and others 
(Walsham, 1995).   
The dissertation researcher used semi-structured interviews as the primary data collection 
method for this dissertation research.  The initial questions of each interview focused on the 
background information of the expert cyber defenders including length of time in the field, 
education level, and title of role. The remainder of the interview focused on the CDM. Klein, 
Calderwood, and Macgregor (1989, p. 464) define CDM as “a retrospective interview strategy 
that applies a set of cognitive probes to actual non-routine incidents that required expert 
judgment or decision making.” CDM has been categorized as a method for “eliciting intuitive, 
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experienced based knowledge” of experts (Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993, p. 43). Probe 
questions used in CDM identify important cues, choice points, actions plans and the role of 
experience (Raanan Lipshitz et al., 2001, pp. 343–344) 
CDM evolved from Flanagan’s (1954) critical incident technique (CIT) which was 
developed from interviews and reports given in response to critical aviation incidents. Both the 
CIT and CDM focus on specific incidents which provide rich sources of data and allow for the 
elicitation of tacit knowledge that is not part of formalized procedures in the domain (Crandall, 
Hoffman, & Shadbolt, 1998). By focusing on specific incidents, researchers gain more specific 
and useful information from research participants rather than focusing on every-day, routine 
events (Klein et al., 1989). CDM differs from the CIT in that CDM focuses on eliciting 
responses that allow the participants to reflect on strategies they used and the bases for their 
decisions (Klein et al., 1989, p. 465). 
According to Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993),  CDM has been used in various 
domains including critical care nursing, computer programming, fireground command, 
instructional design, design engineering, and battle planning. Results from CDM can be used 
“for training, taxonomies of informational or diagnostic cues, and as a basis for assessing skill 
levels” (Raanan Lipshitz et al., 2001). CDM consists of five steps: selecting an incident, 
obtaining an unstructured incident account, constructing an incident timeline, performing 
decision point identification, and conducting decision point probing. These five steps of CDM 
are discussed below in relation to the dissertation research.  
Selecting an Incident 
Klein et al. (1989) suggested that researchers ask the interviewees to select an incident 
that was challenging to respond to and required a high level of expertise. Interviewees might 
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provide examples of different incidents; however, a researcher can guide the interviewee to focus 
on one incident first and other incidents if time allows. For the dissertation research, expert cyber 
defenders were asked to discuss a recent cyber attack that required their expertise to conduct 
research on it. The attacks discussed included phishing attempts, zero-day exploits, and malware 
attacks. In several of the cases, research participants discussed more than one type of cyber 
attack.  
Obtaining an Unstructured Incident Account 
After deciding on an attack to examine, the expert cyber defenders were asked to provide 
an account of the attack from initial detection of the attack to when the research was completed 
on the attack. The expert cyber defenders were allowed to proceed uninterrupted when providing 
their initial accounts.  According to Klein et al. (1989, p. 466), this technique allows the 
interviewee to provide his or her own “phenomenological perspective of the event” which helps 
offset the researcher’s biases of the event. Additionally,  Klein et al. (1989, p. 466) state that this 
procedure also helps to develop a high level of cooperation from interviewees since the 
researchers can be immediately be viewed as “listeners rather than interrogators.”  Below is an 
example of an uninterrupted phishing-attempt SA-task account provided by Cyber Defender 
Interviewee 6 (CD 6)  
First, I became aware of the potential phishing email thanks to my [email] security 
system. Upon opening the email within my security system, I looked at the header 
information. This email in particular displayed that is was coming from a .gov address 
and described a conference that was coming up. I wanted to see if the actual sender 
displayed truly represented coming from a .gov email address. The header showed that 
the email was coming from a yahoo account. In some cases, government contractors who 
send out conference invites do actually use non-.gov email address but not usually a 
general email like Yahoo or Gmail. The contractors use their .org emails. This email also 
had an attachment and links within the email. I opened the attachment, which was a PDF 
within my system to see what it would do. Numerous processes started which I noted. 
This processes indicated executables starting that normally a PDF would not initiate. 
Also, I used Internet Explorer to view the actual landing page of the conference link in 
 82 
 
the email as I suspected the landing page was different then what the displayed linked 
said. After viewing the header, examining processes from opening the file, and examining 
the links, I determined that the email under review was a malicious email that was trying 
to trick the recipient into downloading the file or clicking on the link. CD6 
 
Constructing an Incident Timeline and Identifying Decision Points 
While listening to the uninterrupted account, the researcher developed an incident 
timeline or a series of steps as stated by the interviewees (Klein et al., 1989). Things to note on 
the timeline include specific actions taken or decisions made as well as the thoughts and 
perceptions reported by the interviewees. When constructing the incident timeline, a researcher 
will ask clarifying questions to fill in any gaps when comparing the timeline to the initial 
uninterrupted incident account. The purpose of identifying decision points is to allow for further 
probing around each decision (Klein et al., 1989). The remainder of the interviews focused on 
these decision points. Based on the incident account provided above by CD6, the following 
timeline was created: 
 Became aware of potential phishing email by notice from email security system 
 Reviewed email header information  
o Reviewed sender email address 
 Determined email was not from “displayed” email sender  
 Examined file within email  
o Examined processes started when opening file  
 Determined processes were malicious  
 Examined link within email  
o Used Internet Explorer to examine actual landing page 
 Determined “displayed” landing page was deceptive 
 Determined email under review was a phishing email 
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Conduct Decision Point Probing 
For each decision point identified, a researcher can select from several cognitive probe 
types as shown in Table 9. Although CDM provides specific cognitive probes to use, Crandall 
and Getchell-Reiter (1993) stated that interviewers should use active listening skills, use probes 
as they see fit depending on the decision point (i.e. not using all probe questions for each 
decision point), and be flexible in varying the order of questions.  
Table 9   
Critical Decision Method Interview Probes 
Critical Decision Interview Probes Probe Content 
Cues What were you seeing, hearing, smelling…? 
Knowledge What information did you use in making this 
decision and how was it obtained? 
Analogues Were you reminded of any previous 
experience? 
Goals What were your specific goals at this time? 
Options What other courses of actions were considered 
by or available to you? 
Basis 
How was this option selected? How were other 
options rejected? What rule was being 
followed? 
Experience What specific training or experience was 
necessary or helpful in making this decision? 
Aiding If the decision was not the best, what training, 
knowledge or information could have helped? 
Time Pressure How much time pressure was involved in 
making this decision? 
Situational Assessment 
Imagine you were asked to describe the 
situation to a relief officer at this point, how 
would you summarize the situation? 
Hypotheticals 
If a key feature of the situation had been 
different, what difference would it have made 
in your decision?  
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Overall, the cognitive probes used for each decision in CDM solicit the following: “goals 
that were considered during the incident; options that were generated, evaluated, and eventually 
chosen; cue utilization; contextual elements; and situation assessment factors specific to 
particular decisions” (Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993, p. 43). The CDM interview protocol 
used for this dissertation research is provided in Appendix B. Interview Protocol. 
3.3.4 Conducting the Case Studies   
For the dissertation research, each participant in this study was contacted directly via 
email if their email address was publicly accessible (see Appendix C. Recruitment Email). If 
their email address was not publicly accessible, the researcher contacted a human resources 
representative of the company, identified the researcher by name and affiliation, provided a brief 
explanation of the study, and requested the contact information of an expert cyber defender. The 
dissertation researcher has numerous contacts in the defense industry. These contacts suggested 
companies and expert cyber defenders that the researcher could contact. The previous military 
experience of the researcher helped to establish credibility and helped to establish rapport with 
the research participants. The researcher conducted the interviews via telephone since traveling 
to 21 interview sites would have taken a considerable amount of time beyond the scope of this 
dissertation research.  
When approaching companies for case study research, Darke et al. stated (1998, p. 280) 
that a case study researcher needs to ensure that the research problems are “appropriate in terms 
of their interest, significance and value” for both the research community and for the 
practitioners under study. Expert cyber defenders were approached with the identification of the 
problem (cyber defenders researching cyber attacks) and the potential benefits of the study 
(improving the research process). 
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The researcher tape recorded each interview after receiving permission from the research 
participants. Eisenhardt (1989) recommends writing down all impressions because they may at 
the time seem insignificant but later turn out to be significant to the study. During the interview 
and immediately after each interview, the researcher took impressionistic notes to capture 
impressions in the moment.  
Given the sensitive nature of this cyber defense research topic, numerous steps were 
taken to protect the confidentiality of the expert cyber defenders’ identities and information 
shared. These steps included letting the expert cyber defenders know that their names and the 
names of their companies (as well as any other identifying information) would not be shared, the 
tape recording of semi-structured interviews was optional, and write-ups about their cases prior 
to the sharing of results could be viewed. Furthermore, the expert cyber defenders were assured 
that they could cease their participation in the study at any time and that they did not have to 
provide answers for every question asked. The dissertation researcher noted in a couple of cases 
in which an expert cyber defender stated that he or she did not want a specific piece of 
information shared in the final report.  
3.3.5 Directed Content Analysis  
The interview data for each case, including the recordings of the interviews and the 
researcher’s notes taken during and after the interviews, were reviewed using content analysis to 
look for themes, propositions and questions of the case study (R. K. Yin, 2009). When using 
content analysis, a researcher can select one of three approaches: conventional, summative or 
directed (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). These approaches are summarized in Table 10. 
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Table 10  
Types of Content Analysis 
 
 
 
Conventional or classical content analysis consists of drawing codes from data that are 
under analysis rather than reviewing the data with predetermined theories or models. Therefore, 
researchers use an inductive approach in the content analysis (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 
1999). Theories and relevant models are discussed in the findings rather than at the onset of the 
research study. Hsieh and Shannon (2005, pp. 1279–1280) state that an advantage of using the 
conventional content analysis is letting the data tell the story without “imposing preconceived 
categories or theoretical perspectives.” 
Summative content analysis consists of initially “identifying and quantifying certain 
words or content in text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or 
content” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). The main purpose in the initial step of summative 
content analysis is to explore usage of words and not to infer meaning. Following the analysis of 
usage, a researcher then attempts to discover underlying meanings of words or content. 
Summative analysis can provide insights to how certain words are used. 
Type of Content 
Analysis  
Study Starting 
Points  
Timing for Defining 
Codes or Keywords 
Source of Codes or 
Keywords 
Conventional 
content analysis  
Observation  Codes are defined 
during data analysis  
Codes are derived 
from data 
Summative 
content analysis  
Keywords Keywords are identified 
before and during data 
analysis  
Keywords are 
derived from 
interest of 
researchers or 
review of literature  
Directed content 
analysis  
Theory or previous 
research 
Codes are defined 
before data analysis  
Codes are derived 
from theory or 
relevant findings 
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Directed content analysis consists of a deductive approach and uses previous theory and 
research in the analysis (Mayring, 2000; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). In this approach, 
researchers provide the following: explicit definitions of coding categories, examples from 
research participant responses, and coding rules derived from theory and previous research 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000). Additionally, a researcher can develop his or her own 
subcategories of predetermined main categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  By basing coding 
categories on existing theory, the researcher can increase the confidence of his or her coding 
scheme (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999).  Directed content analysis was selected as the final 
approach for the dissertation research and coding categories were based on LIS models of 
professional information seeking and NDM. The LIS models included Taylor’s (1986) IUE 
Model, Leckie et al.’s (1996) GMISP, and LIS task-complexity research (Byström & Järvelin, 
1995). The NDM approaches included the RPD Model (Klein, 1993) and the CCT (Hammond et 
al., 1997). 
The researcher used Weft QDA,
4
 an open source qualitative data analysis tool, to aid in 
the directed content analysis. Weft QDA provided a method for coding each transcript based on 
codes derived from previous LIS and NDM research, for annotating segments as needed for 
further review, and for viewing segments that only fell under a selected code. For example, after 
coding all of the interview texts, the researcher could select the code “time pressure” and view 
segments from all of the interviews that discussed or were related to “time pressure.” Weft QDA 
provided a robust way of coding and sorting the interview data. The following section provided 
the details of the coding categories used for analysis while utilizing Weft QDA.  
Coding Categories  
                                                          
4
 http://www.pressure.to/qda/ 
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Tasks 
The categories of SA-tasks were not predetermined; rather the categories of SA-tasks 
evolved from the data of initial cases (from Interviews 1-4) and were reaffirmed in the later cases 
(from Interviews 5-9). The three categories of SA-tasks include the phishing attempt, zero-day 
exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks.  
Phishing Attempts 
Phishing consists of an adversary sending a fake email to a broad audience. The fake 
email aims to deceive the receivers into clicking on links or downloading innocent-looking files, 
which contain malicious software. Spear-phishing is a type of phishing tactic that specifically 
targets a small number of users based on background research conducted by the adversary. For 
this dissertation research, the term phishing will be used as a broad category for both phishing 
emails and spear-phishing emails. To combat phishing attempts, expert cyber defenders use 
email security systems from various vendors. These email security systems attempt to 
automatically detect and delete suspect emails as well as bring questionable emails (emails that 
may actually be legitimate) to the attention of expert cyber defenders. 
Zero-Day Exploits 
Zero-day exploits (also called zero-day vulnerabilities) consist of an adversary exploiting 
a hole in the code of software.  Vendors, such as Adobe and Microsoft, provide protection for 
software that they distribute to protect the end user. However, adversaries find holes in the 
vendors’ security measures and attempt to exploit the holes. “Zero-day” represents the first day 
that the exploit is known. As an example, in February of 2013, a zero-day exploit was found for 
Adobe providing the opportunity for adversaries to send PDFs with malicious software or 
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tracking software to unsuspecting users
5
.  Other examples of software compromised by zero-day 
exploits include Internet Explorer
6
 and Java
7
.  When forming situation assessments of zero-day 
exploits, expert cyber defenders review the software versions that are impacted to see if the 
exploits affect the systems that the defenders have in place.  
Malware Attacks  
Malware, malicious software, represents a dangerous threat to expert cyber defenders. 
The response to a malware attack consists monitoring an intrusion and detection system (IDS) or 
intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS), antivirus software, and network device logs 
for suspicious activity. Once suspicious activity is found expert cyber defenders will attempt to 
find more details to determine if an attack is taking place. If an active attack is taking place, the 
expert cyber defenders will attempt to examine the capabilities of the malware and the potential 
impacts.  
All three SA-tasks (forming a situation assessment of phishing attempts, zero-day 
exploits, and malware attacks) consist of expert cyber defenders becoming aware of the threats 
and then evaluating the impact of the threats to determine future actions.  
Task Complexity 
The characteristics used to examine SA-task complexity in this dissertation research were 
drawn from numerous studies as shown in Table 11.  
 
 
                                                          
5
 http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa13-02.html 
6
 http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/05/internet-explorer-zero-day-exploit-targets-nuclear-weapons-
researchers/ 
7
 http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/03/another-java-zero-day-exploit-in-the-wild-actively-attacking-
targets/ 
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Table 11  
Task Complexity Characteristics Used for the Dissertation Research 
Task Characteristic Low Complexity High Complexity Sources 
A priori 
determinability of 
inputs 
Initial state 
understood 
Initial state not 
understood  
MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984), Byström and 
Järvelin (1995), Leckie 
et al. (1996), Hammond 
et al.  (1997) 
A priori 
determinability of 
outcomes  
Possible 
outcomes 
understood 
Possible outcomes 
not understood 
MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984), Byström and 
Järvelin (1995), 
Hammond et al.  (1997) 
Level of task 
variety  
Low level of task 
variety 
High level of task 
variety  
MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984), Leckie et al. 
(1996), Hammond et al.  
(1997) 
Level of risk  Low level of risk  High level of risk  MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984), Klein (2008) 
Level of  time 
pressure  
Low level of time 
pressure 
High level of time 
pressure 
Hammond et al.  (1997), 
Klein (2008) 
 
 
 
For tasks with low complexity, the inputs, processes, and outcomes of tasks can be a 
priori determined and there is low task variety, low risk, and low time pressure. For tasks with 
high complexity, the inputs, processes, and outcomes of tasks cannot be a priori determined and 
there is high task variety, high risk and high time pressure. Tasks with medium complexity 
consist of a mixture of task characteristics of low and high complex tasks. Further explanation of 
these codes can be found in 
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Appendix D. Task Complexity Coding.  
Information Source Types 
The categories of information sources were drawn from Leckie et al.  (1996) and 
Byström (2002) who defined broad categories of information. Additional categories were added 
based on the iterative review of each case. Leckie et al. (1996) defined three broad categories of 
information sources: formal, informal, and personal. Byström (2002, p. 583) also defined three 
broad categories of information sources: people, documentary sources (formal) and visits. 
Additionally, both Leckie et al. (1996) and Byström (2002) allowed each broad category to be 
labeled as either internal or external. As recommend by Byström’s (1999, p. 47), these broad 
categories were combined and tailored for this dissertation research. The information source 
categories include: 
 People Types (people contacted purposely by research participants for two-way 
communication) 
o People concerned directly with the matter at hand (organizational team members, 
supervisors, subordinates or colleagues involved in the task) 
o Experts (people not a priori connected with the task at hand but who hold 
expertise in solving the problem or related problem) 
 Internal –sources within the organization or on a company’s network; examples  
o Entity under review (phishing email or malware attack) that is located within the 
organization’s network 
o Server logs, log files 
o Network activity  
o Fellow employees or colleagues; experts within the company  
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 External – sources outside of organization; examples:  
o Social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, MySpace)  
o Online forums  
o Blogs (either company sponsored or individual authored)  
o Open source in general (stating “open source” but not clarifying further) 
o Websites provided by vendors  
o Experts from outside of the company 
Information Types 
Information type categories were primarily drawn from Byström and Järvelin (1995).  
 Technical or Task Information: this information describes the structure, properties, 
and requirements of the task/problem at hand (e.g. names, numbers, places, 
statements or events.) “This information type is seen to comprise mainly answers to 
the information requirements that are related only to the particular task” (Byström, 
1999, p. 45).  Examples for this dissertation research include technical code, 
capabilities, potential impacts, and software versions of compromised software.  
 Domain Information (Information on How to Solve a Type of Cyber Attack 
Problem): this information consists of laws, concepts, facts, and proven theories of 
the task/problem; applicable to several tasks of the same kind. Examples for this 
dissertation research include information about how to detect phishing emails in 
general, how to respond to zero-day vulnerabilities in general or how to respond 
malware attacks in general.  
 Problem-solving information (General Information about Cyber Defense): this 
information covers the methods or procedures across several tasks. It describes how 
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problems should be viewed and formulated and what domain information should be 
used. Examples for this dissertation research include how to go about planning for 
and responding to cyber attacks in general (such as the NIST cyber incident handling 
guide) and how to set up defenses to detect and analyze cyber attacks. 
Cognitive Modes 
The foundation for coding cognitive modes stems from the CCI of the CCT  (Hammond 
et al., 1997). The characteristics of cognitive modes used for this dissertation research are 
provided in Table 12.  
 
 
Table 12 
Characteristics of Cognitive Modes Used for the Dissertation Research 
Cognitive Mode 
Characteristic 
Intuitive Cognition Analytical Cognition Sources 
Insight into the 
judgment process 
Low insight into 
judgment process, 
difficult to retrace and 
defend 
High insight into 
judgment process; 
publicly retraceable 
(Hammond, 1980) 
Level of methods or 
rules used 
Not methods driven; 
no rules used 
Methods driven; rules 
used  
(Hamm, 1988a; 
Hammond, 1980) 
Basis of decision Based on experience  Based on training or 
education  
(Hamm, 1988a; 
Hammond, 1980) 
Confidence in method Low confidence in 
method 
High confidence in 
method 
(Hammond, 1980) 
 
 
 
Details for coding cognitive modes are provided in Appendix E. Cognitive Modes 
Coding. 
 
Intercoder Reliability   
Although the dissertation researcher established coding categories based on coding from 
previous research (LIS models on professional information and NDM approaches including the 
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RPD Model and the CCT), there still exists the possibility of subjectivity used in the coding 
(Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). To increase the reliability of the coding, the dissertation 
tested for intercoder reliability (Krippendorff, 2004). 
Hayes and Krippendorff  (2007, p. 78) stated that intercoder reliability consists of 
“…evaluating whether a coding instrument, serving as common instructions to different 
observers of the same set of phenomena, yields the same data within a tolerable margin of error.” 
The greater the agreement between independent observers, the greater the reliability of the 
coding instrument (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007).  
The dissertation researcher used Cohen’s Kappa values to test for intercoder reliability.  
According to Neuendorf (2002, p. 145) “a coefficient of .90 or greater would be acceptable to all, 
.80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that, there exists disagreement.” 
For this dissertation research, a Cohen’s Kappan value of .80 was deemed to be acceptable.  
When testing intercoder reliability, testing all of the data is labor and time intensive. Therefore, 
Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken (2004) recommend testing a sample of the data with a 
measure of 50 units of analysis or 10 % of the data depending on the needs of the study.  The 
testing of intercoder reliability for this dissertation research involved the coding of data from 4 
cases of the 38 cases examined (11% of the data).  
Testing for intercoder reliability consisted of two sessions. The first session consisted of 
the dissertation researcher explaining the dissertation’s code book to the independent reviewer. 
The code book included categories falling under task complexity, information source and 
information types, and cognitive modes. After gaining an understanding of the coding categories, 
the independent reviewer coded a sample of the data. The dissertation researcher and the 
independent reviewer then compared their coding results for this first sample. For most of the 
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categories, in general, the dissertation researcher and independent reviewer agreed on the coding. 
However, considerable differences were found in the following categories: “Initial State of 
Attack Understood” (falling under the main Task Complexity category) and “General 
Information about Cyber Defense” (falling under the main Information Source and Information 
Types category). The dissertation researcher and independent reviewer shared their 
interpretations of the coding for these two categories. The discussion resulted in the dissertation 
researcher defining these two categories more explicitly. 
A second round of coding was then conducted on the remaining data. The final results 
were discussed between the dissertation researcher and the independent reviewer. The results 
showed that the coding among the categories was generally in agreement. The Cohen’s Kappa 
was then calculated for all 25 categories after all of the data was coded. For all categories, the 
Cohen’s Kappa values were found to be greater than .80.  The final results of the agreements 
between the dissertation researcher and the independent reviewer are shown in Tables 13-15. 
 
Table 13  
Cohen's Kappa Values for Task Complexity Coding Categories 
Task Complexity Coding Categories Cohen’s Kappa Value 
Initial state of attack understood 0.912 
Initial state of attack not understood 0.945 
Possible outcomes of attack understood 0.978 
Possible outcomes of attack not understood 1.00 
Low level of task variety  0.842 
High level of task variety   1.00 
Low level of risk   1.00 
High level of risk  0.945 
Low time pressure 0.988 
High time pressure  0.966 
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Table 14 
Cohen's Kappa Values for Information Source and Information Type Coding Categories 
Information Source and Information 
Type Coding Categories 
Cohen’s Kappa Value 
Person as a source 0.891 
Internal source 0.912 
External source 0.955 
Expert   0.967 
Technical information for task at hand 0.898 
Information on how to solve a type of 
cyber attack problem    0.875 
General information about cyber defense   0.845 
 
 
 
Table 15 
Cohen's Kappa Values for Cognitive Modes Coding Categories 
Cognitive Modes Coding Categories Cohen’s Kappa Value 
Low insight into judgment process 0.924 
High insight into judgment process 1.00 
Use of rules or methods 1.00 
No use of rules of methods 1.00 
Formal training or education  0.955 
High confidence in completing task   0.966 
Low confidence in completing task  0.975 
 
 
 
3.3.6 Pattern Matching for Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes  
This dissertation researcher used pattern matching to examine the information behaviors 
and cognitive modes used for each SA-task: the phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware 
attack SA-tasks. Pattern matching consists of comparing patterns found in cases with predicted 
patterns as hypothesized early in a study also known as pattern-matching logic (Robert K. Yin, 
2011). For this dissertation research, the predicted patterns stem from the theoretical propositions 
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of LIS task-complexity research (Byström & Järvelin, 1995) and the theoretical propositions of 
the CCT (Hammond et al., 1997). These predicted patterns include: 
As task complexity increases... 
 the amount of information sources used increases (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the use of external sources increases (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the use of people as sources increases  (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the use of experts increases (LIS task-complexity research) 
 the use of domain information and task solving information increases (LIS task-
complexity research) 
 the use of intuitive cognition increases (CCT) 
Pattern matching consists of identifying preliminary patterns from the literature review, 
augmenting the preliminary patterns with initial interviews, identifying predictable patterns that 
emerge, and evaluating whether subsequent interviews continue match the pattern (Zach, 2006). 
After conducting pattern matching for each SA-task type, the overall patterns of information 
behaviors and cognitive modes used for each SA-task type (phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, 
and malware attack) were then compared against the other SA-task types. The dissertation 
researcher used visual displays to compare patterns across the SA-task types.  
3.3.7 Statistical Analysis of Information Behaviors  
As stated by Yin (2009), statistical analysis can strengthen case study findings. The 
purpose of the statistical analysis was to determine if there was a significant relationship between 
SA-task complexity (low, medium and high) and the use of following information-behavior 
variables:  
 Number of Information Sources Used 
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 Number of External Sources Use 
 Number of People Used as Sources 
 Number of Experts Used as Sources  
 Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used 
The statistical analysis consisted of several steps including:  transforming the frequencies 
of each information-behavior variable into categorical variables of Low, Medium and High; 
creating a contingency table (relationship table) to display the counts of low, medium, and high 
for each information-behavior variable against each SA-task complexity level (low SA-task 
complexity, medium SA-task complexity, and high SA-task complexity); and then conducting 
the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test to test for statistical significance. These steps 
are described in more detail below.  
 
Organizing the Data  
The categories Low, Medium, and High were calculated for each information-behavior 
variable through the use of Excel. For example, for the variable Number of Information Sources 
Used, the frequencies found for the number of information sources used each individual case of 
phishing attempts, zero-day exploits, and malware SA-tasks were all placed into Excel as one 
array. This array consisted of 38 cells (38 represents the total number of cases discussed by 
research participants) with counts of information sources used. The data were then sorted from 
lowest to highest and the Percentile Function with Excel was used on this sorted array of data to 
find the 33rd and 66th percentiles to divide the data into three groups of Low, Medium, and 
High. For example, for Number of Information Sources Used, the 33rd percentile was found to 
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the value of 2 and the 66th percentile was found to be the value of 4. Therefore, original counts 
for number of information sources used were categorized as following:  
 Low Number of Information Sources Used: less than or equal to 2 
 Medium Number of Information Sources Used: 3-4 information sources  
 High Number of Information Sources Used: greater than or equal to 5   
The resulting transformation of frequency counts to categories of Low, Medium, and 
High allowed for the creation of a 3 × 3 matrix to examine relationships. As an example, Table 
16 shows the 3 × 3 matrix for the Number of Information Sources Used (categorized as Low, 
Medium, and High) and the three SA-tasks of low, medium, and high complexity (phishing, 
zero-day exploits, and malware). 
Table 16  
3x3 Contingency Table for Number of Information Sources and SA-Task Complexity 
Number of Information 
Sources 
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing 
Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day 
Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware 
Attacks) 
Low  9 1 0 
Medium  0 9 1 
High  0 2 17 
 
 
 
This type of table able is called a contingency table and shows the combination of values 
of two variables (Ruxton & Neuhäuser, 2010).  The transformation of frequency counts to 
categories resulted in five 3 × 3 contingency tables, one for each of the following information-
behavior variables: Number of Information Sources Used, Number of External Source Used, 
Number of People Used as Sources, Number of External Experts Used, and Number of Technical 
Information Piece Used.  
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Performing the Statistical Test  
After creating the five 3 × 3 tables, the researcher used the Freeman-Halton  extension 
(Freeman & Halton, 1951) of Fisher’s Exact test  to test for significant differences between 
categorical variables. The chi-squared approximation was not suitable for this data analysis due 
to the small sample sizes in this study and several cell values in the contingency tables having a 
value less than five (Howell, 2011).  
The Fisher exact test is used for variables with two categories (2 × 2 cross-tabulation 
tables).  The Freeman-Halton extension was developed to use for variables with three or more 
categories (such as 3 × 3 contingency tables) (Conover & Conover, 1980). Both of these tests are 
used to determine if there are nonrandom associations between categorical variables.  
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test was used in a LIS study focusing on 
the search success of research participants when using online finding-aid systems (Daniels & 
Yakel, 2010).  For example, “search success” was divided into three categories of Low, Medium 
and High and then compared to five occupation categories (historian, genealogist, librarian, 
graduate student, and undergraduate student).  This resulted in a 3 × 5 (search success categories 
by occupation categories) contingency table. The researchers presumed that occupation type was 
important in determining search success. However, the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s 
exact test did not show a significant relationship between search success and occupation type.  
Although SPSS can be used for conducting the calculations for Fisher’s Exact test (2 × 2 
contingency tables), the general educational version of SPSS is not tailored to conduct the 
Freeman-Halton extension for 3 × 3 tables. As a result, Ruxton and Neuhäuser (2010) 
recommended the use of an open-source statistical computational tool provided by Vassar 
College (http://vassarstats.net/). VassarStats provides several statistical computational tools as 
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well as a companion statistics textbook (Lowry, 2013).  Several scientific research studies have 
used the VassarStats open-source statistical computational tool for the Freeman-Halton extension 
of Fisher’s exact test (Bertram, Rook, Fitzsimmons, & Fitzsimmons, 2011; Johannesen, 
Keyghobadi, Schuler, Stauffer, & Vogt, 2013; Zaremba et al., 2009; Zhang & Hammond, 2010). 
As a result, this open-source statistical computational tool was deemed as a credible statistical 
tool to use for this dissertation research. 
Evaluating Test Results  
When using the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s Exact test, the null hypothesis 
states that there is no significant relationship between categorical variables. The alternative 
hypothesis rejects the null hypothesis indicating that there is a significant relationship between 
the categorical variables. The Freeman-Halton extension provides two-tailed p-values of 
probability of significance. The decision to accept or reject the null hypothesis is based on the 
following (Gall, Borg, & Gall, 2007): 
 If the p-value is greater than 0.05, we accept the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relationship between categorical variables 
 If p-value is less than or equal to 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis in that there is a 
significant relationship between categorical variables.  
  
3.3.8 Iterative Nature of Research Design   
Challenges in Initial Research Scope 
The research design for this dissertation research evolved over time from the initial 
proposed research to the final research design. The dashed, light-colored arrows in Figure 6 (the 
overview of the multiple-case studies design selected for this research) signify the iterative 
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nature of case study research. The research focus for this dissertation changed over time due to 
issues found with the significance of original research focus for the participants, issues found 
with lack of research participation from prospective participants, and evidence of themes found 
from the initial data analysis.   
 As Darke et al. stated (1998), a case study researcher needs to ensure that research 
participants consider a study’s focus to be significant. In late 2012, the researcher initially 
intended to interview law enforcement analysts to ask questions about how they detected 
deception in spear-phishing emails. The CCT provided the theoretical framework to examine the 
cognitive processes used in deception detection. However, after informally talking with law 
enforcement analysts and researching online if there were reports of law enforcement agencies 
falling victim to spear phishing attacks, the researcher found that spear phishing was not a 
primary concern for law enforcement agencies. Based on further research, the researcher found 
that several defense companies were recently targeted by and fell victim to spear-phishing 
attempts. This led the researcher to change his research participant focus from law enforcement 
analysts to expert cyber defenders from defense companies.  
After initial IRB approval was received, over 30 interview invitations were sent via email 
to expert cyber defenders from defense companies for a pilot study. However, all but one expert 
declined the invitation to participate due to not feeling comfortable in discussing specific 
deception detection practices. Several expert cyber defenders stated that their deception detection 
practices were confidential and could not be shared. This presented another barrier to research.  
The researcher then discussed this issue informally with expert cyber defenders in his 
network and found that expert cyber defenders tended to conduct a lot of research online to 
understand cyber attacks. Additionally, the researcher found that the information gathered by 
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expert cyber defenders tended to come from publicly available sources. This led the researcher to 
ask expert cyber defenders from defense companies if they were willing to discuss how they 
conducted research on new cyber attacks.  
This change of focused resulted in an increase in the invitation acceptance rate for 
participating in the study. 12 invitations were sent to expert cyber defenders from small defense 
companies requesting participation in the study and all 12 stated that they were willing to 
participate. The researcher was able to set up interviews with 9 of the 12 expert cyber defenders 
for the pilot study. Due to scheduling conflicts and other responsibilities, the other three expert 
cyber defenders requested to participate in the future rather than around the time of pilot study. 
Interestingly, the new approach actually resulted in expert cyber defenders sharing specific 
tactics as well as general strategies for combating cyber attacks including spear-phishing emails.  
Iterative Analysis  
Eisenhardt (1989) recommends becoming intimately familiar with each individual case 
since each case may have its own topics, themes, propositions or questions. The content analysis 
and subsequent comparing of cases resulted in changes in the theoretical framework used for this 
dissertation research. The interview data from first interview were analyzed with content 
analysis. When the second interview was completed, themes from the second interview were 
compared to themes found in the first interview to look for similarities and differences. As the 
third interview was completed, themes from that interview were compared to themes from the 
first two interviews.   
After the fourth interview was completed, the researcher started examining themes across 
the four interviews. In Interview 1, the research participant discussed three examples of tasks: 
phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks. In Interviews 2, 3 and 4, each 
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participant discussed only one type of cyber attack: zero-day exploits (Interview 2) or malware 
attacks (Interviews 3 and 4). The researcher then attempted to see if other research participants 
would discuss more than one type of cyber attack in Interviews 5 and 6. After Interviews 1-6 
were completed, the researcher noticed differences in the responses depending on the types of 
cyber attacks discussed. This prompted a review of LIS task-complexity literature. Cases 7-9 
confirmed differences in responses based on the type of cyber attack discussed and confirmed the 
incorporation of the LIS task-complexity research.  
The first nine interviews conducted for the pilot study were included in the final 21 
interviews conducted for this dissertation research. As Interviews 11-21 were conducted, the 
researcher continued to use an iterative approach in reviewing each case resulting in each case 
being reviewed multiple times. Additionally, the iterative nature of the research design helped 
the researcher maintain an open perspective for the incorporation of other theoretical 
frameworks, such as NDM situation assessment research, into the final overall framework used 
in the dissertation research.  
3.3.9 Writing up Findings    
According to Yin (2009, p. 165), the reporting of findings is critical for case study 
research since the findings  can “make a significant contribution to knowledge or practice.” 
Runeson and Höst (2009, p. 156) suggested using a “linear analytic” structure for reporting on 
case studies. The linear analytic structure provides a description of the problem, related work, 
methods, analysis, and conclusions.  Walsham (1995) stated that case study researchers should 
provide details on the collection of data (sites selected and reasons for this selection) and data 
analysis (how interviews were conducted, how they were analyzed, and how the iterative process 
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between data and theory evolved over time). The linear analytic structure was used in this 
dissertation research.   
Case study research, as well as qualitative research, faces criticisms from quantitative 
researchers that should be considered in the write-up of findings as well as throughout the 
carrying out of case studies. Case study research has received two primary criticisms including 
the perceived lack of rigor and the lack of generalizability (Darke et al., 1998; R. K. Yin, 2009). 
Yin (2009) states that the perceived lack of rigor may stem from previous case studies that did 
not follow a systematic approach.  Yin (2009) also states that non-case study researchers may 
expect case studies to be generalizable to populations (statistical generalization); however, case 
studies are generalizable only to theoretical propositions (analytical generalization). Also, 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that it may be challenging to generalize findings from a single case 
study; however, using a multiple-case studies design can make it easier to generalize findings.  
For this dissertation research, the researcher followed a systematic approach as 
recommended by Yin (2009). Although a systematic approach was followed, case study research 
design allows for flexibility. During the conduct of the multiple-case studies design, the 
researcher for this dissertation research aimed to address credibility, transferability, and validity 
of the research.  
Credibility  
Credibility refers to the focus of the research conducted and how well data and processes 
addressed the focus (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). To address credibility, Zach (2006) 
recommends using a robust data collection plan. In this dissertation research, the researcher used 
a previously defined semi-structured interview technique: the CDM-based semi-structured 
interview technique (Crandall et al., 1998; Klein et al., 1989). During the course of the 
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interviews, the researcher took impressionistic notes and took notes immediately following the 
interview. The interview recordings, interview transcripts, in-progress interview notes, and post-
interview notes provided rich sources of data to analyze. Another way to demonstrate credibility 
is to provide representative quotations from transcribed text (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). The 
researcher included quotations from several research participants in the Findings section in order 
to show the research participants’ perspectives on forming situation assessments of cyber attacks.  
An additional technique for increasing credibility includes member checking. Member 
checking consists of the researcher soliciting reactions of respondents to the researcher’s findings 
(Schwandt, Lincoln, & Guba, 2007; R. K. Yin, 2009). Although member checking can be 
conducted in different ways (as in the case of sharing verbatim reports of participant comments), 
Creswell (2009) recommended that member checks should be conducted with more polished 
reports that demonstrate the themes and patterns found in the data. For this dissertation research, 
the researcher sent the Findings chapter to research participants. Sending the Findings chapter 
has been recommended as one way to increase the credibility of a dissertation study (Demps, 
Lincoln, & Cifuentes, 2011). Five expert cyber defenders provided feedback on the Findings 
section. The member checks provided by the five expert cyber defenders reinforced the findings 
of this dissertation research. Below is representative quotation from an expert cyber defender 
who read the Findings chapter: 
The report that you showed me definitely holds true in my view. I mean for these 
advanced attacks there are no procedures that we follow step-by-step. Rather we make 
decisions based on our previous knowledge and being immersed in this complex 
malicious environment for years. Step-by-step procedures really wouldn’t help us and 
definitely would not help new guys at our company. For simple things like emails, step-
by-step methods can easily be taught and followed. Otherwise, we need to train new guys 
side by side so they can pick up what we experienced professionals do.  CD15 
 
Transferability 
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When addressing transferability, Graneheim and Lundman (2004) suggest providing a 
detailed description of contents, characteristics of research participants, data collection details, 
and description of data analysis. The researcher provided a description of the research 
participants’ education background, years of experience, and title of role held in Table 7. The 
researcher provided details of the CDM-based semi-structured interviews as well as the interview 
protocol in Appendix B. Interview Protocol. Additionally, the researcher provided data analysis 
details in this Method section as well as in 
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Appendix D. Task Complexity Coding and Appendix E. Cognitive Modes 
Coding.   
Validity  
Potter and Levine-Donnerstein (1999) state that one way to address validity in 
content analysis is to develop a coding scheme based on a previously used standard. The 
researcher developed coding schemes based on previous research as shown below:   
 The task complexity coding scheme was derived from LIS studies focused on 
professional information seeking Leckie et al.  (1996), MacMullin and Taylor 
(1984),  Byström and Järvelin (1995), the CCT, and the RPD (Klein, 2008). 
 The information source coding scheme was derived from a foundational 
information seeking of professionals study (Leckie et al., 1996) and a 
foundational task complexity and information behavior study (Byström, 
2002). 
 The information type coding scheme was developed from a previous task 
complexity and information behavior study (Byström & Järvelin, 1995). 
 The cognitive modes coding scheme was derived from previous CCT studies 
(Hamm, 1988a; Hammond, 1980). 
The dissertation researcher also tested for inter-coder reliability in order to 
increase the validity of the coding categories.  For all categories, the Cohen’s Kappa 
values were greater than .80 which is cited as an acceptable level by Neuendorf (2002, p. 
145). 
Theoretical Sensitivity  
 109 
 
Theoretical sensitivity is defined as “…having insight into, and being able to give 
meaning to, the events and happenings in the data” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 46)  and 
can be derived from previous literature and professional experience. As stated in the 
Literature Review section,  situation assessment research that focused on information 
behaviors tended to focus on   decision making in the U.S. Navy surface ship and 
submarine warfare domains (Johnston et al., 1997; Kaempf et al., 1996, 1993; 
Kirschenbaum, 1992; R. Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Randel et al., 1996). This dissertation 
researcher served six years as a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer and faced numerous 
real-world situations examined in these NDM studies.  However, as Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) stated, the researcher must balance his or her own experience with the 
interpretations of the experience as shared by the research participants. To overcome this 
pitfall, the dissertation researcher used the CDM interview to listen to uninterrupted 
accounts of the research participants’ experiences at the beginning of the interview. This 
sets the stage for the researcher being the “listener” and helps offset the researcher’s 
biases of the participants’ experiences (Klein et al., 1989) 
3.4 Limitations of Methods 
A limitation for the methods used for this dissertation research includes the use of 
interviews. The dissertation research relied on the research participants’ ability to recall 
specific events and the reasoning for why they followed the steps that they did. Some 
participants may not have recalled an event accurately or may have altered their 
descriptions of the events. They may have altered their descriptions of the events based 
on having time to reflect on what happened or based on trying to show to the interviewer 
that they successfully completed a task. However, the common themes found across 
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interviews helped mitigate challenges faced with research participants’ recall.  Another 
limitation in the methods includes the use of only one data collection method: semi-
structured interviews. Using multiple methods provides the opportunity for triangulation. 
Given the confidential and sensitive nature of cyber defense, using other methods would 
have provided a challenge for the dissertation research. For example, the conducting 
observations of the expert cyber defenders when forming situation assessments of cyber 
attacks would have been time consuming and may have caused a lack of participation 
from research participants.   
An additional limitation is the sample size. Although 21 expert cyber defenders 
were interviewed for this dissertation research, their experiences in information seeking 
when forming a situation assessment of cyber attacks may not be generalizable to all 
expert cyber defenders. However, the results may be transferable to expert cyber 
defenders who work in companies of similar size. The goal of qualitative research is 
transferability and not generalizability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The limitations stated 
here provide opportunities for future research.  
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
The purpose of this dissertation research was to test the theoretical propositions of 
LIS task-complexity research and the CCT in the context of cyber situation assessment. 
The main research questions are restated here:   
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the information 
behaviors of expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment 
tasks? Included in these behaviors are number of information sources used, 
number of external sources used, number of people used as sources, number 
of experts used as sources, and number of technical pieces of information 
used. 
 How does situation-assessment task complexity influence the cognitive modes 
used by expert cyber defenders when completing situation assessment tasks? 
The cognitive modes include analytical cognition, intuitive cognition, and 
quasi-rational cognition. 
For each SA-task type (the phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack 
SA-task), the following findings are reported on: task complexity, information sources 
used, information types used, and cognitive modes used. Patterns were examined for each 
SA-task type.  Included in these findings are numerous quotations from expert cyber 
defenders that were pulled from the interview transcripts. Expert cyber defenders are 
labeled as CD1, CD2, CD3 etc. based on the order in which they were interviewed.  
After the information behavior and cognitive mode findings for each SA-task type 
are provided, the patterns or each case SA-task type are compared with the patterns from 
the other SA-task types. Finally, the results of statistical analysis are presented based on 
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the number of information sources, information source types, and information types used 
by the expert cyber defenders when completing the SA-tasks.   
4.1 Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-
Task 
4.1.1 Level of Task Complexity of the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
The research participants who discussed the phishing attempt SA-task (CD 1, 6, 8, 
9, 12, 13, 15, 19, and 21) described this task as having a low level of complexity. All of 
these expert cyber defenders used email security systems to deter malicious emails. Email 
security systems use pre-determined criteria to automatically discard or mark suspected 
malicious emails similar to how popular email programs, such as Gmail and YahooMail, 
attempt to automatically identify spam.  Email security systems are customizable in that 
expert cyber defenders can alter the pre-defined criteria or provide their own criteria for 
the systems to use. Additionally, the expert cyber defenders can establish criteria for 
emails that they want to review as stated by CD6. 
I have a [email security system technical] policy set up for our emails. If a new 
email gets through the system, I can go back into the policy and add that IP 
address to it to prevent that IP address from getting another email through. 
However, there are some emails that I want to see such as ones that say they are 
coming from some type of .gov email or something like that. I want to make sure 
we aren’t missing anything. CD6 
 
The emails that are individually reviewed by the expert cyber defenders are 
placed in a queue by the email security system.  
So what you do is review the ones in the queue to make sure that you can purge 
them. Usually these are fake messages, but I have to make sure. I will give a quick 
once over and then either send them on to the employee or discard them. CD8 
 
Our email security system makes it easy to pinpoint the emails that you need to 
review. If we did not use this automation tool I would have to manually go 
through each and every email or place the burden on individual employees to 
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review each email. I am sure most could do that but there is a risk involved too. 
Why add that risk to the employees when a system can do it automatically?   CD15 
 
The emails that need to be reviewed by the expert cyber defenders are based on 
system-defined criteria and expert cyber defender defined criteria. The expert cyber 
defenders know they need to review the email because it is placed in the cue by the email 
security system. Therefore, the initial inputs are understood and provided to the expert 
cyber defenders. The outcomes for the phishing attempt SA-task consist of two options: 
the email is determined to be malicious or the email is determined to not be malicious. 
CD9 and C19 state succinctly:  
It is a straightforward process. It [the email] is either fraudulent or real. There 
are really no surprises. CD9 
 
The process is pretty clear-cut. You determine whether it is a fake message or not. 
CD19.  
 
It is either a choice of a real email that landed in the queue that someone needs or 
a malicious email that will try to get the reader to download [a virus]. CD21 
 
The alternatives (malicious or non-malicious email) are clear to the expert cyber 
defenders.  The expert cyber defenders stated that they used a consistent, straightforward 
approach for reviewing suspected phishing emails:  
All I have to do is look at the sender username, then look at the real email address 
that it is coming from and look at the header. CD1 
 
You go straight to the header. You look at if it is coming from who actually sent 
the email. It is quite simple to actually to do that. It takes little time to see that it is 
coming from a different source than it says it’s coming from. CD8 
 
For every message I need to review, there are clear cut steps or email specifics 
that I look at like the date and time of the email, the files attached, the sender, the 
real sender’s email address and so forth. CD19 
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None of the expert cyber defenders mentioned any unpredictable events or 
occurrences. Furthermore, the email security systems presented suspected emails in a 
static fashion, on a list or in a queue as stated above. The expert cyber defenders also 
seemed to attach a low level of risk with phishing attempts. For example CD1, stated: 
Once every couple of days, someone is trying to use social engineering aka 
phishing on us. However, in all, it is quite easy to catch them with our monitoring 
system. I just review them [emails] if I need to and I see they are coming from a 
previously identified or similar to a previously identified source, you know an IP 
address. If it is a new source, I just add the IP address to a blocking list.  CD1 
 
Similarly, CD15 stated about his company’s email security system:  
Our system is highly reliable in detecting these emails. Even if one gets through, 
our employees are primarily scientists and engineers and I know these guys will 
be able to detect anything fishy in emails they receive. I trust they can make the 
right judgments. C15 
 
The expert cyber defenders discussed the regular occurrence of being hit with 
phishing attempts but did not express concern over them.  
These [phishing] attempts don’t worry us too much since our security solution 
automatically screens for them. And when I have to actually check one out, it’s 
not like it already went through to one of my employees. So there is not a lot of 
risk. Maybe once in a while one will get through but what tends to happen is the 
guy who received something that seems a little off, he will ping me to let me know. 
So we are well protected against these. CD8 
 
The expert cyber defenders stated that there lacked an immediate need to review 
emails in their queues. Emails in the queues were either reviewed within the same day or 
after a few days but not viewed immediately. The only time pressure placed on the expert 
cyber defenders occurred when an employee contacted them.   
I may review it that day or another day but it only becomes urgent if a guy 
contacts me and says “hey, I have been waiting for an email from another 
company and I haven’t seen it. Have you?” Then I will go immediately to the 
queue and see if I have it there. CD1 
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Really the only time pressure is when someone is waiting for an email that was 
placed in the holding pattern. That really is the only reason for when I need to 
expedite reviewing the email. I also need to check why this legit email was placed 
in the holding pattern in the first place so I can change the policy as needed. 
CD21 
 
For the phishing attempt SA-task, the following patterns emerged from the 
directed content analysis: the expert cyber defenders faced known inputs, understood the 
potential outcomes, faced predictable situations, viewed the task as having low risk, and 
viewed the task as having low time pressure. These patterns suggest that the phishing 
attempt SA-task represents a task with low complexity.  
4.1.2 Information Sources Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
For the phishing attempt SA-task, the expert cyber defenders tended to not seek 
out information sources outside of the email under review.  All of the expert cyber 
defenders who discussed the phishing attempt-SA task stated that they used email headers 
as a primary information source. CD1 stated: 
All of the information I need is right there in the email, primarily in the header. 
Outside of the email I don’t need to look at anything else. CD1 
 
Fortunately, all I need to review is details within the email and about the email 
such as the header. CD13 
 
Other expert cyber defenders also stated the importance of using the header and 
described other sources of information within the email.  
All I need to look at is the header information like who it was from…well what the 
name says but also the real sender information as well as the subject, the time, the 
IP address. Then I will look at the content and see if there are any files. I can play 
with the files within my security system without things going beyond it [the 
security system]. So I can open it without risking the infection of files or software. 
CD6 
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The header information is undoubtedly the most important piece of information 
that I review for phishing, followed by links and attachments. All I had to do for 
this instance was look at that. CD15 
 
The header really has all that you need, well at least for the initial review. The 
header is the first place I went. But text within the email and files within give you 
clues too. But the header is the primary source. CD13 
 
The attachments were critical to look at. When a user clicks on one, he may 
actually be downloading malware that finds itself into our network. CD19 
 
In some rare cases, an expert cyber defender might need to correspond with a 
fellow employee about a phishing attempt.  
Sometimes I might reach out to a guy in one of our divisions to ask if he was 
waiting for an external email from such and such a guy in such and such a 
company. You definitely don’t want to stop business emails from going through , 
that’s why in some instances you just need to check to clarify.  CD9 
 
CD1 also mentioned the possibility of interacting with fellow employees: 
Maybe once in a while one [phishing email] will get through but what tends to 
happen is the guy who received something that seems a little off, he will call me 
or email me to let me know. CD1 
 
Overall for phishing attempt SA-task, the primary information source for the 
expert cyber defenders consisted of the email itself. In rare cases, the expert cyber 
defenders corresponded with fellow employees to verify some things.  
4.1.3 Information Types Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
The experts used several details within the header for the phishing attempt SA-
task. Within the header information, the expert cyber defenders looked at items such as IP 
addresses found in received lines that provided information on the path that the email 
took to arrive at the companies. 
 
The header information allowed me to see which path the email took as it arrived 
out our doorstep. I was able to trace the email to its origin. By finding the source 
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of this email I was able to block other emails originating from the same place. 
CD15 
 
The path found in the email header tells you how the email crossed different mail 
servers. I just reviewed the received lines in the header to see which email servers 
that the email passed through to get to us. You can see the IP addresses and 
dates. But these guys [phishing attackers] can even create fake received lines. 
CD21 
 
The final received line information did not match the email address of the 
company that the email said it was coming from. I then knew it really did not 
come from the company that the email claimed it was coming from.  CD12 
 
In addition to the IP addresses in the received lines, the expert cyber defenders 
also looked at information about the senders.  
After reviewing the” from line” from the header, I could immediately see that the 
from address was phony. Even though it said helpdesk in the from line, there was 
an extra character. It was a dash, it was either hyphen or an underscore. But 
whatever it was, the from address highly resembled our helpdesk email address. 
CD21  
 
The from address made it appear that it came from a legitimate .gov address. 
However, after further investigation, I could see that it was coming from a Yahoo 
address.  CD13 
 
The expert cyber defenders also reviewed the text in the emails for grammar and 
spelling emails.   
A string of spelling and grammar errors usually accompany these emails. They 
are pretty obvious errors. CD13 
 
You see, this email stated it came from a .gov address and focused on information 
concerning a major research area that we work in, we will say subs for example. 
However, there were numerous obvious typos. I doubt that such an important 
email would contain these blatant typos. CD9 
 
Additionally, some expert cyber defenders assessed the actions called for in the 
emails.  
As I said before many of these emails are easy to detect. Beside the header 
information, the text of the email provides many clues. If there is a tone of 
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urgency, like “you need to click this now or your email account will be closed” 
then that sets off an alarm in your head. CD15 
 
These emails [phishing emails] tend to ask you to perform an action such as 
entering in user account or personal details. Sometimes these requests are 
embedded within the email. Other times the link takes you right to this site. CD13 
 
The links in the email were also heavily reviewed by the expert cyber defenders.  
Links in these emails tend to look legitimate just based on looking at the text. But 
you gotta hover over the link to see what the link is actually linking to. To make it 
even harder for employees to think they are clicking on legitimate links, the links 
take you to web pages that look exactly like the real webpages the real links are 
supposed to take you to. I never click on a link without seeing where it really 
goes. CD12 
 
A typical user may click on a link just based on the text that is shown in the email. 
However, once you actually check the read address of the landing page, you can 
see it does not take you to an actual company’s URL. CD19 
 
Another piece of information reviewed by the expert cyber defenders consisted of 
the attachments.  
Using my security system, I am able to open attachments and then see what 
processes the attachments carry out. For instance, in this example, something was 
downloaded in addition to the PDF file. If an employee, opened this file, he would 
have ended up downloading a virus without him even knowing that he did. CD13 
 
One of the most common file types in the phishing emails are PDFs. Other 
common files are xls, and doc or docx type files. CD19 
 
These are used so heavily within our company and our industry. And there are 
many vulnerabilities found with Adobe. Many times it is not just the fact that the 
email has a PDF it is the fact that there is the PDF as well as typos or a sense of 
urgency or something else that makes you think twice of opening the file. CD15 
 
All of the information types described by the expert cyber defenders during the 
phishing attempt SA-task consisted of descriptive information or data found within the 
emails. For phishing attempts, none of the experts sought “how to” type information on 
detecting phishing attempts (domain information) or information on how to go about 
setting up cyber defense (problem solving information). All of the information described 
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by the expert cyber defenders consisted of technical information (information only 
related to the task at hand).  
4.1.4 Counts of Information Sources and Information Types Used for the 
Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
While conducting the directed content analysis, the frequencies of information 
sources and information types were counted from the interview transcripts.  Figure 8 
shows the average number of information sources, average number of external sources, 
average number of people used as sources, average number of experts used as sources, 
and average number of technical pieces of information used for the phishing attempt SA-
task. The categories are non-exclusive. The original counts are found in Appendix G.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Information Sources and Information Types Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-
Task 
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4.1.5 Cognitive Modes Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
Overall, expert cyber defenders tended to use analytical cognition when 
completing the phishing attempt SA-task. The experts were able to describe step-by-step 
how they evaluated suspected phishing emails. This demonstrated that these expert cyber 
defenders had a high level of insight into their judgment processes.  
First, our email security software filters out suspect emails. Some are 
automatically filtered out, however others are brought to my attention in the 
queue. The first thing I do is look at the header of the email to check if the 
message is really coming from who is says it is coming from. That usually leads to 
the judgment about whether it is fake or not. If I need to, then look at the file types 
that are enclosed in the email if there are any. Then I can easily use Internet 
Explorer to view the full link if a link is embedded in the email. I can view the full 
link without even opening it.  CD6 
 
Although, CD6 did not state the use of procedures, it is evident that he follows a 
methodological approach in reviewing emails that are possible phishing emails. CD1 also 
stated that his first step was reviewing the header.  
Well, the reason I go to the header first is since it has the information you need to 
examine the email. It just takes a click to see the full header and you can quickly 
see that an email from Joe Schmoe is actually from some other name. Then you 
know something is suspect once you see that. Then I can see the originating IP 
address. Those clues let you know how to process it. CD1 
 
CD13 also presented a similar step-by-step process.  
First thing I do is quickly scan the email for obvious things like typos or emails 
that ask to provide personal or confidential information right away. Then I go to 
the header to look at the receiving lines. In tandem with that I look at who the 
email is really from. It is almost the same process for each email. The header is 
the key. CD13 
 
When asked about rules or checklists used for reviewing possible phishing emails, 
none of the expert cyber defenders cited any use of rules or checklists. However, since 
many of the expert defenders stated similar steps, it seems that many are using similar 
methods. Additionally, it seems that they are using “yes/no” rules.   For example, does 
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the sender email address actually represent a legitimate email address? Yes or no. Does 
the path of the email follow a legitimate path? Yes or no. Are there typos or grammatical 
errors in the text? Yes or no. Are there illegitimate actions that are carried out when 
downloading the file? Yes or no.  
The expert cyber defenders were asked how they knew to follow the steps that 
they did. CD9, just like several other of the expert cyber defenders, said he learned 
through experience.  
You just pick it up as you go. All you have to do is look at the header. You don’t 
really get trained on it. It’s common sense. CD9 
 
CD6 and CD 12 also expressed similar views. 
 
Over time after looking at so many emails, you just know what to do. I don’t think 
other employees know to look at the header information right away. I was just 
something I picked up. CD6 
 
It is based on experience. You pick up what the scammers are doing to do over 
time. There are only so many things that they can manipulate. So you can catch 
them. CD12 
 
The expert cyber defenders expressed a high level of confidence in their ability to 
detect phishing emails. CD1 quantified his ability:   
I am 99% sure I can capture all of these types of emails based on how I have my 
[email security system] policy set up. CD1 
 
Others expressed a similar level of confidence: 
 
I can get all of these [phishing attempts] before they [employees] see them. It is 
like a multilayered defense. First obvious ones are purged, other ones I need to 
review. Going to the header easily gets rid of the bad ones. CD9 
 
With my email [security] system I am sure I can detect these emails. The phishers 
are tricky but by looking at the header and other parts of the email, I can catch 
these with no problem. CD15 
 
Without a doubt I can protect our assets when I review messages. CD13 
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As CD9 stated there are multiple layers of defense that an email goes through. 
The email security systems used by the expert cyber defenders conduct an automatic first 
review of incoming emails based on system defined and expert defined criteria. Then if 
some emails need more attention based on certain criteria, the expert cyber defenders will 
follow their methods of looking at the header and other criteria to make a judgment. 
These procedures contribute to a high level of confidence in detecting phishing attempts. 
The following patterns emerged from the expert cyber defenders’ accounts of the 
phishing attempt SA-task: expert cyber defenders demonstrated a high insight into their 
judgment process, showed a methodological approach in their judgment process, and held 
a high level of confidence in their methods. Although a checklist or procedure is not 
being followed, the expert cyber defenders followed a step-by-step process that they 
could easily verbalize.  These processes represent the use of analytical cognition. On the 
other hand, the expert cyber defenders based their decisions on experience (indicative of 
intuitive cognition) rather than formal rather than training or education. However, the 
majority of the processes used by the expert cyber defenders represented the use of 
analytical cognition.    
4.2 Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes Used for the Zero-Day Exploit SA-
Task 
4.2.1 Level of Task Complexity of Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task 
Zero-day exploits try to reach a broad user base by exploiting software such as 
Adobe and Internet Explorer. Expert cyber defenders review the zero-day exploits to see 
if they need to alter their network defenses or if they need to install a patch to fill the hole 
that was exploited. The expert cyber defenders who discussed the zero-day exploit SA-
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task (CD 1, 2, 5-9, 12, 14, 17, 19, and 21) commented on how they were provided clear 
inputs about the zero-day exploits.  
One of the sources we use of course is vendor resources such as Adobe, 
Microsoft, Cisco and this would be related to vulnerabilities. We would get an 
alert from them. One of the RSS feeds, something online. Either way we get alerts 
from them. CD2 
 
Information about the zero-day exploits are contained on the vendors’ websites. 
When going to the vendors’ websites the expert cyber defenders expected to see 
information that focused on information about the threat, including impacted software or 
systems, and recommendations. For example: 
There was the recent [Adobe] Flash vulnerability. I received an alert, don’t 
remember how….maybe a feed or email but whatever…I went to the Adobe site. 
Adobe has this security blog or bulletin that gives info on versions of Flash that 
are affected. There are a lot of details on these bulletins. I can check what version 
we are running to see what actions I need to take. CD9 
 
The Mozilla security bulletin had a lot of the information I needed to get started 
on the response. I go there and then take it from there. CD12 
 
I viewed the Cisco advisory first. These [advisories] have tons of info I can use to 
determine how I will change my defenses when needed. Details focus on impacted 
products, how to do a work around, and range of the vulnerability. CD21 
 
Although the expert cyber defenders can form an understanding of the initial sate 
of the vulnerability, they cannot always predict the outcomes. Each expert cyber defender 
has tweaked his or her company’s defense posture over time and may accept a different 
level of risk than experts from other companies.  
We try to determine if that specific threat, try to see if we have the resources to 
mitigate it or if we will just accept the risk. If the probability is really small that it 
will affect us we accept it. CD8 
 
With this threat to Adobe, I had to evaluate our response. Given the need to get 
information out during the current SBIR cycle[Small Business Innovation 
Research proposal cycle], there was no way I could freeze the use of PDFs. I had 
to research more information to find out what else I could do. The risk was small 
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with this vulnerability and I took on the risk due to the priorities of our proposal 
teams. CD9 
 
This shows that although vendor websites provide a starting point for initially 
understanding the vulnerability, the expert cyber defenders still need to evaluate other 
aspects of the vulnerability to determine the outcome. Additionally, even though the 
expert cyber defenders go to vendor websites and receive the same categories of 
information on the sites, there is still a high level of task variety involved.  
You can’t predict what you will find on the security bulletins. You kinda know 
what information will be provided to you like the software versions affected and 
recommendations for how to work around it but you don’t know the level of threat 
or the level of confidentiality that’s affected. CD12  
 
Everyone of these are the same in the sense that it a vulnerability was found. But 
each one is also different because there are so many factors that make up the 
vulnerability. So some have a high level of threat, have a different way that they 
can impact your mission, and can either be ignored or need an urgent response. 
CD17 
 
For the zero-day exploits, there tended to be a greater sense of urgency in finding 
more information about them as compared to finding information about phishing 
attempts.  
I tend not to waste time. I tend to immediately follow up on the information. One 
day can be costly. [I] tend not to wait on it. CD2 
 
Others also expressed a similar sense of urgency based on these exploits.  
 
You need to respond to these within a day. That is the nature of these types of 
exploits. That’s why they call it a zero-day exploit because the vendor or someone 
just found out about it and now this is the first day that you have to respond to it.  
CD5 
 
These require an immediate response because if you don’t respond you have may 
a piece of version of software that is used widely throughout your company that 
has a high level of risk associated with it. Guys could be using it and passing 
confidential information back and forth all while using software that has a hole in 
it. CD21 
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The other expert cyber defenders also mentioned about responding to the zero-day 
exploits within a day.  CD19 summed up the response time for zero-day exploits 
succinctly: 
Zero-day means the same day, meaning that the vulnerability was found that day. 
This is the first day, the zero-day. I need to at least look at the vulnerability that 
day if it is connected to what we do. I can take an initial look and decide if I need 
to take action. But I have to respond within a day, hence the name “zero-day.”  
CD19 
 
The analysis of the expert cyber defenders’ descriptions of the zero-day exploit 
SA-task suggest that for this task a priori determinability of inputs exists, (alerts and 
information are provided by vendors), the outcomes are generally understood (the need to 
respond or not to respond; however they need to determine the level of response), there 
exists a range in the task variety, there is a medium level of risk, and there is a low level 
of time pressure.  These task characteristics suggest a medium level of SA-task 
complexity.  
4.2.2 Information Sources Used for the Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task  
For the zero-day exploit SA-task, the expert cyber defenders primarily used 
external sources including vendor sources. Examples of these sources include Adobe 
Security Bulletins and Advisories
8
; Microsoft Security Bulletins
9
; Cisco Security 
Responses, and Notices, Advisories
10
; and Firefox Security Advisories
11
.  CD2 states 
One of the sources we use of course is vendor resources such as Adobe, 
Microsoft, Cisco and this would be related to vulnerabilities. CD2 
 
                                                          
8 http://helpx.adobe.com/security.html 
9
 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/dn481339 
10
 https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x 
11 http://www.mozilla.org/security/known-vulnerabilities/firefox.html 
 126 
 
Other CDs reaffirmed that for zero-day vulnerabilities, vendor security bulletins, 
notices, and reports were the only sources that needed to be reviewed. 
I didn’t really need to go beyond Adobe’s bulletin site. Adobe’s bulletins provide 
summaries, software specifications, and actions to take when a vulnerability is 
found. You can get everything you need from there and then go off to look at what 
you have and to initiate your actions. Sometimes you end up not needing to do 
anything. That’s the purpose of these bulletins, is to inform everyone about 
whether or not they need to take actions if they have the versions that are affected. 
CD9 
 
CD7 confirmed the need to only review the vendor’s sites.  
Many companies put out these notices or alerts that recommend you to download 
a new version of their software or to download some type of patch. Their sites are 
like guides. But I need the alerts to become aware of the exploits. Luckily, you can 
pretty much get all you need from the alerts or sites. CD7. 
 
Microsoft security bulletins provide a wealth of information on affected software 
that I use in my analysis. CD17 
 
When something was wrong with our search capabilities I went right to Mozilla’s 
security site. This site offered the most recent vulnerabilities found in Firefox as 
well as Thunderbird, an email system that allows you to encrypt emails and 
receive encrypted emails. Obviously, we need to stay on top of these types of 
vulnerabilities. CD12 
 
These examples show that vendors’ security bulletin and advisory websites 
contain core information that expert cyber defenders used to form an initial understanding 
of zero-day exploits. However, several expert cyber defenders stated that these types of 
sites were only starting points for finding information. There are also third party sites that 
provide information about vulnerabilities.   
I used MITRE CVE that provided a short description of the vulnerability and 
provided references for further review. The references, as in most cases, took me 
to either a blog or a security website like Secunia. CD21 
 
MITRE’s CVE repository let me search across vulnerability sites to find the 
details I needed to evaluate the threat on Adobe Flash. CD9 
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I used the Zero-day Initiative website, but I do not end here. Zero-day provided 
technical details but pushed me to Oracle’s blogs, which then pushed me to 
[MITRE] CVE. From each site I was able to gather the technical details I needed. 
CD14 
 
I used the OSVDB, I think stands for Open Sourced Vulnerabilities Database. 
Within this report, I can quickly gauge the impact and general solution. CD8 
 
Sites like MITRE CVE
12
 and Open Sources Vulnerability Database
13
 (OSVDB) 
provide a list of publicly known security vulnerabilities and were cited by several expert 
cyber defenders.  Sites like Secunia
14
 provide information beyond just one vendor’s 
products and reach across vendors such as Google products, Internet Explorer, and 
Microsoft. 
Secunia offers a one-stop shop, or one of many one-stop shops, that offers 
information about different vulnerabilities coming from the big companies.  It’s 
great to use these to preview what you need to follow up on. CD19 
 
Most of the expert cyber defenders did not reach out to communicate with 
external experts. However, CD1 stated how, in one case, he needed to email a 
representative from a vendor’s company to inquire more about a zero-day exploit.  
I got an alert about this Java vulnerability and noticed that the DNS domain was 
protected against so I emailed the VP of DNS and actually got a response from 
the president to get further assistance. CD1 
 
Overall, for the zero-day exploit SA-task, the expert cyber defenders heavily used 
external sources and rarely communicated with experts. For the most part, expert cyber 
defenders initially went to vendor’s websites to review the information provided on 
security bulletins, reports, and notices to obtain the information needed to evaluate their 
security posture and actions that need to be taken (or not taken).  From these vendor sites, 
                                                          
12
 http://cve.mitre.org/ 
13
 http://osvdb.org/ 
14
 http://secunia.com/community/advisories/ 
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they went to third party sites that collect vulnerability information across vendor sites and 
non-vendor sites.  
4.2.3 Information Types Used for the Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task 
The expert cyber defenders who discussed the zero-day exploit SA-task stated the 
importance of gathering technical details from vendors’ security bulletins, notices and 
reports as well as from third party vulnerability sites.  
Microsoft’s bulletins contain several details as well as summaries of what has 
been compromised. Usually generic information is described first and then a list 
by list detail of versions infected and list by list detail of what versions are needed 
to download or to extract from your system. CD5 
 
We try to find information on techniques that are used. You are looking for more 
information on techniques through other sources and other things that they can 
help you with. CD2 
 
Expert cyber defenders used the security bulletins and third party sites to 
investigate which systems, software, and hardware were affected.  
For the security bulletins, I am looking for the list of patches applied to the 
vulnerability, the operation systems affected, and any hardware specifications 
that I needed to know. CD19 
 
I look for specific software names and versions. I want to see what the overall 
threat is and the level of severity. A lot of times the security notices or 
descriptions provide response actions. CD9 
 
Expert cyber defenders also sought information about what processes the 
vulnerabilities impacted or what processes the vulnerabilities would carry out.  
I found in the vulnerability report whether code was executed or not. I found that 
the vulnerability provided attackers privileges in performing actions within a 
network and even allowing them to elevate their privileges. CD7 
 
Adobe’s security advisory on Adobe Reader provided details on the vulnerability 
and listed the versions of reader for both Windows and Macs. The advisory stated 
that Reader would crash and then allow the attacker to take control of the 
affected system. A solution was provided to install the latest Adobe Reader of 11.0  
CD8 
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Other types of information sought about vulnerabilities focused on work-arounds 
or tips about what to do while the vulnerability was being patched.  
The Computerworld site provided an overview of the threat, in this case an 
Internet Explorer bug. It provided info on the versions affected. Details on the 
work around were found here. Sites outside of the vendor sites provide tips not 
included in the official security bulletins. For instance, in this exploit, one tip was 
to simply use another browser like Google Chrome or Firefox until a permanent 
fix was found.  CD17 
 
Work-around details are great because you can provide a temporary solution to 
the problem you found and still allow work process to continue in your company. 
Then you can search around for how others fixed the problem or encountered 
other problems with the work-around. CD9 
 
Several expert cyber defenders stated the need to find all of the types of 
information stated above. CD21 provides a rich summary.  
On the CISCO site, I was able to pull several technical bits for my review. First, I 
quickly scanned what exact products and versions were vulnerable. Just because 
it says it is vulnerable does not mean the system was infected. After the sca, of 
products, I viewed the vulnerability level of the overall threat and found that there 
was an official fix recommended. From there, I found out how to go about getting 
the newest version or protected version of software. But before I finished, I went 
back to the vulnerable products list to see the exact details of what was viewed as 
vulnerable. There were even measures listed on the bulletin that told me how to 
see if I had a specific version of the product that was deemed vulnerable. So as 
you can see, lots of details are provided on these bulletins. CD21 
 
For the zero-day exploit SA-task, the expert cyber defenders primarily sought 
technical information task-based information including affected products, details on how 
to respond to the specific threat, and work-arounds. None of the expert cyber defenders 
discussed looking for information on how to respond to zero-day vulnerabilities overall 
(domain information) or how to set up cyber defense in response to vulnerabilities 
(problem solving information). 
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4.2.4 Counts of Information Sources and Information Types Used for the 
Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task  
While conducting the directed content analysis for the zero-day exploit SA-task, 
the frequencies of information sources and information types were counted from the 
interview transcripts. Figure 9 shows the average number of information sources, average 
number of external sources, average number of people used as sources, average number 
of experts used as sources, and average number of technical pieces of information used 
for zero-day exploit SA-task. The original counts are found in Appendix H. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.5 Cognitive Modes Used for the Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task 
For the zero-day exploit SA-task, the expert cyber defenders tended to use 
analytical cognition initially and then intuitive cognition as their research on the zero-day 
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exploits progressed. For forming an initial understanding of zero-day exploits, the expert 
cyber defenders tended to describe a step-by-step process.  
Initially, you receive an alert from a vendor. Then you know to go to their 
website. For example, earlier this year, I got an alert from Cisco. I went to their 
site. Their bulletin provided details that could have followed step by step. For 
example, I look for software that is impacted, the exact details, any workarounds, 
versions of the software, and so on. What I get from the site, I then use to check 
against what we are holding. CD5 
 
CD7 and CD21 provided similar steps.  
All of these vendors give you information in their varied formats. It is almost like 
a checklist that they provide. Each alert from the same company is formatted in 
the same way. So every time you go to their alerts page you know what types of 
details will be provided or at least the categories of details since every 
vulnerability is different. CD7 
 
I pretty much use the same steps to review the Cisco bulletins or other bulletins 
for that matter. I check the vulnerable products or systems, see what the 
recommended fix is, if there is one, check the level of threat, and get into the 
details of the vulnerability. CD21 
 
Although none of the expert cyber defenders  used a checklist for capturing 
information from vendors’ sites, CSE 5 used the term “step by step” and CD7 used the 
term “like a checklist” to describe how they get information from the sites. The step-by-
step procedures described by the expert cyber defenders demonstrated a high level of 
insight into their judgment process and showed use of a methodological approach. When 
asked about using a checklist to pulling information from the vendor sites, CD9 
responded:   
We don’t use a checklist for these things. The sites [from vendors] provide the 
information required to move forward with your response. If we had a checklist it 
would probably be filling in what the vendor already has put out there so no 
checklist is really needed on our part. I do note in my head if we have certain 
versions of software that the vendor is talking about but that’s about all I guess.  
CD9 
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Although he followed a methodological approach in the initial process of forming 
a situation assessment, he used  a more intuitive approach in the later process. In another 
example, CD14 states: 
Even though I started with MITRE’s CVE, I still wanted more information. The 
results from a search on CVE provide official information, but my set up for 
defenses and for our systems here cause me to respond in a unique way. From this 
initial search, I have a base of information but I need more information from 
others who may have a similar set up as mine or have similar work processes 
going on that my company does. That’s why I need to see what others individuals 
provide on either blogs or their websites about what they did. CD14  
 
CD12 also stated a similar view.  
The security advisory might say to patch this or get a new version of this or that 
but the security bulletin does not know that I need that version of software to work 
with a version of a different type of software from another platform. I won’t go 
into too much detail, but for instance we do a lot of numerical simulations under 
one software program. This simulation program may only work with one version 
of an Adobe product that we use. So the Adobe bulletin may say to install a newer 
Adobe version. But if we did that then the numerical software we use may not 
speak to that Adobe version. The hope is that there is a newer version of the 
simulation software that matches the new Adobe version. I want to see what 
others who are facing this same situation say.  CD1 
 
CD5 and CD8 also stated that each company’s work processes and defense 
posture cause each company to respond differently to zero-day vulnerabilities, which 
impacts their information seeking.  
I can get a lot of information from the current [security] bulletin on Adobe’s site 
but I still need to evaluate my posture based on this information. For example, if 
there is an exploit in PDFs, I need to consider things like other processes taking 
place. When we have a DoD proposal deadline, everyone working on proposals is 
making use of PDFs to submit their proposals. So I need to research the proposal 
deadlines to see if I can absorb the risk to PDFs as in the case of proposals being 
due the next day or if I can impact work processes for some time to resolve the 
issue. CD8 
 
The information guides me on how I will evaluate my defense in depth security 
posture. Everyone’s posture or every company’s posture is set up differently. So 
one guy [an expert cyber defender from another company] will have to do things 
differently from what I do because he probably has a different configuration then 
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I do. So it’s not like the bulletin tells everyone exactly what to do for their 
company. You just have to know how the details affect you. CD5 
 
Other CDs provided similar views on the need to find more information about 
specific software versions that they run and how others have responded. This shows that 
although the expert cyber defenders can gain an initial understanding of a vulnerability 
from a vendor’s or third-party’s site, they still have other information needs that are 
based on their own company’s defenses. When finding information from others that have 
similar defenses, they did not follow a methodological step-by-step process, rather they 
followed a more intuitive process.  
When I am looking for how others responded, I sense where to go. Over the years, 
I developed a sense for which bloggers, even though they may be anonymous, 
have similar concerns that I do business-wise. They are not necessarily defense 
contractors but they might work on similar types of projects such as natural 
language processing of medical records.  CD14 
 
When you start going beyond the security bulletins, that’s when it gets a little 
more tricky. Many people will post on blogs or forums about the bulletin, only 
providing the exact same information or summary of the information from the 
bulletins. It takes a while to figure out which blogs or forums to ignore and which 
ones are worthwhile reading. It’s hard to explain but it just takes time getting 
familiar with the blogs that are out there. And for each type of vulnerability like 
an Adobe one or a Microsoft one, there are different experts. CD17 
 
When asked about evaluating the zero-day vulnerabilities, none of the expert 
cyber defenders stated that they based their decisions on training or education. Rather it 
was based on experience.  
You based it on your experience and the assets you have in your company. You 
learn how to look at these things over time.  CD7 
 
You make a judgment on the risk involved with each exploit. Sometimes you do 
need to take action but other times you can absorb the risk. For instance, if it is 
an Adobe exploit, you need to determine if you need to shut down the use of PDFs 
which could impact the work flow. You have to make a judgment call based on the 
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information gathered about the exploit. That judgment must come from 
experience. CD8 
 
No, I was never trained on finding information on vulnerabilities. Of course you 
can just Google things and find information but there is more to it. You know how 
to evaluate and find information based on your experience in defense and 
experience at your own specific company. CD2 
 
In terms of confidence, the expert cyber defenders seemed highly confident they 
could get the information needed from vendor’s websites and confident in knowing what 
to do when receiving a notice about an exploit.  
I’m pretty sure the Adobe’s bulletins have all I need to carry out my responses. I 
rarely need to go beyond the bulletin for any other information. The bulletin gives 
me my info and I base my responses on that information and what I know about 
the [software] versions I am running here. There is nothing tricky about it. CD6 
 
The following pattern of cognitive modes used emerged from the zero-day exploit 
SA-task: the expert cyber defenders initially used analytical cognition followed by 
intuitive cognition.  When forming an initial understanding of zero-day vulnerabilities, 
the expert cyber defenders described a step-by-step, methodological process when 
reviewing vendors’ and third-party websites. They also showed a high level of 
confidence in finding the information they needed from these sites. These two aspects 
represent the use of analytical cognition. However, when the experts needed more 
information about how to respond to the vulnerabilities based on their companies’ 
defense postures, they had a difficult time in explaining why they went to specific sites 
and how they knew how to evaluate them both of which represented a low insight into 
their judgment process. Additionally, the experts based their information seeking on 
experience over the years rather than on formal education of training. These two aspects 
suggest the use of intuitive cognition. Since both analytical cognition and intuitive 
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cognition tended to be used by the expert cyber defenders, this suggests that the expert 
cyber defenders used quasi-rational cognition for the zero-day exploit SA-task. 
4.3 Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes Used for the Malware Attack SA-
Task    
4.3.1 Level of Task Complexity of the Malware Attack SA-Task   
The expert cyber defenders who discussed the malware attack SA-task (CD 1, 3-
11, 13-18, and 20) discussed several challenges when completing this task. One challenge 
with forming an understanding of malware attacks is detecting them in the first place.  
CD3 stated: 
And basically what we started to see was a hit on our anti-virus and intrusion 
detection systems. It was kind of strange in the sense that it was giving off a 
rather old signature and was not actually indicative of the threat that the 
signature was looking for. So it was a little strange. It showed some antivirus 
anomalies as well. It was close to a signature that was a couple of years old. In 
that case the first thing you have to do is see if it is a problem with your signature 
or is it something actually live. CD3 
 
IDSs use attack signatures to identify malware attacks. As time goes on the 
signatures change and the IDS needs to be tweaked to capture current signatures of 
attacks. Several expert cyber defenders stated that although their IDS may provide 
indications that something is happening, the expert cyber defenders still need to 
investigate that an attack is actually taking place. The inputs are not clear about exactly 
what is happening. CD4 offered a unique account of analyzing a malware attack while on 
a Navy ship.  
As a matter of fact we got hit by a malware on a ship I was stationed on. It was 
detected by our advanced scanning tools onboard. However, we initially had to 
see if it was an actual attack or something different. Sometimes it ends up being 
nothing. You have to alter the configurations on the IDS to try to filter out the 
noise. CD4 
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CD7 also discussed the challenge of initially detecting a malware incident.  
So you wonder if you are missing the event or if the event did not occur. How do 
you know if you got the right signature if it is not actually occurring? We kept 
correlating things and kept tweaking signatures until we were able to detect 
something.  CD7 
CD17 stated that even though his IDS provides alerts, he feels overwhelmed with 
the number of false positives.  
The IDS is a great tool, well to some degree but it generates a lot of false 
positives. In fact, I spend a lot of time having to go through these to actually find 
suspicious activity that is worth investigating. So it does alert you but it also 
alerts you too much. CD17  
 
For malware attacks, even though the expert cyber defenders received some type 
of notification that something was amiss in their networks, the expert cyber defenders 
still had to evaluate the initial cues to see if malware attack was really taking place. 
Numerous expert cyber defenders discussed the difficulties with the dynamics and 
deceptive nature of malware attacks.   
Imagine that you are firefighter and your job is to put out fires and you don't even 
know where the fires are. You are in the job of firefighting. You don't know where 
to send the trucks. You don't even know what kind of fire so you don't even know 
whether to pour water on it or sand or Purple K. Or if you have to put something 
different on it. CD3 
 
This shows that not only is it difficult to detect a malware attack but it is difficult 
to determine how to respond to it. This also shows the difficulty in determining outcomes 
as well as a high level of task variety. CD6 also discussed the uncertainty surrounding 
malware attacks.  
You have no idea what you will find or when the process will end when trying to 
analyze the malware. You don’t know the extent of the impact, you don’t know if 
you need to shut down some software or systems in your network. It’s quite 
difficult to figure out while conducting your analysis. CD6 
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CD8 stated that malware can change over time making it more difficult to respond 
to during the detection and analysis phase.  
The malware kept changing. [When going] through [an] iteration of response 
cycle, the malware morphed. CD8 
 
Similarly, CD20 stated that malware can be constructed to change when examined 
by cyber defenders.  
These guys [malware authors] are tricky. They know how you will analyze it and 
what steps you will take. They make it so it will change with your response 
actions. For this attack, I started the analysis of network activity to see if it was 
indeed an attack. But what I thought was there initially then seemed to not be 
there upon reanalysis. In another attack, the executables were found to have been 
self-deleted making it hard to determine what the attack executed. CD20 
 
CD17 held a similar view. 
  
This malware incident was not created to stay the same. In one case, I thought I 
had the analysis down but then it changed on me right during the analysis. That 
made it even harder to understand. CD17 
 
The expert cyber defenders stated specific risks and dangers associated with 
malware attacks.  
The particular piece of malware, could have shut us down pretty hard. It could 
have spread to four machines. Malware can worm  through the network, it can 
shut you down. You can't neutralize it. So a malware could infect maybe 8 or 9 or 
30 machines. You need to have a sense of urgency. Malware viruses on the 
network can slowdown or shutdown your network. CD4 
 
CD5 expressed a similar perception on the risk of malware attacks.  
Malware attacks are some of the most dangerous threats out there. If you don’t 
respond immediately, it can completely shut you down. In our industry, you have 
to make sure it does not spread through your network. I mean you, depending on 
your work, may have to protect sensitive or classified data that you don’t want to 
fall into the wrong hands. Malware is dangerous in that regard. You know they 
are trying to get into your system to get things out that they should not have. CD5 
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Additionally, the CDs tended to express a great sense of time pressure for forming 
situation assessments of malware attacks. For example, CD5 in the above comment 
remarked about responding “immediately.” CD3 provided another example.  
Imagine that you are in this firefighting mode with all these bongs and whistles 
going off and you don't know where to send the firefighters. That is the kind of 
analogy for time frames especially when you are dealing with sensitive data, 
classified data. CD3 
In this case the sense of time pressure has to do with responding in time to prevent 
the malware from negatively impacting more systems or the entire network. Other CDs 
offered their perceptions of the time pressure in regards to forming situation assessments 
of malware attacks. 
You have to respond immediately. If I didn’t capture the activity of this malware 
right away, our whole network could have been compromised. CD12 
 
With this high security threat, the time pressure absolutely increases. CD2 
 
It is extreme time pressure. CD7 
 
It is a high time pressure. CD8 
 
The patterns that emerged from the expert cyber defenders’ accounts of malware 
attack SA-tasks consist of the following:  the expert cyber defenders faced challenges in 
initially detecting a malware attack (which required further analysis), challenges in 
analyzing the outcomes, a high variety in the attacks, high risks posed by the attacks, and 
high time pressure. These task characteristics suggest a level of high complexity for the 
malware attack SA-task. 
4.3.2 Information Sources Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
The information sources selected by expert cyber defenders for the malware 
attack SA-task consisted of multiple sources including internal and external sources as 
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well as experts. Publicly available sources were widely cited by the expert cyber 
defenders: 
There are security experts out there that work for companies or organizations and 
they collaborate in an open source forum whether that is Malware.org or 
"Security Threats" or a vast number of other blogs or other post sites that are 
security in focus. Sometimes you can talk about the malware or event without 
saying your organization has been attacked. Many times what you are seeing, you 
will see in the open source format first. People are operating honeypots, they are 
capturing the malware before anybody before a targeted event. CD3 
Sometimes open source has the information or related information you need to 
analyze the malware. Or at the least it gives you an idea of how to get started with 
the analysis. CD1 
 
In addition to using publicly available forums or open source sites, expert cyber 
defenders also mentioned the use of company or expert blogs.  
It is essential to keep up with security focused blogs. They often provide the most 
up to date information about current malware attacks, provide an in depth 
analysis of the malware as well as information on potential impacts on specific 
systems. CD5 
 
Several expert cyber defenders mentioned the use of open source repositories.  
 
One source I used was VirusTotal. You can capture a file name in your analysis 
and slide it over to VirusTotal to identify if there has been an analysis on the file 
or if that file has indeed been infected. You can also search by URL.  Using 
something like VirusTotal definitely helps with your analysis. I think it is run by 
Google or sponsored by Google. That’s why the searches are so fast. CD15 
 
Other expert cyber defenders described the use of sources like VirusTotal.  
The great thing about VirusTotal and other sites like ThreatExpert is that it 
provides extreme technical details about specific threats. All you have to do is 
submit a file and it analyzes it for you. They also have a search engine to see what 
was analyzed before if you have the right details. It’s updated throughout the day 
so you can get the details on the most current threats.  CD18 
 
Other cyber experts mentioned government sponsored sources including National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD)
15
. The NVD contains information about current and 
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 nvd.nist.gov/ 
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previous vulnerabilities and give information on access complexity, confidentiality 
impact, and integrity impact. The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
16
 (CERT) 
also was mentioned as a source by several expert cyber defenders.  
The use of social media was only mentioned by two expert cyber defenders (CD2 
and CD16). The use of news media sites was cited by CD4, CD6, and CD20. In two 
extremely challenging malware attacks discussed by the expert cyber defenders, in-
person meetings with fellow experts were essential for forming situation assessments of 
malware attacks. In CD1’s case, the malware attack infected his company and another 
company that one of his employees was working with for on a DoD contract. The 
response to the malware required numerous discussions over an extended time period.   
For this attack, we had regular phone conversations over the span of four months. 
It took us that long and that many conversations to deal with this. Normally, DoD 
companies don’t work on security things together or collaborate but in this case 
we needed to for us to resolve this threat. CD1 
 
CD4 also discussed the need to work with external experts based on a challenging 
threat that he faced.  
The research was done my by guys and a NWS shop, we also had cyber security 
from Cyber Defense Ops Command [onboard the ship]. They were the SMEs 
[subject matter experts]. They were coordinating over phone, email, chat with 
folks from Norfolk, Virginia. A lot of manhours involved. It was two people on our 
end and two to three on their end. They were working day and night. CD4 
 
In this case, CD4 (in reference to a malware attack while onboard a Navy ship) 
stated that external experts were already visiting, working on another task when they 
became aware of an active malware attack. Even with the experts onboard the ship, it 
took a considerable amount of time to resolve the threat. This case also represented CD4 
working with other internal expert cyber defenders as well as experts outside of his 
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immediate organization.  CD3 also mentioned that he was paired with another expert 
cyber defender internal to his organization to conduct research about the malware 
incident.  
In our case there was a team of a few of us that were there to do incident response 
handling and tuning the sensor network. I was pulled aside to go research this 
specific malware. CD3 
 
All of the CDs discussed the need to work with others external to their 
organizations to combat the malware attacks. Some mentioned the need to check what 
other experts had written about the threats. However, CD4 was the only one to state that 
he never consulted open source sources.  
The Navy had a good repository network of incident data. The response guys can 
go back and do the research through that. I guess we use open source indirectly. 
That stuff might get into our SIPRNET [a Navy secure network]. It is a more 
formal cyber security repository. It [research] mostly happens on the SIPRNET. 
CD4 
 
The expert cyber defenders who formed situation assessments of malware attacks 
also used numerous internal sources of information.  
Of course the first thing I use to see if there is an attack is our IDS. The IDS looks 
for a signature of an attack. Sometimes I have to go into the signature database to 
alter things to make sure I can find existing attack signatures. CD13 
 
Several expert cyber defenders stated the important of scanning network activity.  
I view the log analyzer to view the network activity within our network. I filtered 
the activity based on IP addresses and protocols. My goal is to find which activity 
on the network set off the IDS alert that actually caused me to investigate this 
more. I often have to do this for the false alerts too. By using the log analyzer I 
can filter out the false positives. CD14 
 
The data and information provided by the log analysis allow me to narrow down 
to what alerts I really need to look at and which alerts I can ignore. CD17 
 
I need to monitor tools such as file and registry access, network communications, 
process activities. CD18 
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In general, when completing the malware attack SA-task, the expert cyber 
defenders tended to use more external information sources and external experts. 
Additionally, the expert cyber defenders corresponded via email, phone, and chat with 
fellow experts. The experts also used internal sources such as logs and network activity 
parameters to complete the malware attack SA-task.   
4.3.3 Information Types Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Expert cyber defenders who discussed the malware attack SA-task stated that they 
primarily searched for technical pieces of information.  CD3 stated: 
I have a file name or I have a file name and a hash, I have maybe what I saw on 
DCamm, or some little granular thing and amazingly the more and more people 
use it the more you will find. Of course you have to find the closest to what you 
are looking for. What you are looking for is code, the technical code. You don’t 
have time to look at all of the malware code yourself. You hope someone else has 
done the research and provided the codes.  CD3 
 
CD7 provided a similar view on the type of information he was seeking.  
The best thing you are trying to find is if when someone is attacked they provide 
the technical information in a public forum. The more technical details provided 
the better the rest of us can protect ourselves. CD7 
 
CD9 also stated the importance of finding specific details about the malware 
attack. 
Since there is so much code to analyze in the malware, you look online to see if 
you can find more specifics about the malware rather than trying to go line by 
line yourself. You could be there forever if you had to do that. You try to find what 
files are infected and then use those in your search. CD9 
 
Expert cyber defenders used specific technical details about an attack to search 
online for more information.  
I used the MDF fingerprint to search for information about it on the internet. 
There are resources out there like VirusTotal that allow you to search for MD5 
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fingerprints. With tools like these you can use SHA1 and SHA256 hashes too. 
CD20 
 
I went to a vulnerabilities database to find what the actual threat was posed by 
the malware. In this case, I found that this instance of malware sends passwords 
in clear text allowing the intruder to find the administrator password. If he was 
able to use the admin log on we would have been in deep trouble. CD15 
 
The expert cyber defenders also sought more technical, descriptive information 
about the malware attacks.  
For a malware analysis, I also want to see more information about a suspect file 
such as the time stamp of its creation and when it was last modified along with its 
code entry point. I also look for source and target IP addresses. CD13 
 
The expert cyber defenders also looked at changes in network activity that may 
indicate an attack is taking place.  
What I use the most are log files and metadata to detect suspicious activity on the 
network. I am looking at the raw data. CD17 
 
One thing checked was to see if there was an increase in traffic that is normally 
should not be there. I found an increase in traffic from our server inside our 
network. That immediately set off alarms to me. CD13 
 
One key piece of information I look for is ports. I will do port scans, look if ports 
are open that are usually not open. I will also look for an unusual amount of 
network traffic.  CD20 
 
In addition to monitoring network activity, the experts also viewed other types of 
activity.  
I also want to see processes of virtual and physical memory usage. CD17 
I checked the modifications of registry entries and files systems. CD14 
 
I went to see if were are any callouts being made by the malware and I found that 
there were processes there that tried to resolve DNS addresses. CD10 
 
I searched my system memory track the imported calls that were redirected to 
other functions. CD11  
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The pattern found in the responses from experts who discussed the malware SA-
task shows that the experts heavily sought task-based technical information. The experts 
used specifics found within codes or file names to search online for information, searched 
for abnormal network traffic or other types of traffic, and looked for suspicious processes 
carried out by programs for files. None of the experts discussed seeking domain (how to 
go about responding to malware attacks) or problem solving information (how to set up 
cyber defense).  
4.3.4 Counts of Information Source and Information Types Used for the 
Malware Attack SA-Task   
 
The frequencies of information sources and information types used for the 
malware attack SA-task were counted from the interview transcripts. Figure 10 shows the 
average number of information sources, average number of external sources, average 
number of people used as sources, average number of experts used as sources, and 
average number of technical pieces of information used for the malware attack SA-task. 
The original counts are found in Appendix I. 
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Information Sources and Information Types Used for the 
Malware Attack SA-Task (N = 17) 
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4.3.5 Cognitive Modes Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task  
When completing the malware attack SA-task, expert cyber defenders tended not 
to use a methodological approach or step-by-step procedures.  Numerous expert cyber 
defenders stated that their seeking of information sources was based on their “sense” and 
that this “sense” developed over time.  
You get a sense when the sites are providing the same value as the used to. Over 
time you develop a sense for what type of thing you are looking at or 
classification of the thing you are looking at so you can make your searches more 
efficient. CD3 
 
When you have been in this [cyber defense] for so long you kind of know where to 
go, who to talk to, and how to find what you need. You have to be it for a while to 
get the feel of it. CD20 
 
You need to be involved with the search process for some time to really 
understand how some sources of information change over time. I mean you have 
to get a sense for when the value of a source changes because you don’t always 
know who is doing the writing behind the source. But if you read the source on a 
regular basis you can tell when the author changes. When that happens, the value 
of the source changes. Unless you have used that source before you won’t know 
how to sense that change. CD16 
 
These above participant comments demonstrate how no rules or methods are 
followed when forming situation assessments of malware attacks. Rather, the expert 
cyber defenders sense what information is needed and sense the value, as well as changes 
in the value of information sources.  The expert cyber defenders tended to have a difficult 
time answering how they knew when to stop their search process. None of the expert 
Figure 10. Information Sources and Information Types Used for the Malware 
Attack SA-Task 
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cyber defenders could clearly describe the steps that were taken to reach the stopping 
decision.  
I just reach a judgment when to stop. You look online and try to find out the 
details about the malware itself. At some point, I just reach the conclusion that I 
have enough for what I need to start analyzing the malware. I can’t describe it. 
Each threat is different so you look for different things and then you just go from 
there. CD6 
 
CD8 also stated that the stopping process was more of a judgment than a process 
to stop.  
This varies by threat; however I try to make the best judgment call on the 
information received. CD8 
 
CD15 expressed difficulty in describing stopping decision when asked about how 
he knew when to stop searching.  
Wow, that is a hard one to answer. I don’t know how to describe it. I just know 
when to stop. It’s more of my own decision rather than someone or something 
telling me when to stop. I just go with my gut feeling on this. CD15 
 
In response to interview questions about the use of checklist to form a situation 
assessment of malware attacks, the consensus was that no checklists were used.  
No, no checklist is used. You kinda develop a checklist in your head over time. 
CD3 
 
For the Navy, in the strike groups, we don’t have standard means to do computer 
forensics. CD4 
 
No, no checklist is used. You go out (online) and find what you need each time. 
CD13 
 
There is no checklist that we use for researching about malware. After doing this 
for so long, you find what you are looking for based on your own experience. 
CD10 
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CD3 was asked to describe his mental checklist but he said it was too hard to 
explain. When asked about how he knew to reach out to peers for malware attacks, CD5 
responded: 
It’s just experience over time. You quickly learn that peers are a great source of 
information. Pairing up is just learned over time. I was never trained on it. It 
comes from experience and learning from others. CD5 
 
Other expert cyber defenders held similar views: 
We [cyber defenders] were never taught that reaching out to peers would be 
essential for malware analysis. Basically we were trained to do it ourselves, 
independently of other companies or other professionals. Without my peers I 
could forever be in malware analysis. CD10 
 
Several expert cyber defenders stated that the basis of their decisions for 
researching malware attacks came from experience rather than formal training or 
education. CD1 talked about how he was planning to retire soon and was then asked how 
someone new in his position would take over his role in combating malware attacks. 
I built our security from the ground up for defending [against] these type of 
threats. I was the third employee of this company. I learned from things in the 
past, things that hurt. In the beginning, during many, many times the CEO was 
breathing down my neck. The email system went down and things were on me to 
fix. I learned from the school of hard knocks. If someone new were to come in 
here even with some type of M.S. degree it would take him three to four years to 
figure all of this, to protect against advanced threats. I would want to spend at 
least a year, maybe two years, with him side by side with him so he could try to 
pick all of this up. CD1 
 
CD1’s perceptions on how a new person should be trained provide evidence that 
his approach for combating malware attacks is based on his experience and not formal 
training or education.  CD1’s desire for a one or two year shadowing shows that 
education alone could not prepare someone new to his role. CD11 also commented the 
turnovers between cyber defenders are too short.  
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When we do a turnover with a new guy we only get one day or two at most. That 
is way too short for new guys to gain the knowledge the needs for these advanced 
attacks. Ideally, we would need months of turnover so he could at least get an 
initial grasp of  how to do this. He has to be embedded in our environment for a 
while, like I said months, to get a feel for how we analyze these advanced threats. 
CD11 
 
Some of the research participants were asked about how a decision aid could 
assist in their situation assessment process for malware attacks. The consensus was that 
no aid could help them.  
I don’t think anything could help me. I think an automated system would find a lot 
of information but I think it would also miss out on a lot of information that I 
really want to see. That’s why I want to be intricately involved in the research 
process. I want to be able to make the decision to say “yeah” or “nay” to 
information as well as to the sources. CD16 
 
So many people will probably say they are so used to doing it my way, that 
nothing could help them. CD3 
 
No nothing could help me. CD4 
 
The expert cyber defenders expressed a lack of confidence in the methods they 
use to respond to malware attacks. A common theme in expert cyber defenders responses 
centered on their perception of their own lack of expertise.  
It takes more effort and more resources than we had on our ship to deal with that 
[a malware attack]. I just don’t have the expertise to deal with all of these 
malware attacks. That’s why I need to reach out to the experts. Without their help, 
I could not do this. CD4 
 
Your hope is that someone else has paid that price of time and resources first. 
Obviously others in a lab environment are better suited or in an academic 
environment.  CD3 
 
It can be really difficult to deal with these malware attacks. It is really hard to 
come up with a solid answer on them. They write this malware to get by you.  
CD7 
 
I could never find the answer all by myself. I don’t have the skills and time for all 
of these malware analyses. That’s why I go online right way to find out if others 
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have done the analysis already. The malware can be so difficult to deal with and 
is sometimes beyond my skill set. CD20 
 
The patterns that emerged from the expert cyber defenders who discussed the 
malware attack consist of the following: the expert cyber defenders showed a low level of 
insight into their judgment process, lacked methods to use including formal rules, based 
decisions on experience rather than education or training, and expressed a low confidence 
in their methods. All of these characteristics suggest that the expert cyber defenders were 
using intuitive cognition for the malware attack SA-task.  
4.4 Comparison of Overall Patterns of Information Behaviors and Cognitive Modes 
Used for Different SA-Task Types   
Patterns of information behavior and cognitive modes used for each SA-task type 
were compared across all the SA-task types (phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and 
malware attack SA-tasks) via a display of the data.  Figures 11-13 provide a visual 
comparison across case the SA-task types based on the averages of number of 
information sources used, number of external sources used, number of people used as 
sources, number of experts used as sources, and number of technical pieces of 
information used.   
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Figure 11. Information Sources and Information Types Used for the Phishing Attempt 
SA-Task 
 
Figure 12. Information Sources and Information Types Used for the Zero-Day SA-Task 
 
 
Figure 13. Information Sources and Information Types Used for the Malware Attack SA-
Task 
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Figures 11-13 displayed above suggest the following overall pattern exists - as 
SA-task complexity increased, the following increased: 
 Average number of information sources used 
 Average number of external sources used 
 Average number of people used as sources used  
 Average number of experts used 
 Average number of technical pieces of information used 
The suggested findings from the directed content analysis conducted for cognitive 
modes are displayed in Table 17 suggests that as SA-task complexity increased from the 
phishing attempt to the zero-day exploit to the malware attack SA-task, the use of 
intuitive cognition increased while the use of analytical cognition decreased.  
 
 
Table 17 
SA-Tasks and Cognitive Modes 
 
 
 
 
Overall, the directed content analysis suggests that increased SA-task complexity 
influences the information behaviors and cognitive modes used by expert cyber 
defenders. The statistical analysis conducted in the next section examines if there is a 
Phishing Attempt  
SA-Task 
Zero-Day Exploit  
SA-Task 
Malware Attack SA-Task 
Low Task Complexity Medium Task Complexity High Task Complexity 
   
Analytical Cognition Quasi-rational Cognition Intuitive Cognition 
 152 
 
significant difference between the information behaviors for the different levels of SA-
task complexity. 
4.5 Statistical Analysis of Information Behaviors  
The subsections of this section describe the statistical analysis conducted on the 
following based on descriptions provided by expert cyber defenders for the phishing 
attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks: 
 Number information sources used (Section 4.5.1)  
 Number of external information sources used (Section 4.5.2)  
 Number of people used as sources (Section 4.5.3)  
 Number of experts used as sources (Section 4.5.4) 
 Number of technical pieces of information used (Section 4.5.5)  
4.5.1 Statistical Analysis for Number of Information Sources Used  
The original counts for the Number of Information Sources Used will be used as 
an example of how original counts were transformed into categorical data tables. The 
categorical data tables were used to conduct the Freeman-Halton extension (Freeman & 
Halton, 1951) of Fisher’s Exact test  in order test for significant differences between 
categorical variables. The procedure described below was used for all categorical 
variables (Number of Information Sources Used, Number of External Sources Used, 
Number of People Used as Sources, Number of Experts Used as Sources as Sources, and 
Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used).  
The original counts for the Number of Information Sources Used for the phishing 
attempt SA-task were: 
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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The original counts for Number of Information Sources Used  for the zero-day 
exploit SA-task were:  
 
 
The original counts for the Number of Information Sources Used for the malware 
attack SA-task were: 
 
10 7 7 8 8 12 13 9 10 9 7 7 12 9 8 8 9 
 
The above original counts for the Number of Information Sources Used for the 
phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks were combined and 
sorted smallest to largest:  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 
 
 
5 5 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 12 12 13 
 
 
The data were placed into Excel and the PERCENTILE function was used to 
compute the percentiles desired (33rd and 66th percentiles) in order to form three 
categories of Low, Medium, and High for the original counts.  The 33rd percentile was 
found to be value of 2 and the 66th percentile was found to be a value of 4. Therefore, 
original counts for Number of Information Sources Used were categorized as following:  
 Low number of information sources used: less than 3 
 Medium number of information sources used: 3-4 information sources  
 High number of information sources used: greater than 4 information sources  
With the Low, Medium, and High categories defined, the researcher went back to 
the original counts of the Number of Information Sources Used to transform these 
original counts into category counts for Low, Medium, and High.  Tables 18-20 show the 
original counts for Number of Information Sources Used, the category that each original 
3 4 5 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 
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count fell into, and sum of the category counts for each type of SA-task. In the tables, 
cases are labeled as case numbers for each type of cyber attack in terms of the order they 
appeared in the interviews.  L, M, and H represent categories of Low, High, and Medium.  
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Table 18.  Number of Information Sources Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
Phishing –  
Number of 
Information 
Sources 
Used  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
Original 
Count 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 11 
Category  L L L L L L L L L 
9 L 
0 M 
0 H 
 
 
Table 89.  Number of Information Sources Used for the Zero-Day Exploit Task 
Zero-Day  - 
Number of 
Information 
Sources 
Used 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Original 
Count 3 4 5 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 42 
Category  M M H M M M M L H M M M 
1 L 
9 M 
2 H 
 
Table 20. Number of Information Sources Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Malware - 
Number of 
Information 
Sources 
Used 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
Original 
Count 10 7 7 8 8 12 13 9 10 9 7 7 12 9 8 8 9 153 
Category  H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H 
0 L 
0 M 
17 H 
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The total counts that fell into the Low, Medium, and High categories for the three types 
SA-tasks were then placed in a 3 × 3 contingency table as shown in Table 21. Contingency tables 
show the combinations of values of different categorical variables (Ruxton & Neuhäuser, 2010).  
 
 
Table 21  
Contingency Table (3 x 3) for Number of Information Sources Used and SA-Task Complexity 
Number of Information 
Sources Used 
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing 
Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day 
Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware 
Attacks) 
Low  9 1 0 
Medium  0 9 1 
High  0 2 17 
 
 
 
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test (Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used 
to determine the significant probability between relationships in the Number of Information 
Sources Used and SA-task complexity. An open-source statistical computational tool from 
Vassar College (Lowry, 2013) was used to conduct the calculations for the Freeman-Halton 
extension of Fisher’s exact test. The results of the test indicated p <0.05  (2.2e-13). Since the p-
value is less that 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and can state that there is a significant 
relationship between the Number of Information Sources Used and SA-task complexity.   
4.5.2 Statistical Analysis for Number of External Sources Used    
The original counts of the Number of External Sources Used for the phishing attempt, 
zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks were placed into Excel to determine the 
categories of Low, Medium and High. The PERCENTILE function (using 33rd and 66th 
percentiles) informed the definitions of the categories as following:  
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 Low Number of External Sources Used: less than 3 
 Medium Number of External Sources Used: 3-4 
 High Number of External Sources Used: greater 4 
With these categories defined, the researcher relabeled the original counts of the Number 
of External Sources Used as Low, Medium or High.  Tables 22-24 show the original counts for 
Number of External Sources Used, the category that each original count fell into, and sum of the 
category counts for each type of SA-task. 
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Table 9. Number of External Sources Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
Phishing – 
Number of 
External 
Sources  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
Count 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Category  L L L L L L L L L 
9 L 
0 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 23. Number of External Sources Used for the Zero-Day Exploit Task 
Zero-day  - 
Number of 
External 
Sources 
Used  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Count 3 4 5 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 42 
Category  M M H M M M M L H M M M 
1 L 
9 M 
2 H 
 
 
 
Table 10. Number of External Sources Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Malware - 
Number of 
External 
Sources  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
Count 8 4 5 5 6 9 5 6 7 5 6 5 8 6 9 5 4 103 
Category H M H H H H H H H H H H H H H H M 
0 L 
2M 
15 H 
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The total counts that fell into the Low, Medium, and High categories for the three SA-
tasks were then placed in a 3 × 3 table as shown in 25. 
 
 
Table 25  
Contingency Table (3 x 3) for Number External Sources Used and SA-Tank Complexity 
Number of External 
Sources 
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing 
Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day 
Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware 
Attacks) 
Low  9 1 0 
Medium  0 9 2 
High  0 2 15 
 
 
 
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test (Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used 
to determine the significant probability between relationships in Number of External Sources 
Used  and SA-task complexity.  The results of the test indicated that p < 0.05 (6.4e-11). Since 
the p-value is less that 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and can state that there is a significant 
relationship between the Number of External Sources Used and SA-task complexity.   
4.5.3 Statistical Analysis for Number of People Used as Sources   
The original counts of the Number of People Used as Sources for the phishing attempt, 
zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks were placed into Excel to determine the 
categories of Low, Medium and High. The PERCENTILE function (using 33rd and 66th 
percentiles) informed the definitions of the categories as following:  
 Low Number of People Used as Sources: less than 1 
 Medium Number of People Used as Sources: 1-2 
 High Number of People Used as Sources: greater than 2 
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With these categories defined, the researcher relabeled the original counts of the Number 
of People Used as Sources as sources as Low, Medium or High.  Tables 26-28 show the original 
counts for Number of People Used as Sources, the category that each original count fell into, and 
sum of the category counts for each type of SA-task.  
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Table 11. Number of People Used as Sources for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
Phishing – 
Number of 
People Used 
as Sources  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
Count 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Category  L M M L L L L L L 
7 L 
2 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 12. Number of People Used as Sources for teh Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task 
Zero-day  - 
Number of 
People Used 
as Sources 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Count 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 8 
Category  L M M M L M M M L M L M 
4 L 
8 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 13. Number of People Used as Sources for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Malware - 
Number of 
People Used 
as Sources 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
Count 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 59 
Category  H H H H H H M H H H H H H H H H H 
0 L 
1 M 
16 H 
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The total counts that fell into the Low, Medium, and High categories for the three SA-
tasks were then placed in a 3 × 3 table as shown in Table 29.   
 
 
Table 29.  
Contingency Table (3 x 3) for Number of People Used as Sources and SA-Task Complexity 
Number of External 
Sources 
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware Attacks) 
Low  7 4 0 
Medium  2 8 1 
High  0 0 16 
 
 
 
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test (Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used 
to determine the significant probability between relationships in the Number of People Used as 
Sources and SA-task complexity.  The results of the test indicated that p <0.05  (2.9e-10). Since 
the p-value is less that 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and can state that there is a significant 
relationship between the Number of People Used as Sources and SA-task complexity.   
4.5.4 Statistical Analysis for Number of Experts Used as Sources as Sources 
The original counts of the Number of Experts Used as Sources for the phishing attempt, 
zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks were placed into Excel to determine the 
categories of Low, Medium and High. The PERCENTILE function (using 33rd and 66th 
percentiles) informed the definitions of the categories as following:  
 Low Number of Experts Used as Sources: less than 1 
 Medium Number of Experts Used as Sources: 1-2 
 High Number of Experts Used as Sources: greater than 2.  
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With these categories defined, the researcher relabeled the original counts of the Number 
of Experts Used as Sources as Low, Medium or High.  Tables 30-32 show the original counts for 
Number of Experts Used as Sources, the category that each original count fell into, and sum of 
the category counts for each type of SA-task. 
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Table 30. Number of Experts Used as Sources for the Phishing Attempt SA Task 
Phishing – 
Number of 
Experts 
Used as 
Sources 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
Count 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Category  L L L L L L L L L 
9 L 
0 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 31.  Number of Experts Used as Sources for the Zero-Day Exploit Task 
Zero-day  - 
Number of 
Experts 
Used as 
Sources  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Count 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 8 
Category  L M M M L M M M L M L M 
4 L 
8 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 14. Number of Experts Used as Sources for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Malware - 
Number of 
Experts  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
Count 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 59 
Category  H H H H H H M H H H H H H H H H H 
0 L 
1 M 
16 H 
  
 
 
165 
 
 
The total counts that fell into the Low, Medium, and High categories for the three SA-
tasks were then placed in a 3 × 3 table as shown in Table 33.   
 
 
Table 33.  
Contingency Table (3 x 3) for NUmberof Experts Used as Sources and SA-Task Complexity 
Number of Experts Used 
as Sources as Sources  
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing 
Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day 
Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware 
Attacks) 
Low  9 4 0 
Medium  0 8 1 
High  0 0 16 
 
 
 
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test (Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used 
to determine the significant probability between relationships in Number of Experts Used as 
Sources and the SA-task complexity. The results of the test indicated that p <0.05 (3.1e-11). 
Since the p-value is less that 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and can state that there is a 
significant relationship between the Number of Experts Used as Sources and SA-task 
complexity.   
4.5.5 Statistical Analysis for Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used 
The original counts of the Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used for the 
phishing attempt, zero-day exploit, and malware attack SA-tasks were placed into Excel to 
determine the categories of Low, Medium and High. The PERCENTILE function (using 33rd 
and 66th percentiles) informed the definitions of the categories as following:  
 Low Number Technical Pieces of Information Used: less than 6 
 Medium Number Technical Pieces of Information Used: 6-10 
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 High Number Technical Pieces of Information Used: greater than 10 
With these categories defined, the researcher relabeled the original counts of Number 
Technical Pieces of Information Used as Low, Medium or High.  Tables 34-36 show the original 
counts for Number Technical Pieces of Information Used, the category that each original count 
fell into, and sum of the category counts for each type of SA-task. 
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Table 15. Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used for the Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
Phishing – 
Number of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Information  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
Count 3 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 26 
Category  L L L L L L L L L 
9 L 
0 M 
0 H 
 
 
 
Table 35. Number of Technical Pieces of Information used for the Zero-Day Exploit Task 
Zero-day  - 
Number of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Information 
Used  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Count 7 6 5 6 8 9 7 7 6 6 5 4 76 
Category  M M L M M M M L H M L L 
4 L 
7 M 
1 H 
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Table 16. Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task 
Malware - 
Number of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Information  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
Count 14 12 11 12 13 15 16 14 14 19 8 12 12 11 14 9 9 215 
Category  H H H H H H H H H H M H H H H M M 
0 L 
3 M 
14 H 
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The total counts that fell into the Low, Medium, and High categories for each type of SA-
task were then placed in a 3 × 3 table as shown in Table 37. 
 
 
Table 37.  
Contingency Table (3 x 3) for Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used and SA-Task 
Complexity 
Number of Technical 
Pieces of Information 
Used  
Low SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Phishing 
Attempts) 
Medium SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Zero-Day 
Exploits) 
High SA-Task 
Complexity 
(Malware 
Attacks) 
Low  9 4 0 
Medium  0 7 3 
High  0 1 14 
 
 
 
The Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test (Freeman & Halton, 1951) was used 
to determine the significant probability between relationships in Number of Technical Pieces of 
Information Used and SA-task complexity. The results of the test indicated that  p <0.05  (2.50E-
09). Since the p-value is less that 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis and can state that there is a 
significant relationship between the Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used and SA-
task complexity.  
4.5.6 Summary of Statistical Analyses for Information Behaviors  
For each variable (Number of Information Sources Used, Number of External Sources 
Used, Number of People Used as Sources, Number of Experts Used as Sources as Sources, and 
Number of Technical Pieces of Information Used), the original counts were transformed into 
categories of Low, Medium and High. The category counts were then placed into 3 × 3 
contingency tables to conduct the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test to test the 
significant probability for relationships between the categorical variables and SA-task 
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complexity. The decision to accept or reject the null hypothesis was based on the following (Gall 
et al., 2007): 
 If the p-value is greater than 0.05, we accept the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relationship between categorical variables 
 If p-value is less than or equal to 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis in that there is a 
significant relationship between categorical variables.  
The results of the tests are summarized in Table 38.  
 
 
Table 38  
Summary of Fisher-Freeman-Halton Exact Test Probabilities 
Information Behavior Variable 
Freeman-Halton extension of 
Fisher’s exact test (p value) 
Significant Relationship Exists 
between Information-Behavior 
Variable and SA-Task 
Complexity? (Y/N) 
Number of Information 
Sources Used 
p < 0.05 Yes 
Number of External Sources 
Used 
p < 0.05 Yes 
Number of Peoples Used as  
Sources  
p < 0.05 Yes 
Number of External Experts 
Used as Sources 
p < 0.05 Yes 
Number of Technical Pieces 
of Information Used  
p < 0.05 Yes 
 
 
 
As Table 38 shows, a significant relationship was found between the information 
behavior variables under study and SA-task complexity.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
5.1 Summary of the Findings   
The purpose of this dissertation research was to test the theoretical propositions of LIS 
task-complexity research and the CCT in the context of cyber situation assessment. A multiple-
cases study design was selected as the research design for this dissertation research.  CDM 
served as the basis of semi-structured interviews conducted with 21 expert cyber defenders from 
small defense companies. In response to interview questions, the expert cyber defenders 
provided their accounts of how they formed situation assessments of phishing attempts, zero-day 
exploits, and malware attacks resulting in a total of 38 attacks (cases) being discussed.   
Based on a directed content analysis approach, coding categories for this dissertation 
research were derived from LIS task-complexity research and NDM research including the RPD 
Model and the CCT. The dissertation researcher tested for intercoder reliability on the coding 
categories resulting in acceptable levels for all categories (Cohen Kapp coefficients  > 0.80).  
The analysis showed that forming situation assessments of phishing attempts represented a SA-
task with low task complexity, forming situation assessments of zero-day exploits represented 
medium SA-task complexity, and forming situation assessments of malware attacks represented 
high SA-task complexity.  The frequencies of number of information sources, number of external 
sources number of people used as sources, number of experts, and number of technical pieces of 
information were tracked and then used for statistical analysis. A summary and discussion of the 
results are provided below.  
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5.1.1Task Complexity and Information Behaviors  
Based on directed content analysis and statistical analysis using the Freeman-Halton 
extension of the Fisher exact test, the findings of this dissertation research suggest the following 
in regards to information behaviors: 
For expert cyber defenders, as SA-task complexity increased: 
Finding 1. The number of information sources used increased 
Finding 2. The number of external sources used increased 
Finding 3. The number of people use as sources increased 
Finding 4. The number of experts used as sources increased 
Finding 5. The use of task-based technical information increased 
Findings 1-4 support theoretical propositions posed in previous LIS task-complexity 
research. More specifically, Findings 1-4 align with findings from several empirical studies on 
task complexity and information studies (Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Byström, 2002; Culnan, 
1983; Daft & Macintosh, 1981; Pinelli et al., 1993; Tiamiyu, 1992; Zeffane & Gul, 1993) 
This is significant because it shows how several theoretical propositions of LIS research 
on task complexity and information seeking (derived from non-NDM contexts) hold in a NDM 
context with high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty.  
Finding 5 represents a difference from previous theoretical propositions posed in 
previous LIS task-complexity research. Previous LIS task-complexity research, posited that as 
task complexity increases the use of domain and problem solving information increases 
(Byström & Järvelin, 1995; Byström, 2002; Culnan, 1983). However, this dissertation research 
suggests in the cyber defense context, a NDM context, as task complexity increased the use of 
task-based technical information increased and not the use of domain and problem solving 
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information. In fact, none of the expert cyber defenders discussed the use of any domain and 
problem solving information. The difference in context of the professionals under study in this 
dissertation research and the contexts examined in previous LIS task-complexity research may 
explain this difference. For example, in previous LIS task-complexity research, the studies 
focuses on experts in non-NDM contexts such as municipal administrators (Byström, 2002), civil 
servants (Byström, 2002), and professionals conducting environment scanning in large 
corporations (Culnan, 1983).  
The LIS task-complexity contexts mark a difference from contexts focused on in NDM 
studies such as Navy ship and submarine warfare. Previous NDM situation assessment studies 
showed that experts, when faced with tasks of high complexity, sought technical information 
(Kirschenbaum, 1992; Pliske et al., 2004) and only sought information on the task at hand rather 
than domain or problem solving information (Kaempf et al., 1996; R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; 
Serfaty et al., 1997) .  As an example,  Kirschenbaum (2001) found that expert submarine 
decision maker sought data focused on the changing direction, speed, and/or depth of unknown 
contacts rather than how to go about detecting contacts. Also, NDM situation assessment 
research suggests that experts in NDM contexts are focused at the threat at hand as in the case of 
enemy submarines or air threats  rather than trying to learn how to complete the task (Kaempf et 
al., 1996). Perhaps during downtime, when the experts are not facing a situation with high stakes, 
high time pressure, and high uncertainty, the experts would seek more domain and problem 
solving information as in the case of training purposes.   
5.1.2 Task Complexity and Cognitive Modes Used  
The dissertation findings on cognitive modes suggest the following: 
For expert cyber defenders, as SA-task complexity increased. 
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Finding 6. The use of intuitive cognition increased  
This finding on cognitive modes used supports theoretical propositions from NDM 
research (the RPD and the CCT). Both the RPD and CCT posited that as task complexity 
increases the use of intuitive cognition increases (Hammond et al., 1997; Klein, 1993). In this 
dissertation research, for the tasks with low complexity (forming a situation assessment of 
phishing attempts), the expert cyber defenders used more analytical cognition. When faced with 
tasks of high complexity (forming a situation assessment of malware attacks), the experts used 
more intuitive cognition.  Additionally, for with a medium level of complexity (forming a 
situation assessment of zero-day exploits), the expert cyber defenders use quasi-rational 
cognition, a mix of intuitive and analytical cognition. The connection of low task complexity 
with analytical cognition, middle task complexity with quasi-rational cognition, and high task 
complexity with intuitive cognition all support previous findings of other CCT studies (Dowding 
et al., 2009; Dunwoody et al., 2000; Hammond et al., 1997). This suggests that theoretical 
propositions from CCT hold in the domain of forming cyber situation assessments.  
Also, Finding 5 relates to previous situation assessment research that stated experts use 
schemas, that are based on experience, for information seeking in NDM contexts.  Previous 
NDM situation assessment research stated that experts develop schemas based on years of 
experience (R. Lipshitz & Shaul, 1997; David F. Noble et al., 1986) indicating that schemas are 
not formal checklists or procedures followed by experts. This dissertation research provides 
initial empirical evidence to support these NDM situation assessment conceptualizations.  
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5.1.3 Limitations of the Dissertation Research 
One of the limitations of the study included the lack of generalizability of the results. The 
only professionals interviewed for this dissertation research consisted of expert cyber defenders 
who work for small defense companies. Caution must be placed on generalizing the results to 
other types of small companies as each company holds its own context, which will influence 
behaviors.  
Another limitation of the dissertation research consists of relying solely on the research 
participants’ accounts of their actions when forming situation assessments. Due to the 
confidentiality of cyber defense, the research participants may have not shared all of the steps 
that they took when forming situation assessments. Therefore, the dissertation researcher cannot 
claim that the findings represent the absolute truth of how the expert cyber defenders formed 
situation assessments of various cyber attacks.  
Finally, although the dissertation researcher’s familiarity with NDM situation assessment 
contexts (such as Navy ship warfare) helped form an understanding of the expert cyber 
defenders’ information behaviors and cognitive modes used, the dissertations researcher’s 
familiarity may have also introduced bias into the study.   
 
5.2  Significance of the Dissertation Research  
 
The findings of this dissertation research lead to three unexpected concepts:  
 When using intuition, the expert cyber defenders sought a lot of information rather than 
just relying on their “gut feelings.”  
176 
 
 Rather than following a step-by-step, linear process to form a situation assessment in a 
high stakes domain with severe consequences, the expert cyber defenders followed a non-
linear process. 
 In a domain considered to be highly confidential, the expert cyber defenders relied 
heavily on informal collaboration and the use of unofficial sources of information.  
Each of these is described in more detail.  
Typically when one thinks of experts using intuition to complete a task one may think that 
the experts only rely on their “gut feeling” and their expertise without the need for seeking any 
additional information. However, this dissertation research shows that when the experts relied 
heavily on intuition they also sought a lot of information. The reason that the expert cyber 
defenders seek a lot of information when using their intuition may be due to the complexity of 
the cyber attacks. Each cyber attack is unique and contains an abundance of cues that need to be 
evaluated by the expert cyber defenders to determine if an attack is taking place.  Given that each 
attack is unique as well as highly deceptive, the expert cyber defenders cannot recognize an 
attack as completely similar to a previous attack. Therefore, the expert cyber defenders use their 
intuition to determine areas to investigate in a network and seek information to see if their 
intuition is correct.  
 
In a high stakes domain in which cyber attacks occur on a regular basis, it was expected that 
the expert cyber defenders would follow step-by-step methods in forming situation assessments 
However, the dissertation findings suggest that the expert cyber defenders followed a non-linear 
approach. As stated above, each cyber attack is unique and contains an abundance of cues to 
evaluate. Therefore, it may not be feasible to follow a step-by-step approach when forming 
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situation assessments of complex cyber attacks. This is significant for training because it shows 
that training that promotes step-by-step procedures for detecting and analyzing cyber attacks may 
not be suitable for the real-world environment of cyber defense. The findings suggest that cyber 
professionals should be trained on recognizing patterns in cues and on how to form situation 
assessments across a variety of situations.  
Another unexpected concept derived from the findings consists of the observation that 
although the expert cyber defenders work in a highly confidential domain with barriers to 
information sharing, the expert cyber defenders relied heavily on informal collaboration and 
unofficial information sources authored by peers. The dissertation findings suggest that expert 
cyber defenders consider collaboration and peer-authored sources to be critical for forming 
situation assessments of cyber attacks. The collaborative relationships are built up over time 
based how expert cyber defenders evaluate the author of a source as well as the information 
provided by the source.  Additionally, the expert cyber defenders have to evaluate whether or not 
to trust an information source as well as the creator of the source since cyber attackers often 
create deceptive information sources.  More research is needed to examine how cyber defenders 
evaluate the credibility of sources and the authors of the sources.  
Overall, these findings will lead to more research in the relationship of increased information 
seeking and the use of intuition, how to elicit and use tacit knowledge of information seeking, 
and examining the trust and evaluative nature of information seeking in domains with high 
stakes, high time pressure and high uncertainty.  
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5.3 Implications  
5.3.1 Implications for LIS Research 
The findings of this dissertation research contribute to the demonstrating the application 
of LIS research to other fields as in the case of NDM situation assessment research. NDM 
situation assessment research showed the importance of information seeking in contexts with 
high stakes, high time pressure, and high uncertainty. However, there lacked a solid foundation 
for examining the information behaviors and a lack of consistency in methods used. As shown in 
this dissertation research, LIS professional information seeking models can be applied to 
professional contexts outside of education and academia. Furthermore, this dissertation research 
shows that information seeking is a key componenUt of cyber defense and may present an 
opportunity for an LIS education focus. For example, none of the expert cyber defenders said 
that they were trained on finding and evaluating information sources. Additionally, several of the 
cyber defenders said that novices have a hard time keep track of the information sources that 
they used for research new cyber attacks.  This presents an opportunity for LIS educators to 
explore the role of LIS in professional settings as in case of intelligence analysis. For example, 
the types of skills that LIS educators teacher including identifying, retrieving and evaluating 
information are all important in intelligence analysis.  
5.3.2  Implications for Cyber Defense Training  
The findings of this dissertation research suggest that expert cyber defenders used 
intuitive cognition when forming situation assessments of complex cyber attacks. NDM research 
has shown that forming a situation assessment is critical for decision making in NDM contexts. 
Cohen et al. (1994) stated that it is important to understand the process of performing a situation 
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assessment so it can be taught and performed well. However, none of the expert cyber defenders 
stated any formal training or education that they received for forming situation assessments. 
Current cyber security training methods that focus on instructor-led classroom training do 
not address the realistic challenges faced by cyber defenders. These current training systems 
focus on rational decision making or deliberate, step-by-step decision making. However, cyber 
defense falls into the area NDM that focuses on intuitive decision making when facing the real-
world challenges similar to ones faced by cyber defenders. A virtual cyber security training 
system that is based on the NDM approach can better train cyber defenders. 
An approach that can support the virtual training of novices in forming situation 
assessments consists of the Event-Based Approach to Training (EBAT)  (Oser et al., 1999). 
EBAT focuses on scenario-based training in simulated environments. The EBAT approach has 
been used to develop training programs in other NDM contexts including the Combat 
Information Centers (CICs) on Navy ships, air coordination training, and multi-service 
distributed teams. This approach suggests that training novices, such as novice cyber defenders, 
should not consist only of lecture based training. Rather scenario based training that provides 
realistic content and naturalistic conditions (high time pressure, high stakes, and high 
uncertainty) should be used to develop situation assessment skills. 
Additionally, training on situation assessment skills should also focus on collaboration. 
All of the expert cyber defenders stated the importance of collaborating with or reviewing the 
information provided by others especially when facing complex attacks. However, they all stated 
that this was something that was not taught to them and something they did not practice in their 
formal training. Rather training consisted of them responding to attacks with no opportunity for 
communication with others.  
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5.3.3 Implications for System Design  
The results from this dissertation research can also provide suggestions to information 
system designers who design tools for cyber defenders.  When forming situation assessments of 
complex attacks, the expert cyber defenders stated the need to search online and to communicate 
with external experts. Many expert cyber defenders stated they used online forums, blogs, instant 
messaging, chat, and telephone calls. However, none of the expert cyber defenders stated that 
they used a secure, collaborative information sharing space to work with and communicate with 
fellow experts. A secure, collaborative information sharing space may support the information 
seeking of cyber defenders. Examples of features that could be used included in a collaborative 
sharing system include collaborative tagging of information sources, automatic evaluation of 
information sources, methods for sharing different levels of confidential information, and storage 
of information sources used for documentation and for later research.  
Additionally, a system that allows expert cyber defenders to share confidential 
information in a secure way (such as stripping a company’s identifying information) would be 
beneficial to expert cyber defenders.  
5.4 Suggestions for Future Research  
This dissertation research provided an in depth understanding of the information 
behaviors and cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders when forming situation 
assessments of different cyber attacks. However, future research is needed to confirm the 
findings. For example, this dissertation research focused solely on retrospective interview 
techniques; additional data collection techniques such as survey, laboratory studies with 
simulations or observational studies would also confirm the findings.  
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To increase the transferability of the findings, further research is needed to examine the 
information behaviors and cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders in small businesses 
outside of the DoD domain. Additional research is needed to examine the information behaviors 
and cognitive modes used by expert cyber defenders in larger organizations. This would allow 
the examination of team processes in information seeking and cognition.  
Additional research is needed to examine the information seeking and cognitive 
processes used by novice cyber defenders when forming situation assessments of the same type 
of attacks examined in this dissertation research. By using the focusing on the same types of 
attacks and using the same research design in this dissertation research, we could examine 
whether there are differences that have been found in previous NDM situation assessment studies 
that compared the information seeking of novices and experts (Kirschenbaum, 1992; R. Lipshitz 
& Shaul, 1997; Serfaty et al., 1997; Waag & Bell, 1997).  
One thing that is not certain in this dissertation research is whether or not the expert cyber 
defenders successfully defended against the cyber attacks discussed. Although the research 
participants have an average of 11 years of experience, cyber attacks are complex and are created 
to bypass IDS as well as the skills of cyber defenders. Therefore, even though intuitive cognition 
was used to combat the complex attacks, it does not mean that it was the correct way. For 
example, in another CCT study, Offredy, Kendall, and Goodman (2008) showed that when nurse 
medication prescribers lack expertise in facing a certain task, they switched from using  
analytical cognition to using intuitive cognition. Many of the expert cyber defenders felt like 
they could not handle all of the cyber attacks as well as the complexity of cyber attacks. More 
research is needed to evaluate responses of expert cyber defenders to complex cyber attacks.  
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Additionally, this dissertation research only investigated the work practices of expert 
cyber defenders at the task level. However, more research is needed to focus on more dimensions 
of the expert cyber defenders’ work domain. Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) provides a 
framework for examining the work domain, the actors in the domain, and the interactions 
between these two.  Under the CWA perspective, human-information interaction is guided by 
goals which can be explicit or implicit, personal or organizational, stable or situational. (Fidel et 
al., 2004). Additionally, CWA focuses on the work actors do, their information behaviors, the 
context in which they work, and the reasons for their actions as well as the complex interactions 
between all of these aspects (Fidel & Pejtersen, 2004).  Therefore CWA provides a more robust 
framework for examining the work of cyber defenders than the CDM which only focused on the 
task level.   
 
Overall, cyber defense is a domain full of high stakes, high uncertainty, and high time 
pressure. This dissertation researched showed that for the most complex attacks, intuitive 
decision making and high information processing are used by expert cyber defenders to defend 
our nations’ critical national security assets against cyber attacks. More training, tools, and 
understanding of the actual practices used by expert cyber defenders can better protect our nation 
against cyber attacks.  
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Appendix B. Interview Protocol 
 
 
 
 
Introductions—provide a brief description of the project and its goals—describe how the 
information we are collecting will be used to develop an understanding of how expert cyber 
defenders conduct research in response to cyber incidents. 
.   
Before the interview starts, complete the following tasks: confirm that the interview is being 
recorded and tell participant that he/she can stop the interview and/or recording at anytime as 
well has have an opportunity to review the transcript of the interview. 
 
The following questions are to be used as guidance—the interviewee should be allowed to share 
his/her ideas with minimal interruptions.  
 
 
General Questions  
 
How long have you worked in cyber security?  
 
What is your educational background?  
 
What is job title?  
 
 
Critical Decision Questions:   
 
1.  Can you think of recent time in which you had to  a cyber attack that required your expertise 
to conduct research about it? 
 (If the interviewee cites more than one, try to pick the one that the interviewee felt was the most 
challenging to review.) 
 
 
2. Please describe this specific time in detail, from moment the incident was brought to your 
attention until situation was resolved (As the interviewee is telling his or her story, create a 
sequence of steps that were taken.)  
 
 
3. Based on the account that you just told me, I created a sequence of steps that were taken. Here 
is how I understand the sequence: (describe the sequence that was created based on the response 
given in the previous question.) Are there any changes that I should make on this sequence?  
 
4. For each step, I am going to ask you some questions to learn more about what you were 
looking for, why you took this step, and what you found in each step.  For each step ask all or 
some of the following:  
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2) What were you seeing at this time?  
 
3) What information did you use in making this decision, and how was it obtained? 
 
4) Were you reminded of any previous experience? 
 
5) What were you specific goals at this time or what were you looking for at this time? 
 
6) What other courses of action were considered by or available to you? 
 
7) How was this step elected/other steps not taken? What rule was being followed?  
 
8) What specific training or experience was necessary or helpful in making this decision?  
 
9) If this step was challenging, what training, knowledge, or information could have helped? 
 
10) How much time pressure was involved in making this decision? 
 
11) How would a novice make a mistake in this step? 
 
Now, move onto the subsequent steps and ask these same questions. 
 
After discussing the final step, ask the participant if he or she would mind discussing another 
type of cyber attacksuch as a malware attack, a zero-day exploit or a phishing attempt. If so, 
follow the above steps again.  
 
 
Thank the interviewee for his or her time. Encourage follow-up emails if the interviewee 
remembers something else that he/she wants to tell or has additional questions about the study. 
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Appendix C. Recruitment Email  
 
 
 
 
Dear ____________, 
My name is Thomas Heverin and I am PhD student at the College of Information Science 
and Technology at Drexel University based in Philadelphia. I am conducting a research 
study* on how cyber security professionals research new cyber attacks.  The purpose of 
this study is to understand how cyber security professionals going about researching new 
attacks.    
 
I would like to request your assistance with the research by participating in a telephone 
interview. The interview will take approximately 30 minutes. I will ask some questions 
about the research processes you use. Any information you share will be useful for the 
research study. Note that your information and company information will not be shared in 
any report written about this study.  
 
If you are interested in participating in this study, learning more about this study or if you 
have any questions please respond to me at this email address th424@drexel.edu. Thank 
you for your time.   
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Thomas Heverin   
 
College of Information Science & Technology  
3141 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104 
Th424@drexel.edu 
 
*This research is conducted under the supervision of Dr. Lisl Zach of Drexel University, 
lisl@drexel.edu, 215-895-2476 
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Appendix D. Task Complexity Coding 
 
 
 
 
This appendix provides a description of how the coding for task complexity was derived 
from previous studies.  
The category of “a priori determinability of inputs”  
MacMullin and Taylor (1984) stated that that simple tasks consist of the “Initial State 
Understood” characteristic in which the interrelationships among contributing factors are 
understood to some degree or completely  while complex tasks consist of the “Initial State Not 
Understood” characteristic in which the interrelationships among contributing factors are not 
understood.  Byström and Järvelin (1995) consider simple tasks to hold a high degree of a priori 
determinability of inputs (the inputs can be a priori determined) while complex tasks do not (the 
inputs cannot be a priori determined). Leckie et al.  (1996) stated that for simple tasks, 
information needs are anticipated while for complex tasks, the information needs are unexpected.   
From the Task Continuum Index – Task Decomposition - Hammond et al.  (1997) stated 
that asimple task holds a priori task decomposition while a complex task consists of a posteriori 
task decomposition.  
Coding of tasks with low complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states he or she knows the types of initial inputs that he or she 
will see for the cyber attack. 
 The inputs have a clear value. 
 The expert cyber defender can immediately make a determination that a cyber attack is 
taking place based on the initial inputs.  
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Coding of tasks with high complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states he or she does not know the exact types of initial inputs 
that he or she will see for the cyber attack. 
 The inputs do not have a clear value and require additional work to decipher the value. 
 The expert cyber defender cannot immediately make a determination that a cyber attack 
is taking place.  
The category of “a priori determinability of outcomes”  
MacMullin and Taylor (1984) stated that from their list of problem dimensions simple 
tasks consist of the “Simple” characteristic, in which the path from initial statement to solution is 
easily defined.  Complex task consists of the “Complex” characteristic, in which the path from 
initial statement to solution is not easily defined. Byström and Järvelin (1995) consider simple 
tasks to hold a high degree of a priori determinability of outcomes (the outcomes can be a priori 
determined) while complex tasks do not (the outcomes cannot be a priori determined).  
From the Task Continuum Index – Outcome Accuracy- Hammond et al.  (1997) stated 
that for a simple task, the outcomes are known and high accuracy is likely. For a complex task, 
the outcomes are unknown and high accuracy is unlikely.  
Coding of tasks with low complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states that specific outcomes are known or that the 
possible outcomes are known.  
Coding of tasks with high complexity 
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 The expert cyber defender states that specific outcomes are unknown or that he or 
she does not know the possible outcomes.   
The category of “level of task variety”  
MacMullin and Taylor (1984) stated that from their list of problem dimensions simple 
tasks consist of the “Familiar Pattern” characteristics in which problems are procedural. 
Complex task consists of the “New Pattern” characteristic, in which problems are non-
procedural.   Leckie et al. (1996) stated that for simple tasks information needs are known and 
recurring while for complex tasks, the information needs are new and unpredictable.  From the 
Task Continuum Index – Task Content - Hammond et al.  (1997) stated that for a simple task, the 
content consists of familiar task content. For a complex task, the content consists of unfamiliar 
content.   
Coding of tasks with low complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states that the pattern of the cyber attack or the pattern 
of response is predictable.  
 The cyber attack does not cause any surprises nor does it offer unpredictable 
events.  
Coding of tasks with high complexity  
 The expert cyber defender states that there is no predictable pattern to follow.  
 The cyber attack offers surprises or unpredictable events.  
 The expert cyber defender states that actions need to change based on unforeseen 
changes in the cyber attack.  
The category of “level of risk” was derived from the following:  
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MacMullin and Taylor (1984) stated that from their list of problem dimensions simple 
tasks simple tasks consist of the “Risk Not Great” characteristic which means that the 
consequences of failure are low. Complex tasks consist of the “Risk Great” characteristic which 
means that the consequences of failure are high. Klein (2008) stated that simple tasks consists of 
low stakes while complex tasks consist of high stakes.  
Coding of tasks with low complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states that the cyber attack has low consequences due 
to the nature of the cyber attack or due to the actions taken by the expert.  
Coding of tasks with high complexity  
 The expert cyber defender states that the cyber attack has high consequences. 
 The expert cyber defender expresses concern over consequences because of 
inability to resolve attack.   
The category of “level of time pressure” was derived from the following:  
Hammond et al. (1997) and Klein (2008) stated that simple tasks consist of low time 
pressure while complex tasks consist of high time pressure.  
Coding of tasks with low complexity 
 The expert cyber defender states that he or she does not face time pressure or that 
the time pressure is low.   
 The expert cyber defender can delay response for over a day.  
Coding of tasks with high complexity  
 The expert cyber defender states that he or she faces high time pressure. 
 The expert cyber defender feels compelled to respond immediately.  
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Appendix E. Cognitive Modes Coding 
 
 
 
 
This appendix provides details of the coding for each category of analytical and intuitive 
cognition.  
 
The category of “insight into the judgment process” was derived from the following:  
 The use of analytical cognition is evidenced by a “…step by step, logically defensible 
process of problem solving”  (Hammond, 1980, p. 8). The use of intuitive cognition is evidenced 
by  a process that is completed “…without the use of a conscious, logically defensible, step by 
step process.” (Hammond, 1980, p. 8).  
Coding for analytical cognition in use   
 The expert cyber defender states that he or she follows specific steps in sequential 
order.  
 The expert cyber defender is able to easily recollect the steps that he or she took 
to research a cyber attack.  
Coding for intuitive cognition in use 
 The expert cyber defender uses phrases such as “I use my judgment” or “You 
develop a sense about how to” or “I just know” or “It is intuitive.”   
 The expert cyber defender has a difficult time in describing steps taken or bases of 
steps.  
The category of “level of methods or rules used” was derived from the following:  
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If an individual states that he or she used prescribed methods or rules, this represents the 
use of analytical cognition (Hamm, 1988a; Hammond, 1980). When an individual states her or 
she did not use any defined methods or rules, this represents the use of intuitive cognition.  
Coding for analytical cognition in use   
 The expert cyber defender mentions a specific checklist he or she uses or 
procedures that he or she follows. 
Coding for intuitive cognition in use 
 The expert cyber defender states that he or she does not use a checklist or follows 
any named procedures.  
The category of “basis of decision” was derived from the following:  
For the basis of decision, if the individual stated he or she made decision on his or her 
experience, then this represents the use of intuitive cognition; if a user stated he or she used 
specific training or education, then this represents the use of analytical cognition (Hamm, 
1988a). 
Coding for analytical cognition in use   
 The expert cyber defender mentions specific training or education he or she uses 
or principles that he or she uses.  
Coding for intuitive cognition in use 
 The expert cyber defender does not cite specific training or education used.  
 The expert cyber defender states process was learned over time or just on the job.  
The category of “confidence in method” was derived from the following: 
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 Confidence in method refers to the individual’s level of confidence in how he or she 
completed the task. The use of analytical cognition is associated with high confidence in method 
and intuitive cognition is associated with low confidence in method (Hammond, 1980). 
Coding for analytical cognition in use   
 The expert cyber defender states that he or she is confident in methods used to 
research the cyber attack.  
 The expert cyber defender uses phrases such as “I am sure” or “I know how to” or 
uses a quantitative measure to express confidence in methods.  
Coding for intuitive cognition in use 
 The expert cyber defender does not express confidence in the methods he or she 
used to resolve the cyber attack.  
 He or she explicitly states that he or she lacks the expertise, tools or knowledge to 
resolve the cyber attack.  
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Appendix F. Freeman-Halton Extension Calculation Procedure 
 
 
 
 
From - http://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc3/calc.aspx?id=59 
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Appendix G. Frequencies of Information Sources and Types Used for the  
Phishing Attempt SA-Task 
 
 
 
 
Phishing –  
Information 
Sources/Types 
Used  
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  Total  
 
 
 
Avg. 
Number of 
Sources 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 11 
 
 
1.2 
Number of 
External 
Sources   0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
0.1 
Number of 
people used as 
sources  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 
0.2 
Number of 
experts used as 
sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.0 
Number of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Information  3 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 26 
 
2.9 
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Appendix H. Frequencies of Information Sources and Types Used for the  
Zero-Day Exploit SA-Task 
 
 
 
 
Zero-Day  
Information 
Sources/Types 
Used 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 Total  
Average 
Number of 
Sources 3 4 5 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 42 
3.5 
Number of 
External 
Sources   3 4 5 3 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 3 42 
3.5 
Number of 
people used as 
sources  0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 8 
0.7 
Number of 
Expert as 
Sources 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 8 
0.7 
Number of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Information  7 6 5 6 8 9 7 7 6 6 5 4 76 
6.3 
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Appendix I. Frequencies of Information Sources and Types Used for the Malware Attack SA-Task   
 
 
 
 
Malware 
Info 
Sources/
Types 
Used 
Case 
1 
Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8  
Case 
9  
Case 
10  
Case 
11 
Case 
12 
Case 
13 
Case 
14 
Case 
15 
Case 
16 
Case 
17 Total  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Avg 
Number 
of 
Sources 10 7 7 8 8 12 13 9 10 9 7 7 12 9 8 8 9 153 
9.0 
Number 
of 
External 
Sources   8 4 5 5 6 9 5 6 7 5 6 5 8 6 6 5 4 103 
5.9 
 
Number 
of people 
used as 
sources  4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 59 
3.5 
Number 
of Expert 
as 
Sources 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 59 
3.5 
Number 
of 
Technical 
Pieces of 
Informati
on  14 12 11 12 13 15 16 14 14 19 8 12 12 11 14 9 9 215 
12.6 
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